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Abstract
In this paper, I study the effect of risk-free rate shocks on firms that are exposed
to interest rate risk. To examine their influence on the firms’ investment behaviours,
I define an interest rate exposure, which is measured by the total floating debt, so
that the impact of interest rate shocks on firms can be measured by the product of
the interest rate exposure and the change in the interest rate. Using the Compustat
data from 1974-2012 and the US annual fundamental financial data, I firstly find
that the firms, which are exposed more to interest, have more sensitive cash flows
of interest payments and retained earnings. Secondly, I find that exposed firms’
investment behaviours are sensitive to the interest rate shocks as well: the higher
the exposure to interest rate risk, the more the firms would react to interest rate
shocks. Furthermore, I show that financially constrained or high-leverage firms are
more sensitive to interest rate shocks than financially non-constrained or low-leverage
ones. Interestingly, I find that the fact that firms have different reactions to the
interest rate shocks of different signs also works for R&D policies. Finally, I show
that the model structure changes a lot after the 2008 financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
What determines the firm’s investment level? This question has been mainly studied by
using microdata and starts to be studied more and more with macro factors. According
to the classical theory, at the firm level, a higher interest rate induces directly a higher
unit cost of capital for debted firms, which will affect negatively the investment level of
firms. Meanwhile, for the banks exposed more to interest rate variations, the higher the
interest rate, the more they want to lend (Landier, Sraer, & Thesmar 2013 Table 6). With
more capital resources available to firms, a higher interest rate can induce an increase in
investment. These two facts lead to our interest to study more carefully the impact of
the risk-free rate variations on firms’ investment levels. In other words, we are studying
how firms’ investment decisions are affected by the interest rate shocks when they have
different degrees of exposure to the interest rate. A lot of economists agree that, at least in
the short run, that firm’s activities are significantly influenced by the monetary policy in
the course of the real economy. In 1963 Friedman and Schwartz found that the monetary
policy actions are followed by movements in real output that may last for two years or
more.
The direct effects of a change in the interest rate are transmitted not only through the
resulting increase in the user cost of capital but also through the exacerbation of financial
constraints: an increase in policy rates is reflected in larger interest payments, hence a
worsening of the firm’s cash flow, and in a decrease in the value of assets that could be
used as collateral for new loans (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)). Furthermore,
the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy on sales can affect investment decisions
both directly (as sales enter the neoclassical demand for capital) and indirectly through
their effect on the cash flows. In this paper, I mainly study this exogenous macro cash-
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flow shocks on firms’ investment policies. Do firms have to tighten their investments
when these shocks come? Lamont(1990) and Rauh(2006) show that firms’ investments
are sensitive to cash flow shocks. From Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) we could
know that financially constrained firms are more sensitive to cash flow shocks.
Besides the macro factors described above, we still have to consider the micro factors
of firms which can have significant effects on firm levels so as to control the sensitivity of
firms’ investments. These micro facts have been studied a lot by the previous researcher
and we will consider them as the control variables in this paper.
When interest rate increases, the risk management manager would start to be active.
The increased interest rate could possibly increase the risk of default if firms depend on
bank loans. Then firms would possibly cut their long-term debt or the total debt amount
which could have an indirect effect on investments. Fridson et al. (1997) exclusively focus
on the correlation between real interest rate and default rate. Using Moody’s quarterly
default rate on high-yield bonds from 1971-1995, they find a weak positive correlation
between default rate and nominal interest rates, a moderate positive correlation between
default rates and real interest rate, and a strong positive correlation between default rate
and lagged 2-year real interest rate. They argue that the interest rate level is the basis
of the cost of capital. When the interest rate is high, the firm must generate a higher
rate of return in order to survive. If the cost of capital is higher than the rate of return,
the firm would run into financial insolvency or bankruptcy. This indicates that there
is a positive relationship between the default rate and real interest rates. Meanwhile,
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) develop a simple approach to valuing risky corporate debt
that incorporates both default and interest rate risk, and test its empirical implications.
Using the changes in the 30-year Treasury bond yield and the changes in the bond yield
using Moody’s corporate bond database from 1977- 1992, they find a negative correlation
between the two across combinations of industries and rating categories. For example, a
100 basis point increase in the 30-year Treasury yield reduces Baa-rated Utility industry
2
credit spreads by 62.6 basis point.
Hayashi (1982) proved the Q-theory of investment that Tobin’s Q, Market value/book
value, is positively correlated to investment. According to maximum profits program of
firms, the higher the marginal benefits (Tonbin’s Q) from the investment, the more the
investor want to invest. So we are expecting this factor will have a positive sign with the
investment. Firms that pay no dividend demonstrate a higher sensitivity of investment
to cash flows, which suggests that investment-cash flow sensitivity reflects the tighter
liquidity constraints faced by these firms (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988). Lang,
Ofek, and Stulz (1996) argue that investment should be negatively related to leverage
because high leverage reduces the current funds available for investment and affects the
firm’s ability to raise additional funds due to reasons discussed by Myers (1977) and
Jensen and Meckling (1976). They provide evidence that for firms with unattractive
growth opportunities investment is significantly negatively related to leverage. For the
size of firms, Audretsch & Elston (2000) indicate that medium-sized firms appear to be
more constrained by liquidity in their investment behaviour than either the smallest or
largest firms.
Using all these controls, I am focusing on the impact of interest risk-free rate shocks
on 9830 US firms using Compustat annual data from 1974 to 2012 in this paper. I
find evidence that monetary policy affects significantly investments through the variation
of the risk-free interest rate. Also, the measure of exposure to interest rate has the
power of prediction on investment changes. I show that the way interest shocks affects
investment differs across types of firms and across time. Financially constrained firms and
the ones with a large ratio of leverage are in overall more sensitive to interest shocks than
financially non-constrained firms and low leverage firms; with particularly a faster answer
to monetary policy changes. Moreover, I find that when investment is financed by long-
term floating debts, firms have consistent investment policies responding to interest shocks,
i.e., when there is a positive shock, the growth of total investment is more aggressive; when
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there is a negative shock, the growth of investment decreases. Finally, I find that patterns
change after the last financial crisis.
I will structure the rest of the paper in this following way. In section 2, I present the
evolutions of monetary policies and investment in the US. Section 3 describes data sets,
the variables and the composition of the groups I realized. Section 4 specifies the main
model and shows the empirical results. Section 5 discusses possible problems and way for
further studies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy and Investment: Stylized Facts in
the US
2.1 The US Interest Rate
How is the US interest rate determined? As defined in the Federal Reserve Act, the
US Congress assigned three objectives to the monetary policy: full employment, the
stability of prices and not too high long-term interest rate. To attain these objectives,
the Federal Reserve use different instruments in the open market operations, such as
adjusting the level of treasury securities, the discount window and the reserve requirement
of commercial banks. These operations aim at manipulating the short-term interest rate
and the money base so as to make an influence on the rate at which commercial banks
lend to their clients. The Interest rate is cyclical and also a result of a fine tuning trade-off
between potentially opposite objectives (full employment and low inflation as stated by
the standard relationship in the Phillips’ curve). As shown in Figure 1, it was set to be
high in 1978-1982 due to a need for controlling excess inflation following the second oil
peak. On the contrary, it is set to be low to revitalize the economy when unemployment
is high, as in the last period since 2008.
The 1979-1982 monetary policy aimed at controlling an inflation which lasted over
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one decade and peaked at 13% in 1981. The FED new chairman Paul Volcker increased
the interest rate up to 20% in June 1981. Also, because it was politically impossible
to further adjust the interest rate too sharply and fast, the FED entered in an active
targeting policy on banks’ reserve requirements (Meulendyke, 1998). As a result, inflation
sharply dropped to 3% in 2 years, with the prices of an unemployment rate larger than
10% and an economic recession. An expansion started again after the end of 1982 and the
inflation was controlled then by continuously targeting the monetary base until the end
of the 1980s. Nevertheless, a long-term impact persists in the US economy and is even
recognized by some scholars as a major cause of the saving and loans crisis in the 1980s
and 1990s (Bodie, 2006).
The 1990s correspond to the longest expansion in the US. However, this period turned
also to be difficult for the monetary policy, which had to fight the inflation following the
stock price crisis of October 1987, decrease the fed funds rate in the recession of the early
1990s and stabilize it in the long boom of 1994-99. The burst of the internet bubble
and the sharp decrease in investment then made the authorities obliged to decrease the
interest rate again to fight against recession and maintained it as a low level even when
the expansion came back (Goodfriend, 2002). Recently, the sub-prime crisis forced the
FED to reduce its interest rate further, almost closed to 0, and even to use nonstandard
instruments such as quantitative easing.
2.2 The US Investment
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the US investment, which is increasing over time with
some small fluctuations. The first decrease occurred during the period 1979-1982, in which
the US interest rate also decreased at the same time aiming at diminishing the inflation. In
the period of expansion starting from the end of 1982, the investment stopped decreasing
but maintained a relatively stable level, which might be due to the inflation shock in the
previous period. During this time, even a decreased interest rate could not dramatically
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boost the economy. Only after 1986 did the investment start to increase very slowly until
2001. It appears that the economic expansion that began in 2001 drew to a close in
2007; at the beginning of this period policy maker reduced the interest rate in the first
several years and made a tax cut at the same time. From 2004, the US started to adopt
a tightening policy and increased the interest rate, while the investment still went up
until 2007 and then dropped down after the end of 2007. During these years, the total
investment responded slowly to the monetary policies. The short-term interest became
close to zero after 2008 and the investment started to increase after 2009.
Although the level of total investment is sensitive to the changes in interest rate to
some extent, how the monetary policy affects a firm’s investment decisions is not fully
clear. Firms would like to expand their investment when they face good opportunities
(good market expectations) and are able to obtain financial resources. On the one hand,
from the perspective of opportunities, Tobin Q, which generally measures the investment
opportunities for firms, is one of the main factors considered by firms; sale growth could
be used as a major signal of market expansion; macroeconomic information could be in-
corporated into investors’ market expectations. On the other hand, from the perspective
of financial resources, cash available and debt ratio, which exert a direct effect on interest
payment and an indirect effect on solvency, could also affect the firms’ investment de-
cisions. To better understand what determines the firm’s level of investment, both two
channels need to be thoroughly discussed.
2.3 Investment and Risk Management
From the view of a firm’s investment manager, the variations of interest rate could affect
its investment decisions through the two main channels. Firstly, the change of interest rate
could transfer some exact macroeconomic information to the firm. Secondly, the change
of interest rate could affect the firm’s level of investment through making an influence on
the financial resources it can obtain. For example, an increase in the interest rate could
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make investor have good predictions of economics while at the same increase the cost of
capital.
Meanwhile, from the view of a firm’s risk manager, an increase of interest rate would
increase the risk of default, so the firm would like to decrease the level of debt or cut the
investment to control the default risk. Moody’s Analytics (2009) empirically examines
the relationship between interest rates and default risks using firm-level corporate default
data in the United States between 1982 and 2008. They find significant negative contem-
poraneous correlations between the changes in short-term interest rates and aggregate
default rates, with a particularly strong relationship around financial crises. It implies
that positive interest shocks could make firms become more aggressive on investment.
3 Data and Descriptive statistics
In this section, I first describe the data used and definitions of interest rate shocks in
subsection 3.1, and then discuss how to measure firms’ exposures to interest rate risk in
subsection 3.2. Subsection 3.3 discusses the construction of our sub-samples on financially
constrained or non-constrained firms and high-leverage or low-leverage firms.
3.1 Data Construction
3.1.1 Firm-level Data
I use annual fundamental data of North American firms available in Compustat from
WRDS, which covers the period 1974-2012. I restrict my analysis to non-financial firms
in the US to isolate the effect of monetary policy within one country. Financial firms are
not taken into account since the effect of interest rate shocks on them will be different.
The data of US firms is used for its advantage of being complete for the whole period
of time considered. I also exclude the bottom 3% and the upper 97% of the sample in
the data to avoid the outliers. From this data, I construct a set of dependent variables
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and controls variables. The details of the construction of these variables are presented in
Appendix I and the summary statistics in Table 1.
Two classes of dependent variables are used. The first is a set of investment-related
variables: an investment ratio, defined as the change of investment between t and t-1
divided by the total assets of the last period, and a dummy variable for the firms making
some acquisitions. We expect that they will be negatively correlated with the shocks of
the interest rate. The second is a set of three dependents variables related to the firms’
cash flows and market values: the yearly change in interest payments, retained earnings
and market values, all of which are scaled down by total assets. I use the second set of
dependent variables to check whether the measure of impact on firms from interest rate
shocks is valid or not.
As shown in the Table 1, the change of retained earnings has a negative mean, which is
closed to its 25th percentile. The dummy for acquisition has 0 value at the 75th percentile,
which means that I have only a few observations of acquisitions in this sample. I use two
control variables that I present in Table 1. First, to limit endogeneity problems, I consider
the lag on the investment ratio. Second, I consider the cash held by the firm in period
t and in period t-1 and the tangibility (Property, Plant and Equipment Net). The three
are normalized by total assets of the last period. Also, I take market leverage, the Tobin
Q (market value over book value) at period t and t-1 and the sale growth of firms. All
these control variables are conventionally used in the literature as the other determinants
of firms’ investment. Interestingly for the leverage, I find a mean around 0.24 while the
p- 25% value is of only 0.024.
3.1.2 Interest Rate Data and the Definition of Interest Rate Shocks
There are several valid proxies for the risk-free rate in the existed studies (Tobin, &
Golub, (1998) page 16). The return on domestically held short-dated government bonds is
normally perceived as a good proxy for the risk-free rate. However, it is only theoretically
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correct if there is no perceived risk of default associated with the bond. Meanwhile,
another proxy for the risk-free rate is the inter-bank lending rate: fed funds rate. 1
In this paper, I first use the time series of both monthly and annual fed funds rate from
1974-2012 as a measure of the risk-free rate from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
system2 . When using annual rates, I take the rate observed in December of each year. In
the end, I will also look at whether the changes of long-term 10-year interest rate would
affect the firms’ investment levels. I find that the monthly fed funds rate has a similar
value and variations as the annual interest rate. Following Landier, Sraer&Thesmars
(2013), I use the realized change in fed funds rate to estimate the natural interest shocks
for firms, defined as ∆rt = rt − rt−1.
Secondly, I use the one-year zero-coupon yields for the same period as risk-free rates
from Federal Fund Reserve 3. Furthermore, I will use the two-year maturity government
bonds’ annual returns to construct the unexpected interest shocks, defined as εt, in the
following way: Suppose that the one-year zero-coupon rate r
(1)
t is the risk-free rate at time
t. Meanwhile, firms could also make an expectation of r
(1)
t at time t−1 conditional on the
information at time t− 1, denoted as Et−1(r
(1)
t ). Suppose that the annual return rate of a
2-year maturity zero-coupon bond at time t− 1 is r
(2)
t−1. From the no-arbitrage condition:
(1 + r
(1)
t−1)(1 + Et−1(r
(1)
t )) = (1 + r
(2)
t−1)
2
1In the United States, the federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions actively
trade balances held at the Federal Reserve, called federal funds, with each other, usually overnight, on
an uncollateralized basis. Institutions with surplus balances in their accounts lend those balances to
institutions in need of larger balances. The interest rate that the borrowing bank pays to the lending
bank to borrow the funds is negotiated between the two banks, and the weighted average of this rate
across all such transactions is the federal funds effective rate. The federal funds target rate is determined
by a meeting of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee .
2From the Table Federal funds (effective). http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
3From the Table The U.S. Treasury Yield Curve. http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/
200628/200628abs.html
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firms know that
Et−1(r
(1)
t ) = (1 + r
(2)
t−1)
2/(1 + rt−1
(1))− 1.
Then the interest rate shocks for firms at period t can be obtained as εt = r
(1)
t −Et−1(r
(1)
t ).
In this paper, I mainly use ∆rt as the interet rate shocks and then verify the main
results by using the unexpected interest shocks εt.
3.2 Firms’ Exposures to Interest Rate Risk
In most empirical work based on panel data, the user cost of capital is not included in
investment functions. Generally, it is assumed to be the same for all firms (a transfor-
mation of the interest rate) and its effect is accounted by the time dummies. While this
approach makes it possible to obtain a consistent estimation of the remaining parameters,
it sheds no light on the effect of monetary policy. In order to directly estimate the effect of
monetary policy on firm-level investment, Ber, Blass and Yosha (2000) proxy the user cost
of capital with the short-term rate and omit time dummies from the regression. However,
this approach can result in biased estimations and is particularly problematic if the time
dimension of the sample is limited.
From the firms’ capital structure, we know that firms can borrow short-term debts
and long-term debts, where short term debts’ borrowing rates are directly affected by the
current risk-free rate. At the same time, firms may borrow long-term floating debts whose
interest payments depend on the current borrowing interest rate. Therefore, firms can be
directly affected by the monetary policy through the capital structure by affecting the
cash flows of interest payments. Therefore, I use the change of cash flows to represent the
effect of interest rate shocks on firms through the cash channel, which has also been used
by Mishkin &Eakins (2009).
According to Chava and Purnanandam (2006), the total floating debt is the sum of
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the short-term debt and long-term floating debt:
Total floating debt = DLC +DLTP
where DLC (in Compustat) is the total amount of short-term debts (due in one year) and
DLTP represents the total amount of long-term debts, of which the interest rate fluctuates
with the prime interest rate. This item includes any long-term debt tied to a fluctuating
or floating rate. The interest payments on both debts depend on the current interest
rate. From the definition above, I know that total floating debt measures the extent to
which a firm’s interest payments are sensitive to the changes of interest rate paid. If
interest rate paid increases, the borrowing cost also increases for firms. The changes of
interest payment could be measured by total floating debt × change of borrowing rate.
We know that the interest rate paid by the company can be modeled as the risk-free rate
plus a risk premium, which itself incorporates a probable rate of default (and amount of
recovery given default). Therefore, I can use total floating debt, scaled down by the total
assets in the last period, to measure the extent of firms’ exposures to the risk-free rate
variations: exposurei,t−1 = total floating debti,t−1/total assetsi,t−1. Following Mishkin
and Eakin (2009), I measure the effect of changes in short-term risk-free rate on firms by
calculating: exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt.
Besides, I also take into account the effect of lag one interest rate changes (∆rt−1) by
exposurei,t−1×∆rt−1, which measures the firms’ exposures to the last period’s short-term
interest rate variations. At the same time, in order to account for the individual effects of
∆rt−1 and total floating debt (that will disturb the effect of exposurei,t−1×∆rt), I control
in my regressions the level of ∆rt, ∆rt−1 and exposurei,t−1. Table 2 presents the summary
statistics of debt levels and changes of risk-free rate.
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3.3 Grouping on Firms’ Financial Constraints and Leverage
Will interest rate shocks have the homogeneous effect on financially constrained firms
and financially non-constrained firms? In the literature, several measures of financial
constraints have been proposed. One approach is to use a proxy to measure it. Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Peteresen (1988) propose dividend payout as a proxy for financial constraint
while Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use the size of the firm, with the idea that the bigger
the firm, the less likely it can experience some cash constraints. Another approach is
to construct some index. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) construct a KZ index, using the
estimates from the Probit model of investment on the five factors (cash flows, cash stock,
Tobin Q, leverage and dividends). Whited and Wu (2006) propose to modify their index
by using factors as cash flow, positive dividends, long-term debt, the log of assets, the
industry sales growth and the sale growth of the company. The first three are scaled down
by the assets of the firm. In this paper, I choose to use the generic one, KZ index, and
present the details on how to construct it in the appendix.
Giroud and Mueller (2012) classify a firm as financially constrained if its KZ index
larger than the median of the sample. However, they also mention that empirical studies
using Compustat data typically classify about 30% to 40% of firms as financially con-
strained, which would thus need a slightly adjustment of the cutoff value below or above
the median. In this paper, to avoid a blurred adjustment on the cutoff value when differ-
entiating financially constrained firms from non-constrained ones, I choose to only keep
the firms in my sample whose KZ index is above the 75th percentile and classify them as
financially constrained, and keep the firms whose KZ index is below the 25th percentile
and classify them as financially non-constrained.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the KZ index and the factors used to con-
struct it. The mean of KZ is a negative and its standard deviation is relatively large.
According to my classification, the firm whose KZ index is smaller than -4.4 (25th per-
centile) is treated as financially non-constrained and the firm whose KZ index is larger
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than 0.89 (75th percentile) is treated as financially constrained.
I also group firms by their levels of market leverage in the analysis to take into account
potential heterogeneous effects. Several literatures have investigated the relationship be-
tween firms’ values or levels of investment with the leverage, but the result is inconclusive.
McConnell and Servaes (1995) examine a large sample of non-financial US firms for the
years 1976-1988. Through separating their sample into two groups: those with strong
growth opportunities and those with weak growth opportunities, they show that the firms’
value is negatively correlated with the leverage of firms with strong growth opportunities
(indicated by high Tobin’s Q), and positively correlated with the leverage of firms with
weak growth opportunities (or low Tobin’s Q). Lang et al. (1996) analyze a large sample of
US industrial firms over the period 1970-1989 and find a strong negative relation between
leverage and subsequent investment, but only for firms with weak growth opportunities
(with Tobin’s Q less than one). Again, their results are consistent with the hypothesis that
leverage attenuates incentives to invest in poor projects. In this paper, I define the firms
with market leverage less than 0.024 (25th pecentile) as the low-leverage group and the
firms with market leverage larger than 0.41 (75th pecentile) as the high-leverage group.
.
4 Empirical results
In this section, I present the empirical results of the effects of interest rate shocks on firms’
investment decisions. In the first sub-section, I verify the validity of the independent
variable that I constructed by studying the effect of exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt on firms’ cash
flows of interest payments and market values. Then, I investigate the effect of risk-free rate
variations on the changes of interest payments, retained earnings and firms’ market values.
Since the changes of interest rate could have a direct effect on the changes of expenses
which influence directly on net earnings, we could examine the effect of exposurei,t−1×∆rt
on retained earnings to verify the validation of measure of interest rate risk exposure.
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Then, I study how the change of short-term interest rate affects investment decisions
made by the firms that are exposed to interest rate risk, which is the main result I am
looking for in this paper. I use the changes of investment from t-1 to t, scaled down by
total assets, as the dependent variables to represent the firms’ reactions to the changes
of short-term interest rate. The evidence that firms’ investments are sensitive to cash
flows has been found in a few literatures (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and
Kaplan & Zingales(1997)). Thus, theoretically, the change of risk-free interest rate could
affect the investment through the cash flows of interest payments. Furthermore, I also
investigate the reactions of R&D, a main part of investment, to the change of interest rate
shocks as a robustness check.
4.1 Cash flows & firm values respond to Interest rate shocks
Firstly, I check the sensitivity of cash flows (interest payments and retained earnings) and
firm values to interest rate exposure. If interest risk exposure affects cash flows or firm
values, then it could serve as a valid measure of interest risk. Following Kashyyap and
Stein (1995, 2000) and Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2013), I consider a linear specification
in the following way:
(∆Yi,t/Ai,t−1) = β0 + β1 · exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt + β2 · exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1
+ γ1 · (∆Yi,t−1/Ai,t−1) + γ2 · exposurei,t−1 + γ3 ·∆rt + γ4 ·∆rt−1
+ γ˜ ·Xi,t + yt + vi + ui,t (1)
where for firm i at time t, Yi,t represents the firms’ interest payments, retained earnings
or market values, Xi,t represents other control variable mentioned earlier. I also control
the yearly effect and the firms’ fixed effect by yt and vi.
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4.1.1 Interest payment and interest rate shocks
When the interest payments are used as dependent variable, since their level are also
determined by the level of debt and the borrowing cost, I add the leverage ratio in the
model (1) as another control variable. Furthermore, I also add control variables for the
factors that could affect the borrowing rate of firms: return on asset (ROA), size of firm
(lsize) and cash, etc.
From Table 2-A, we see that if the exposure to interest risk is higher, firms will have
a higher changes in the interest payments if there is shock in the interest rate. Both
coefficients on exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt and exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt−1 are significantly positive.
For each extra unit of exposurei,t−1, an increase of ∆rt will increase the interest payment
more by 0.127∆rt, while an increase of ∆rt−1 will increase the interest payment even more
by 0.380∆rt−1. The results show that the level of total floating-rate debts indeed affects
the firms’ exposure to interest rate shocks.
The second column and third column of Table 2 show the result when firms are grouped
into the financially constrained or non-constrained. For each extra unit of exposurei,t−1,
a contemporary increase of ∆rt will increase the interest payment more for the financially
constrained firms than the financially non-constrained (0.137 vs. 0.0872), while a increase
of ∆rt−1 in the last period will increase the current interest payment slightly less for the
financially constrained firms than the financially non-constrained (0.382 vs. 0.404).
Consistent with empirical studies (Frank & Goyal, 2002), firms with higher ROA will
have lower leverage ratio; and so a negative correlation between with interest payment. If
in the last period firms have higher available cash, they should have a lower leverage ratio
and a lower interest payment: this confirm our negative coefficient of lag-one cash. A
higher leverage ratio means that if firms increase one more unit of leverage ratio, interest
payment would increase 0.00899 units. This implies a higher marginal cost of borrowing
for high leverage ratio firms.
Also, in Table 2-B, I propose to distinguish between negative (∆rt < 0 ) and positive
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shocks (∆rt >0) of interest rate so as to see if we obtain some symmetric results or
not. The first three columns present the negative interest rate shocks, while in the last
three columns we look at positive interest shocks. Both of these two shocks give the same
positive signs of a short term impact on interest payment: higher exposure to interest rate,
higher sensitivity of interest payments. In other words, when the shocks are negative, the
more firms are exposed to interest risk free rate, the more the interest payments are
cut; when shocks are positive, the increase of interest payment is higher for firms with
higher floating debts. From the “constrained” and “non-constrained “columns, we see that
whatever the sign of the shocks, constrained firms cash flows are much more sensitive to
the impact of interest shocks. When there is a negative shock, an increase of 1 unit of
floating interest payment (exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt) lead to a two period-cumulative decrease
of interest payment by 0.61 for constrained firms while only 0.341 for non-constrained
firms.
Overall, we confirm that the exposurei,t−1×∆rt could measure the impact of interest
shocks on firms’ cash flows. When firms are exposed more to interest rate, firms cash
flows are more sensitive to interest shocks. So exposure\times\bigtriangleup r_{t}. is a
reasonable measure to capture the impact of interest shocks of interest risk exposed firms
.
4.1.2 Earnings & market values and interest shocks
Now, I check the influence of interest shocks on firm values: retained earnings and market
values. Using the equation (1) above, I control leverage, sale growth, tangibility, cash
which are all scaled down by total assets.
Table 3 reports the results of interest rate shocks on retained earnings, which is the
difference of t and t-1 scaled down by total asset. Columns (1)-(3) present the results
for the whole sample, non-constrained group and constrained group. The first columns
tells that when exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt increase by 1 dollar, then the retained earnings will
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decrease by -0.944 for next period which is significant at 1% level. While for the current
period it will be cut by 0.183 with 0.30 p-values. This show us that retained earnings are
negatively sensitive to the past interest rate shocks which has one strong direct intuition:
when firms are highly exposed to interest rate shocks, a higher interest rate shock could
lead to higher interest payment (confirmed in table 2-A); a higher the interest expense
could cut down the net earning which could have a negative effect on current and next
period retained earnings.
While for non-constrained firms, when the exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt increases, the retained
earnings increase by 0.996 at 10% significant level. This is contrary to constrained firms
which would have a negative impact on retained earnings. From this result, we could know
that when policy makers increase interest rate, constrained firms are negatively shocked on
retained earnings while non-constrained firms improve their increase of retained earnings.
Therefore, when exposed to interest risk, constrained firms retained earnings have different
sensitivity to interest shocks than non-constrained firms.
Furthermore, we could see from the different sign of interest shocks could have differ-
ent impact on firms earnings. When the shock is positive, only constrained firms have
a negative and significant response to the increase of interest shocks. In other words,
constrained firms who are exposed more to interest rate risk are more sensitive to inter-
est rate shocks; and the sign is consistent with different shocks. While financially non-
constrained firms are less responsive to interest shocks compared to financially constrained
firms, and they have a different response to interest shocks. For negative shocks, non-
constrained and constrained firms earnings are negatively correlated to exposurei,t−1×∆rt
and exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1.
Similarly as retained earnings, market value which is presented in Table 4 is defined
as the difference of market value from t to t-1 scaled down by total assets. We find
that the coefficients of exposure×∆r (when without time notations means including the
current and past interest rate changes’ effects) are negative and significant for the whole
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sample. It shows that market values of firms exposed to interest rate risk are sensitive to
interest shocks: when interest rate increase firm market values increase less. The higher
the exposure to interest risk, the more the market value will decrease when interest rate
increase. Meanwhile, we find that, when it is a positive shock, all the firms’ market
values are less responsiveness to the change of interest rate. In other words, when the
macroeconomics goes up, market values of firm are not sensitive to the increase of interest
rate shocks. While when it’s a negative shock, policy maker are trying to stimulate the
economy by decreasing the interest rate. Nevertheless, both constrained firms and non-
financially constrained firms’ market values are negatively sensitive to the shocks. In other
words, the decrease of r could make the market value of firms increase less.
Moreover, the measure of exposure extentexposurei,t−1 is positive correlated with the
increase of market value; i.e., when the floating debt ratio increases; it could concentrate
on the increase of market values. As explained by the pecking order theory, debt financial
resources transfer more positive information’s than equity finances.
In a word, this sub-section proves that floating debt is a good measure of the extent of
exposure to interest rate risk for firms;exposure×∆r measures the impact of interest rate
shocks on firms cash and firms income value level. Even though, we measure the impact
of interest rate only through the cash flow channel. But at least, it could capture the
sensitivity of firm’s income or cash flows to interest rate risk. Also, generally speaking,
financially constrained firms who are more exposed to interest rate risk are more sensitive
to interest rate shocks. Finally, negative shocks have generally more important effects
than positive shocks.
These results allow us to anticipate what will be the impact of an interest shock on
firm’s investments. When the interest rate decreases, cash flows and the firm value in-
crease. We can expect from that an increase of investment. We can think that this
increase will be larger for constrained firms than for non-constrained ones. On the oppo-
site, a positive shock will also have some effects, but smaller ones and only on constrained
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firms. We verify these intuitions in section 4.2.
4.2 Investment policy respond to interest cash-flow shocks
The level of investments of firms is mainly affected by the firm’s own characteristics.
Therefore we should control the fixed effect of firms to avoid that endogeneity problems
affect our coefficient. Furthermore, firms face different investment opportunities at differ-
ent time. For example, firms invested more before 2008 and invested much less after. At
each specific year, firms have various investment policies according to the macro environ-
ment and firms development plans.
I use the same model as equation (1) but withYi,t standing for investment. In this
model, in addition to the general factors of equation (1), I also consider the Cash and
Tobin’s Q and their lags which could have a direct effect on the current investment level.
From Hayashi (1982) we know that we can use the average Tobin Q to represent the
marginal Tobin’s Q which is representing the investment opportunities for firms. There-
fore, at t-1 if firms had good investment opportunities, then they would have a good
prospect on the future market. They therefore are tending to increase the investment
level at the current period. This idea is supported by Aivazian, Ge Qiu (2005). While
for the lag of cash, the higher the cash available at t-1; the higher the ability to invest
for firms. So, when firms have good projects and available cash, they will increase their
investment. Therefore, we could expect a positive sign for the Tobin Q and the cash.
Here, I find in overall as expected a negative reaction of firm investment to shocks
of interest rate: a variation of exposure × ∆rt by one unit slows down significantly the
change of investment by 0,165 units (first colunm in table 5 in Appendix I). The shock is
nevertheless not completely symmetric. Indeed, a decrease of the interest rate will cause
an increase of investment (one unit of increase of exposure×∆rt will decrease investment
by 0.162). On the contrary, an increase of interest rate will also increase investment with
even a larger impact (one unit of increase of exposure × ∆rt will increase investment
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by 0.585). When the interest rate increases and the cost of capital increase, this could
decrease investment. But at the same time, an increase of the FED fund rate accompanied
an economic upturn and this second effect is a stronger impact than the first one. I propose
now to study the difference of the impact for constrained and non-constrained firms.
4.2.1 A differenct impact between financially non-constrained and constrained
firms
As I describe in the section 3.3, I split the sample into a constrained group and a non-
constrained group according to the KZ index. I find a negative relation between KZ and
the investment level of firms (see more details in Table II-1). The negative and significant
size of KZ confirms the fact that when firms have financial constraints, everything else
being equal, they will decrease their investment. So will the financially constrained firm
be more sensitive to the change of interest rate? If it’s true then policy maker could adjust
their policies according to the categories of firms to validate the fiscal policies.
From Table 5, If we look at the non-constrained firms only (column 2) , the impact
is not significant suggesting that non constrained firms respond little to policy changes
compared to an average firm. Indeed, if some good investment opportunities present to
them, because they own cash, they can still invest. At the opposite, other firms decrease
significantly their investments when the interest rate increases. This adjustment is 20%
larger than for the whole sample.
If I look at negative shocks (the last three columns),it is showed that a decrease of
the interest rate is coming with an increase of investment for constrained firms. Indeed,
we can interpret this decrease of the interest rate as a loosening of the constraint they
are facing, which allow at least for some of them to invest more. For non-constrained
firms, the impact is not significant. Turning to positive shocks, for the whole sample, the
impact of this increase of interest rate is not significant. This insignificant results implies
that when the economics goes up the positive shocks of interest couldn’t really affect the
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investments of firms.
4.2.2 High leveraged VS low leveraged
Since leverage is an important characteristic of firms, I look at potential differences be-
tween low leverage ones and high leverage ones. Therefore, I split the group according to
the level of leverage. I take the lower 25% quantile of market leverage as the low leverage
group and the upper 75% quantile of leverage as the high leverage group.
I find that firms with a high leverage ratio significantly decrease their investments when
interest rate increase (the coefficient ofexposure ×∆rt is of -0.122), while the relation is
not significant for non-constrained firms (see Table 6 column 2). When focusing only on
negative shocks, I find that a financially constrained firm with a high leverage seeing a
decrease of the interest rate, if exposure×∆rt increase 1 dollar, investment will increase
by 0.774 dollar at a significant level 1% (see the last column in Table 6)
Therefore, as expected, I find some similar pattern between the groups of constrained
vs non-constrained firms as for the group of firms by their levels of leverage. While the
size of the effect of a negative shock is approximately the same for the firms that I defined
as constrained and the I have defined as with a high leverage (-0.356 vs -0.353), the size
of the impact is 50% when we deal with a positive shock for high leverage firms compared
to non-constrained (0.744 vs. 0.574).
4.2.3 Before and after 2008: Are the reactions the same in the years following
the financial crisis?
From figure 2 we observe that the average of total investment experienced a large decrease
around 2008 when the financial crisis occurred. It is also interesting to look at the impact
of the 2008 financial crisis on our relationship (Table 7).
If we are looking at the impact for the whole sample, before the crisis, we confirmed the
negative relation between investment and an increase of the interest rate. After the crisis,
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the effect of the current interest rate is no more significant but we keep a negative impact
of the variation of the interest rate from the previous year (appearing in exposure×∆rt−1).
Nevertheless, the interesting point is that while non-constrained firms did not respond to
interest shocks before the crisis, they now react also negatively and at the same level than
constrained firms (a variation of one unit ofexposure × ∆rt−1 decrease the investment
of 0.501 of non-constrained firms and of 0.562 of constrained firms). This finding would
advocate that while in general, investment is largely impacted by the characteristics of
firms, investment in a period of crisis as since 2008 is mainly impact by the state of the
macroeconomic conjuncture.
4.2.4 Why firms are exposed to interest rate variations?
Table 10 and table 11, they show the interest shocks impact only through short-term debt
or long-term floating debt. Firstly, these two tables confirms that constrained firms are
more sensitive to interest shocks than non-financially constrained firms whatever the signs
of shocks. Secondly, it shows that both longpayment and shortpayment could help to ex-
plain well when shocks are negative. Remain that longpayment = (DLTPi,t/ATi,t−1)×∆rt
,shortpayment = (DLC/ATi,t−1) ×∆rtwhich replace the exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt , the total
measure of exposure to interest rate risk. Thirdly, when there are positive shocks; only
short-term debt could explain well the change investment policy. In other word, the
interest shocks impact the investment decisions mainly through short-term debt chan-
nel. Fourthly, we could find that non-constrained firm’s investment policies have no any
negative relationships with interest shocks. This confirms that policy makers couldn’t
effectively affect financially non-constrained firms’ investment behaviors through interest
adjustments. Finally, compare the two tables, we could know that when positive shocks
comes, firm’s with more short-term debts will be significantly affected by shocks than
firms’ with long-term floating debts. While financially constrained firms’ with more long-
term floating debts are always negatively reacting to interest shocks. So this long-term
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debts are the consistent part which helps to exercise the monetary policies.
4.2.5 R&D epensen and interest shocks
R&D expense is an important part of expense aiming at the developpment of companies
which is not treated as an investment in accounting ; this item is very sensitive to cash
flows. So we could study the sensitivity of this item to check the responses of firms’
behaviors after interest shocks. As in Table 5, we present the changes of R&D scaled down
by total assets as the dependent variable. From this table, we could find that constrained
firms’ R&D expenses are more sensitive to interest shocks; especially sensitive to the past
period’s shocks. We can learn that, financially constrained firms are negatively correlated
to the interest shocks; the more the financially constrained firms are exposed to interest
rate, the higher sensitivity of R&D to interest cash-flow shocks. Finally, it confirms us
again that financially non-constrained firms are not sensitive to interest shocks.
4.3 Comparisons With the Unexpected interest shocks
For some pubic firms who have a good magane level could predict well next period’s
interest rate. In this case, they could adjust their investment lelve before the change
of interest rate. This could have an endogeneous problems for the model. In order to
identify the exo shocks from interest rate. We will use the unexpected shocks to replcae
the first shocks defined in section 3. If we use the definition (2) of interest shocks in
section 3.1.2, we can do the same regressions as with the rchange (∆rt). First stage,
we check the validation of interest rate risk exposure measure exposurei,t−1 × εt, now,
the unexpected interest shock is εt=rt
(1)
−Et−1(rt
(1)). From Table II-2 & Table II-3, we
could conclude that firms who have floating debts are more sensitive to interest shocks.
The higher the floating debts firms have, the more cash flows will be affected by the exo
cash-flow shocks of interest adjustments. And we could find that retained earnings are
overall negative correlated to the impact of interest ratee, this shows a higher sensitivity
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of retained earnings to interest shocks than the previous one in Table 3.
The interesting one we are looking at is the changes of investments or R&D changes,
as the previous shocks; firms who have higher floating long-term debts will negatively
react to the past interest rate shocks, i.e., when the there was a positive interest shocks,
financially constrained firms who have more floating debts would cut 0.467 units of R&D
expenses. Non-constrained firms would not be sensitive to this interest changes. And
for firms who own more short-term debts have no the same reactions to the changes of
interest rates. But it confirms that constrained firms are more sensitive to the interest
shocks than those who are not.
5 Possible problems and Further Studies
As many financial data papers, there are endogenous problems for financial firm data.
The first problem is Omitted variables: I am using the cash and salegr, TobinQ to predict
the increase of investment; meanwhile, the error term which could contain the unknown
variables could affect the explainable variables and dependent variable at the same time.
Look at figure 5 (Appendix I), we could find a strong business cycle effect of investment;
which are strongly affected by the trend of macro economics. The second problem is: the
measure of the exposure to interest rate is noisy; I am measuring the effect through the
change of interest payment on total floating debt. While there are about 1/4 of firms
who only have a low leverage ratio around 0.026 which means a lot firm haven’t affected
by the monetary policy through the debt interest payment channel; maybe through other
channels. Third, the interest cash-flow shocks are real interest rate; it is treated as an
exogenous shock for firms while the real interest-rate paid of firms is consisted by risk free
rate and risk premium. So it’s better to islolate the cash-flow shocks of risk-free rate by
controlling risk-premium cash-flow shocks at the same time.
In this paper, we are trying to use year effects and the instrument variables of interest
rate changes to explain part of the macro variables which are changing across time. How-
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ever, these couldn’t all explain the cycle macro effects on the investment. Even though
it is difficult to eliminate this problem; we could still find some solutions to lighten this
problem. One possible way is to use less periods but larger sample size of panel data,
this kind of sample construction could lessen the time variance macro variable effects.
Another possible way is to consider more represented macro variables, such as the overall
US Stock index which could predict well the whole economic trends.
We could continue to study whether firms who are buying the interest rate derivatives
to against the interest rate risk would response less to the interest rate changes. Because
the hedge of interest rate risk could make firms less affected by the monetary policies;
therefore we could expect a small coefficient absolute value and less significant values
from those firms. It could be interesting point to examine. If it’s the case, then the
transmission of monetary policy can be obstructed. The third way is to search for possible
better instrument: we could further analysis the main determinants of change of floating
debt and the change of interest rate, and then we could specify the effect of interest rate
on the debt changes. Like that, we could find a much exacter and less noisy measure of
exposure to interest rate changes.
6 Conclusion
When using the annual financial data of non-financial firms in US from 1974-2012, I
fond evidence that monetary policy affects significantly investment through the interest
cash-flow shocks and that often the measure of exposure to interest rate has power of
prediction on investment changes. I measured the exposure to interest variations of firms
by total floating debts which is sensitive to interest rate changes. I used exposurei,t×△rt
(floatingdebt × interest rate changes) , the cash-flow shocks, to capture the effect of
interest rate shocks on firms. From the overall of this paper, it is showed that firms’
investment policies respond significantly to the interest cash-flow shocks.
Also, I found that the way interest risk-free rate shocks affect investment differs across
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types of firms and across time. In general, treated firms (highly exposed to interest rate
risk ), answer to an increase in interest rate by slowing down their investments increases.
However, treated financially constrained firms are in overall more sensitive to the interest
cash-flow changes than financially non-constrained firms; with particularly a faster answer
to interest changes. In other words, an negative interest cash-flow shock could decrease
the firms’ investments’ increment in next year. I also found a similar pattern when looking
at firms which differ in terms of their level of leverage ratio. Indeed, high leverage ratio
firms are found to be more sensitive to interest rate changes than low leverage ratio firms.
Moreover, I found that when investment is financed more by short term debts rather
than long term debts, the investment adjustment to an increase of the interest rate is quite
different and not robust. Firms who own more long-term floating debts will invest more
when negative interest shocks bring positive cash-flows to firms ; while this is not true
for firms with more short-term debts. Therefore, the change of interest rate could affect
the firm’s investment behaviors through the long term floating debts or short-term debts.
Nevertheless, for firms who own more short-term debts when the macro economies boost
firms, they are still expecting the good market for near future; then they will respond less
to the interest free-rate shocks in normal situations or respond in an undesired direction.
Also, firms have different reactions to the different signs of shocks. When realized
interest rate is higher than firms’ expectations, firms don’t adjust their investments poli-
cies, suggesting that an increase of the interest rate couldn’t lead to investment are cut
for firms. In other words, firms’ investment are less affected by negative cash-flow shocks.
Indeed, an increase of the FED funds rate can be seen by investors as a positive signal
regarding the expected dynamism of the economy, which give them an incentive to invest
more. When there is a negative shock, firms are more aggressive to investments and the
impacts are significant. When focusing on the post 2008 financial crisis, we found that
even financially non-constrained firms are sensitive to interest cash-flow shocks. More
generally after the crisis, the level of the correlation between the overall investment and
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interest rate was increased to around 0.5 for these two groups. These findings advocate a
structural change of the model in a period of crisis, where investment reacts much more
to monetary policies movements.
Then, the sensitivity of R&D to interest rate shocks confirms us again the impact of
interest risk-free rate on firms’ investment policies. The unexpected interest rate shocks
have the similar effects on firms.
Finally, we can conclude that firms’ investments are sensitive to external financial
resources and sensitive to cash-flow shocks which is contrary to the MM theorem. As
previous studies, it is also showed that more financial constrained firms are more sensitive
to cash-flow shocks than non-constrained firms.
27
References
[1] Ahn, S., Denis, D. J., & Denis, D. K. (2006). Leverage and investment in diversified firms.
Journal of financial Economics, 79(2), 317-337.
[2] Andrew Kaplin ,Amnon Levy ,Shisheng Qu Danni ,Wang Yashan ,Wang Jing Zhang (2009).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFAULT RISK AND INTEREST RATES: AN EM-
PIRICAL STUDY, RESEARCH INSIGHT ;Moody’s KMV Company.
[3] Bodie, Z. (2006). On asset-liability matching and federal deposit and pension insurance.
REVIEW-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAINT LOUIS, 88(4), 323.
[4] Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. C. (1988). Financing constraints and corporate
investment.
[5] GAYANE, H., & SHERIDAN, T. (2006). Corporate Investment with Financial Con-
straints:Sensitivity of Investment to Funds from Voluntary Asset Sales. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking,Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 357-374.
[6] Goodfriend, M. (2002). The phases of US monetary policy: 1987 to 2001. FRB Richmond
Economic Quarterly, 88(4), 1-17
[7] Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful
measures of financing constraints?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 169-215.
[8] Lamont, O. (1997). Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital markets. The
Journal of Finance, 52(1), 83-109.
[9] Landier, A., Sraer, D., & Thesmar, D. (2013). Banks Exposure to Interest Rate Risk and The
Transmission of Monetary Policy (No. w18857). National Bureau of Economic Research.
[10] Lang, L., Ofek, E., & Stulz, R. (1996). Leverage, investment, and firm growth. Journal of
financial Economics, 40(1), 3-29.
28
Figure 1: The Evolution of Monthly Interest Rate in the US during 1974-2012
The y-axis denotes the US monthly interest rate (in percentage) and the x-axis is time index.
[11] Meulendyke, A. M. (1998). US monetary policy and financial markets.
[12] Tobin, J., & Golub, S. S. (1998). Money, credit, and capital. Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
[13] XIN, Q. Q., & Lin, B. (2006). Debt Leverage and Corporate Investment: A Duplicate Soft
Budget Constraint Perspective [J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 7, 32.
29
Figure 2: The Evolution of Investment and Interest Rate in the US during 1974-2012
The y-axis denotes the average of total investment of non-financial firms in each fiscal year and the x-axis
is time index.
The y-axis denotes the US monthly interest rate (in percentage) and rchange is the change of interest
rate from t-1 to t: ∆rt.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variables and Control Variables
mean sd p25 p75 obs
investment/assets .081264 .1082389 .0213416 .0995495 162494
∆investment/assets .1869883 19.35171 -.0123375 .0251182 164901
earnings/assets .0415203 .0415203 .0415203 .1961736 162789
∆retained earnings/assets -.0636026 .3113865 -.0754273 .0651147 150383
market values/assets 1.799907 2.11331 .7459897 1.916933 173499
∆market value 0.148755 1.000064 -.1728309 .3330742 .3330742
acquisition 0.1525369 0.3595416 0 0 173499
∆interest payment -.0008447 .0095432 -.0041075 .0023418 97939
sale growth 0.1603756 0.3937623 -.021287 .2485227 155675
log of size 4.518642 2.209834 2.911005 6.054954 170068
tangibility/assets .3340485 0.274697 .1151969 0.4865062 163910
cash/assets 0.1345651 0.256111 .0155443 0.1501027 152489
leverage 0.2435599 0.2372045 .024187 0.4103273 168399
Summary statistics are based on the annual Consolidated Financial Statements US companies from 1974-2012. All the
variables are annual. Mean is the mean of all the observations. Sd is the standard deviation of the variable. p25 (p75) is
the critical value at the 25th (75th) percentile. Obs is the number of observations.
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Main Considered Explainable Variables and its components
mean sd p25 p75 obs
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -.0003586 .0042583 -.0004646 .0001354 131501
exposurei,t−1 .1218708 .148663 0.0014034 0.1990906 89824
short-term debt/debt .3517129 .3607004 .0448834 0.6173995 145145
floating long-term debt/debt 0.2435079 0.342971 0.003 9.21325 106846
short-term debt 12.25736 37.48395 .056 6.5 167753
floating long-term debt 12.25212 48.88848 0.013 3 111135
monthly risk-free rate .0513289 .0350133 .0216 .0691 468
monthly ∆rt -.0017254 .019216 -.0082 .0108 468
annual risk-free rate .058238 .034136 .03145 .0737 39
annual ∆rt -.002205 .019243 -.0176 .0127 39
long-run rt .0701 .0290353 .0463 .0849 39
long-run ∆rt -.0012949 .0104682 -.0085 .0046 39
Summary statistics are based on the annual Consolidated Financial Statements US companies from 1974-2012. All the
variables are annual. Mean is the mean of all the observations. Sd is the standard deviation of the variable. p25 (p75) is
the critical value at the 25th (75th) percentile. Obs is the number of observations.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: KZ Index
mean sd p25 p75 obs
KZ -5.324468 25.2977 -4.41558 .8904605 161707
Cash Flow/Capital Stock .1062014 5.582171 .2887584 1.433184 163184
Dividends/Capital Stock .0424449 .1400165 0 .0362727 167149
TobinQ 2.215805 1.699674 1.305222 2.410963 162144
Coverage Ratio .134987 .3587155 0 .2433819 153764
Positive shock: ∆rt >0 .0151647 .0149028 .0018 .02245 17
Negative shock: ∆rt <0 -.0161682 .0176046 -.029925 -.002975 22
Summary statistics are based on the annual Consolidated Financial Statements US companies from 1974-2012. All the
variables are annual. Mean is the mean of all the observations. Sd is the standard deviation of the variable. p25 (p75) is
the critical value at the 25th (75th) percentile. Obs is the number of observations. KZ is defined in Appendix. Coverage is
the total interest payment /income.
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Table 4: Interest payment changes and Interest shocks (∆rt) from 1974-2012 in the US
∆ Interest payment
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt 0.127*** 0.0872** 0.137***
(0.01360) (0.03410) (0.03380)
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 0.380*** 0.404*** 0.382***
(0.01370) (0.03510) (0.03450)
exposurei,t−1 0.0221*** 0.0181*** 0.0188***
(0.00039) (0.00091) (0.00094)
interestdifflag1 -0.0936*** -0.101*** -0.159***
(0.00492) (0.01020) (0.01190)
leverage 0.00899*** 0.0133*** 0.00968***
-0.000347 -0.000844 -0.00104
roa -0.00228*** 0.000282 0.000685
(0.00051) (0.00080) (0.00169)
roalag1 -0.0118*** -0.00888*** -0.0189***
(0.00062) (0.00087) (0.00211)
cashlag1 -0.00358*** -0.00227*** -0.00950***
(0.00042) (0.00050) (0.00170)
Constant 0.00243*** 4.31E-05 0.00254*
(0.00037) (0.00069) (0.00154)
Observations 42,838 10,793 9,859
R-squared 0.169 0.123 0.182
Number of id 7,694 2,994 3,647
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In this table, dependent variable : I use the interest payment changes as the cash flow changes which is scaled down by last
period’s total assets : (XINTit, −XINTi,t−1)/ATi,t−1. the column “all”, represents the whole sample; “non-constrained”
represents the financial non-constrained firms defined as the lower 25% quantile of KZ firms; while “constrained ” means the
financial constrained firms which lies on the upper 75% quantile of KZ. We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index)
the constrained measures of firms in our analysis. Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short
term debt+long term floating debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by
Ai,t−1: exposurei,t−1×∆rt = (floatingdebt/assets)× interest rate change = (DLTPi,t+DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1×∆rt. Where
∆rt = rt − rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US( rtrepresents the monthly fed funds rate. ) ; where i
stands for firm and t is time index. . exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1.
exposurei,t−1 is the floating debt amount over last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage ratio which is the total
debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of share×price per share). inrerestdifflag1 represents the lag
one of the dependent variable: the change of interest payment of last period. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1and cashlag1 is its
lag-one. Roa is the return on asset, which is the current total earnings over current total assets, and its lag one is presented
as roalag1. We still control the year effect , r change level and lag one of r change which are not presented in the table.
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Table 5: Cash flow changes with positive and negative Interest shocks (∆rt) from 1974-
2012 in US
∆INTEREST PAYMENT
Positive Negative
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Constrained
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt 0.219*** 0.156 0.229** 0.174*** 0.0641 0.232***
(0.04560) (0.11200) (0.09680) (0.02350) (0.06060) (0.05980)
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 0.536*** 0.504*** 0.512*** 0.360*** 0.341*** 0.378***
(0.03240) (0.08580) (0.06730) (0.01740) (0.04550) (0.04400)
exposurei,t−1 0.0165*** 0.0117*** 0.0140*** 0.0267*** 0.0170*** 0.0259***
(0.00077) (0.00184) (0.00155) (0.00069) (0.00167) (0.00181)
interestdifflag1 -0.0796*** -0.0646*** -0.129*** -0.0947*** -0.104*** -0.172***
(0.00798) (0.01680) (0.01580) (0.00711) (0.01570) (0.01740)
leverage 0.00902*** 0.00923*** 0.0106*** 0.00832*** 0.0132*** 0.00872***
(0.000569) (0.00147) (0.00193) (0.000491) (0.00120) (0.00151)
roa -0.00169* 0.00122 -0.00343 -0.00324*** 0.00227* -0.000812
(0.00087) (0.00135) (0.00243) (0.00075) (0.00128) (0.00251)
roalag1 -0.0124*** -0.00774*** -0.0221*** -0.0107*** -0.00800*** -0.0149***
(0.00102) (0.00145) (0.00287) (0.00089) (0.00129) (0.00307)
cashlag1 -0.00340*** -0.00254*** -0.00932*** -0.00392*** -0.00368*** -0.00897***
(0.00063) (0.00077) (0.00227) (0.00065) (0.00082) (0.00275)
Constant -0.000765* -0.000973 -0.00263* 0.000171 -0.000383 0.00171*
(0.00041) (0.00078) (0.00135) (0.00037) (0.00071) (0.00097)
Observations 22,570 5,509 5,408 20,268 5284 5548
R-squared 0.179 0.129 0.23 0.163 0.097 0.173
Number of id 6,528 2,271 2,771 6,496 2,334 2,327
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
At the left panel, present the cash flow changes results with negative interest shocks (∆rt<0) while the
right hand side presents the results with positive shock of intrest rate.The column “all”, represents the
whole sample; “non-constrained” represents the financial non-constrained firms defined as the lower 25%
quantile of KZ firms; while “constrained ” means the financial constrained firms which lies on the upper
75% quantile of KZ. In this table,dependent variable : I use the interest payment changes as the cash flow
changes which is scaled down by last period’s total assets : (XINTit, − XINTi,t−1)/ATi,t−1.We recall
that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constrained measures of firms in our analysis. Independent
variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short term debt+long term floating debt) of firm i at
time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1: exposurei,t−1×∆rt=(floating
debt/assets)×interest_change=(DLTPi,t +DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 ×∆rt. Where ∆rt=rt-rt−1is the change of
short term interest rate in US. ; where i stands for firm and t is time index. exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt−1 is
the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the floating debt amount over
last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage ratio which is the total debt (DLC+DLTT) over the
market asset (total debt+number of share×price per share). inrerestdifflag1 represents the lag one of the
dependent variable: the change of investment. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1and cashlag1 is its lag. Roa is
the return on asset, which is the current total earnings over last periond’s total assets, and its lag one is
presented as roalag1. We also contol rchange (∆rt) and rchanglag1 (∆rt−1) which are ommitted because
of the dummy year effects.We still control the year effect , r change level and lag one of r change which
are not presented in the table.
34
Table 6: Earnings and Interest rate shocks(∆rt)
∆Retained earnings
All shocks Positive shocks Negative
VARIABLES All Nonconstraint Constraint All Nonconstraint VARIABLES All Constra
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -0.183 0.996* -0.202 3.266 0.746 0.488 -0.739 -0.54
(0.17400) (0.57300) (0.28600) (2.06100) (0.91700) (0.55300) (0.52100) (0.298
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 -0.944*** -0.929 -0.993*** -1.726 -1.322** -0.473 -0.999*** -1.204
(0.17400) (0.60000) (0.28700) (1.58000) (0.65300) (0.40100) (0.38400) (0.223
exposurei,t−1 -0.0299*** -0.0382** -0.0199** -0.0573* 0.000795 -0.0322*** -0.0423*** -0.0397
(0.00533) (0.01670) (0.00822) (0.03480) (0.01600) (0.01020) (0.01530) (0.008
leverage -0.152*** -0.104*** -0.141*** -0.112*** -0.142*** -0.137*** -0.130*** -0.156
(0.00426) (0.01500) (0.00741) (0.02810) (0.01250) (0.00700) (0.01080) (0.005
cash 0.105*** 0.0406*** 0.00166 0.012 -0.0572** 0.0760*** 0.0617** 0.159*
(0.00528) (0.00858) (0.01600) (0.01380) (0.02480) (0.00772) (0.02690) (0.008
tangibility 0.0961*** 0.0309 0.192*** -0.0484 0.131*** 0.0667*** 0.206*** 0.115*
(0.00548) (0.02350) (0.00964) (0.03760) (0.01530) (0.00848) (0.01460) (0.007
salegr 0.0909*** 0.0949*** 0.0672*** 0.0820*** 0.0547*** 0.0772*** 0.0797*** 0.105*
(0.00227) (0.00472) (0.00427) (0.00780) (0.00690) (0.00349) (0.00694) (0.003
rearninglag1 0.189*** 0.180*** 0.103*** 0.188*** 0.112*** 0.210*** 0.147*** 0.195*
(0.00388) (0.00740) (0.00790) (0.01280) (0.01330) (0.00628) (0.01260) (0.005
cashlag1 -0.0315*** -0.0223*** -0.0127 -0.0599*** 0.00993 -0.0455*** -0.0264 -0.0448
(0.00490) (0.00821) (0.01190) (0.01340) (0.02010) (0.00745) (0.01920) (0.007
Constant -0.0311*** 0.0212* -0.0812*** 0.0511*** -0.0656*** 0.0142** -0.0816*** -0.0422
(0.00461) (0.01240) (0.00858) (0.01350) (0.01100) (0.00608) (0.01370) (0.005
Observations 54,535 13,655 17,922 6,597 8,082 25,575 9,840 28,96
R-squared 0.176 0.137 0.154 0.116 0.126 0.148 0.18 0.21
Number of id 9,064 3,562 5,698 2,763 4,011 7,649 4,509 7,92
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We present the results of all shocks in the first three columns ; the middle three columns with negative
interest shocks; the last colunms with positive interest shocks. Dependent variable is the change of
retained earnings over total assent ATi,t−1: (REi,t − REi,t−1)/Ai,t−1. The column “all”, represents the
whole sample; “non-constrained” represents the non-constrained firms defined as the lower 25% quantile
of KZ firms; while “constrained ” means the constrained firms which lies on the upper 75% quantile of
KZ.We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constrained measures of firms in our analysis.
Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short term debt+long term floating debt)
of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1:exposurei,t−1 ×
∆rt=(floating debt/assets)×interest_change=(DLTPi,t +DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 ×∆rt. Where ∆rt=rt-rt−1is
the change of short term interest rate in US. ; where i stands for firm and t is time index. .exposurei,t−1×
∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the floating debt amount
over last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage ratio which is the total debt (DLC+DLTT) over
the market asset (total debt+number of share×price per share).rearninglag1 represents the lag one of the
dependent variable: the change of investment. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1and cashlag1 is its lag. Roa is
the return on asset, which is the current total earnings over last periond’s total assets, and its lag one
is presented as roalag1. Tangibility is PPENT/Ai,t−1. Salegr is the sale growth of firm i between t and
t-1.We still control the year effect , r change level and lag one of r change which are not presented in the
table.
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Table 7: Market Value and Interest rate shocks (∆rt)
∆ Market values
All shocks Positive shocks Negative sh
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstra
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -9.532*** -15.12*** -6.553*** 4.196 6.82 -4.521 -12.91*** -12.31
(1.33000) (5.16400) (1.88500) (4.93600) (19.18000) (7.91100) (2.01100) (9.19200
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 -3.512*** -6.633 0.723 4.625 9.05 6.761 -6.688*** -13.82*
(1.32300) (5.21200) (1.88000) (3.52200) (14.24000) (5.56000) (1.49100) (7.15600
exposurei,t−1 0.770*** 0.967*** 0.693*** 0.790*** 1.017*** 0.830*** 0.553*** 0.860***
(0.04010) (0.14800) (0.05380) (0.08820) (0.32400) (0.13400) (0.06030) (0.28300
leverage -0.988*** -1.366*** -1.271*** -1.378*** -2.114*** -1.663*** -0.738*** -1.105**
(0.03170) (0.13200) (0.04810) (0.05900) (0.25800) (0.10200) (0.03860) (0.19300
deltamarketlag1 -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.248*** -0.303*** -0.291*** -0.306*** -0.196*** -0.202**
(0.00406) (0.00845) (0.00761) (0.00699) (0.01400) (0.01530) (0.00561) (0.01350
cash 1.754*** 1.558*** 2.317*** 2.093*** 1.524*** 3.569*** 1.356*** 1.289***
(0.03840) (0.07470) (0.10200) (0.06450) (0.12300) (0.19300) (0.05140) (0.11800
tangibility 0.622*** 0.861*** 0.719*** 0.727*** 0.951*** 0.762*** 0.533*** 0.720**
(0.04100) (0.20400) (0.06270) (0.07160) (0.32800) (0.12400) (0.05160) (0.32600
salegr 0.776*** 1.045*** 0.422*** 0.898*** 1.135*** 0.465*** 0.691*** 0.889***
(0.01730) (0.04340) (0.02780) (0.03000) (0.07330) (0.05720) (0.02340) (0.07150
Constant -0.00997 -0.111 -0.0129 0.144*** 0.273** -0.0542 -0.126*** -0.0117
(0.03880) (0.12100) (0.05440) (0.04920) (0.13200) (0.08790) (0.03590) (0.13500
Observations 54,198 14,024 14,325 25,280 6,782 7,730 28,918 6,201
R-squared 0.246 0.268 0.259 0.232 0.218 0.265 0.287 0.344
Number of id 8,791 3,514 3,448 7,389 2,754 3,859 7,737 2,479
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We present the results of all shocks in the first three columns ; the middle three columns with posi-
tive interest shocks; the last colunms with negative interest shocks. Dependent variable is the change
of retained earnings over total assent ATi,t−1:(Marketvaluei,t − Marketvaluei,t−1)/ATi,t−1, market
value=total debt+number of shares×priceper share. The column “all”, represents the whole sam-
ple; “non-constrained” represents the non-constrained firms defined as the lower 25% quantile of KZ
firms; while “constrained ” means the constrained firms which lies on the upper 75% quantile of KZ.
We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constrained measures of firms in our analysis.
Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short term debt+long term floating
debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1:
exposurei,t−1×∆rt = (floatingdebt/assets)× interest change = (DLTPi,t+DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1×∆rt.. Where ∆rt=rt-
rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US. ; where i stands for firm and t is time index. .
exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the
floating debt amount over last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage ratio which is the total
debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of share×price per share). deltamarketlag1
represents the lag one of the dependent variable: the change of market value of last period. Cash is the
cashi,t/Ai,t−1. Tangibility is PPENT/Ai,t−1. Salegr is the sale growth of firm i between t and t-1.We also
contol rchange (∆rt) and rchanglag1 (∆rt−1) which are ommitted because of the dummy year effects. We
still control the year effect , r change level and lag one of r change which are not presented in the table.
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Table 8: Investment and interest rate shocks (∆rt)
∆INVESTMENT
All shocks Positive shocks Negativ
VARIABLES All Nonconstraint Constraint All Nonconstraint Constraint All Nonco
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -0.165*** -0.0468 -0.190** 0.185 0.132 0.574** -0.162* -0
(0.05290) (0.12800) (0.08540) (0.17200) (0.46000) (0.28900) (0.09160) (0.2
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 0.0851 -0.0748 0.11 0.112 -0.0301 0.0329 0.098 -0.
(0.05270) (0.12600) (0.08490) (0.12300) (0.32700) (0.20600) (0.06850) (0.1
exposurei,t−1 0.00777*** -0.00398 0.00784*** 0.00315 -0.00162 0.00268 0.0106*** -0.0
(0.00152) (0.00334) (0.00240) (0.00299) (0.00696) (0.00500) (0.00264) (0.0
invstratiolag1 -0.212*** -0.281*** -0.222*** -0.185*** -0.248*** -0.182*** -0.216*** -0.3
(0.00438) (0.00895) (0.00713) (0.00725) (0.01550) (0.01280) (0.00626) (0.0
leverage -0.00744*** 0.0047 -0.0102*** -0.0241*** 0.000611 -0.0360*** -0.0206*** 0.0
(0.00172) (0.00389) (0.00282) (0.00229) (0.00608) (0.00428) (0.00196) (0.0
cashlag1 0.0277*** 0.0174*** 0.0377*** 0.0278*** 0.0136*** 0.0381*** 0.0301*** 0.01
(0.00151) (0.00176) (0.00353) (0.00226) (0.00275) (0.00593) (0.00241) (0.0
tangibility 0.0806*** 0.0888*** 0.0886*** 0.0914*** 0.108*** 0.0924*** 0.0704*** 0.06
(0.00189) (0.00535) (0.00319) (0.00293) (0.00835) (0.00523) (0.00276) (0.0
TobinQ 0.00146*** 0.000580** 0.00266*** 0.000760*** 0.000788* 0.000515 0.000973*** 0.0
(0.00021) (0.00027) (0.00044) (0.00029) (0.00041) (0.00070) (0.00035) (0.0
TobinQlag1 0.00193*** 0.00196*** 0.00229*** 0.00238*** 0.00170*** 0.00388*** 0.00268*** 0.00
(0.00020) (0.00025) (0.00044) (0.00029) (0.00039) (0.00073) (0.00033) (0.0
salegr 0.0220*** 0.0163*** 0.0212*** 0.0212*** 0.0139*** 0.0195*** 0.0235*** 0.01
(0.00071) (0.00103) (0.00130) (0.00109) (0.00169) (0.00221) (0.00112) (0.0
Constant -0.0243*** -0.0201*** -0.00217 -0.0259*** -0.0115*** -0.0208*** -0.0241*** -0.0
(0.00148) (0.00272) (0.00336) (0.00176) (0.00363) (0.00348) (0.00174) (0.0
Observations 53,591 13,414 13,149 25,054 6,556 6,436 28,537 6
R-squared 0.169 0.185 0.192 0.146 0.147 0.156 0.163 0
Number of id 9,039 2,601 2,613 7,554 2,783 2,818 7,855 2
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We present the results of all shocks in the first three columns ; the middle three columns with
positive interest shocks; the last colunms with negative interest shocks. The dependent variable
is the change of investment of firm i from t-1 to t scaled down by the last year’s total asset
Ai,t−1:(Investmenti,t − Investmenti,t−1)/ATi,t−1. The column “all”, represents the whole sample; “non-
constrained” represents the financial non-constrained firms defined as the lower 25% quantile of KZ
firms; while “constrained ” means the financial constrained firms which lies on the upper 75% quan-
tile of KZ.We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constrained measures of firms in our
analysis. Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short term debt+long term
floating debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by
Ai,t−1: exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt = (floatingdebt/assets) × interes change = (DLTPi,t + DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 × ∆rt. Where
∆rt=rt-rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US. ; where i stands for firm and t is time index.
exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the
floating debt amount over last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage ratio which is the total
debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of share×price per share). invstratiolag1
represents the lag one of the dependent variable: the change of investment. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1..
Tangibility is PPENT/Ai,t−1. Salegr is the sale growth of firm i between t and t-1.TobinQ is the market
value of firm i over the book value of firm i at time t; Tobinlag1 is the lag one of TobinQ.We still control
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Table 9: Investment and Interest shocks (∆rt) with different leverage levels
∆INVESTMENT
All shocks Positive shocks Negative sho
VARIABLES All Low High All Low High All Low
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -0.165*** -0.105 -0.122* 0.185 -1.084 0.744** -0.162* -4.043
(0.05290) (0.15400) (0.07010) (0.17200) (1.25100) (0.35500) (0.09160) (2.46100
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 0.0851 0.242 0.0608 0.112 0.619 -0.203 0.098 -0.89
(0.05270) (0.14700) (0.06970) (0.12300) (1.28200) (0.26000) (0.06850) (1.98300
exposurei,t−1 0.00777*** 0.0107*** 0.00484** 0.00315 0.124*** -0.00187 0.0106*** 0.0555
(0.00152) (0.00380) (0.00197) (0.00299) (0.02770) (0.00626) (0.00264) (0.07200
invstratiolag1 -0.212*** -0.231*** -0.225*** -0.185*** -0.259*** -0.222*** -0.216*** -0.238***
(0.00438) (0.00628) (0.00651) (0.00725) (0.00939) (0.01730) (0.00626) (0.01480
leverage -0.00744*** -0.0101 -0.00999*** -0.0241*** -0.329*** -0.0341*** -0.0206*** -0.179
(0.00172) (0.00732) (0.00253) (0.00229) (0.07530) (0.00633) (0.00196) (0.11600
cash -0.00450*** -0.00525*** 0.000434 -0.00345 -0.00950*** 0.0029 -0.00736*** -0.0143**
(0.00169) (0.00191) (0.00427) (0.00246) (0.00265) (0.01300) (0.00276) (0.00418
cashlag1 0.0277*** 0.0291*** 0.0301*** 0.0278*** 0.0379*** 0.0531*** 0.0301*** 0.0310**
(0.00151) (0.00172) (0.00368) (0.00226) (0.00304) (0.01260) (0.00241) (0.00378
tangibility 0.0806*** 0.102*** 0.0762*** 0.0914*** 0.113*** 0.0862*** 0.0704*** 0.0975**
(0.00189) (0.00316) (0.00273) (0.00293) (0.00535) (0.00645) (0.00276) (0.00880
TobinQ 0.00146*** 0.00120*** 0.00358*** 0.000760*** 0.000789*** 0.00489 0.000973*** 0.00148*
(0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00088) (0.00029) (0.00030) (0.00338) (0.00035) (0.00085
TobinQlag1 0.00193*** 0.00193*** 0.00154** 0.00238*** 0.00253*** 0.00912*** 0.00268*** 0.00216**
(0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00069) (0.00029) (0.00029) (0.00231) (0.00033) (0.00056
salegr 0.0220*** 0.0213*** 0.0206*** 0.0212*** 0.0203*** 0.0150*** 0.0235*** 0.0205**
(0.00071) (0.00095) (0.00116) (0.00109) (0.00136) (0.00283) (0.00112) (0.00235
Constant -0.0243*** -0.00658** -0.0257*** -0.0259*** 0.0108 -0.0425*** -0.0241*** -0.0203**
(0.00148) (0.00318) (0.00257) (0.00176) (0.00786) (0.00639) (0.00174) (0.00484
Observations 53,591 12,724 12,867 25,054 6,233 6,249 28,537 6,333
R-squared 0.169 0.174 0.176 0.146 0.187 0.168 0.163 0.178
Number of id 9,039 5,956 6,187 7,554 2,621 3,097 7,855 2,621
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We present the results of all shocks in the first three columns ; the middle three columns with positive
interest shocks; the last colunms with negative interest shocks. The dependent variable is the change
of investment of firm i from t-1 to t scaled down by the last year’s total asset Ai,t−1:(Investmenti,t −
Investmenti,t−1)/ATi,t−1. The column “all”, represents the whole sample; “LOW” represents the low
leveraged firms defined as the lower 50% quantile of leverage firms; while “High ” means the high lerveage
ratio firms which lies on the upper quantile of Mlev. Mlev is the market leverage ratio which is the
total debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of share×price per share). Other
Independent variables :stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short term debt+long term floating
debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1:
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt = (floatingdebt/assets)× interest change = (DLTPi,t +DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 ×∆rt. Where ∆rt=rt-
rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US. ; where i stands for firm and t is time index. .
stexposurei,t−1 is lag one of stexposurei,t: the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1. Fdebt1
is the floating debt amount over last period total asset. invstratiolag1 represents the lag one of the
dependent variable: the change of investment of last period. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1.. Tangibility is
PPENT/A . Salegr is the sale growth of firm i between t and t-1.TobinQ is the market value of firm
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Table 10: Investment and interest rate(∆rt): before and after 2008
∆INVESTMENT
Before 2008 After 2008
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstraint constraint
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -0.214*** -0.169 -0.270*** 0.0102 0.0453 -0.271
(0.060) (0.163) (0.096) (0.129) (0.233) (0.337)
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 0.0968 0.0737 0.109 -0.233* -0.501* -0.562*
(0.059) (0.158) (0.094) (0.141) (0.268) (0.331)
exposurei,t−1 0.00849*** -0.00308 0.00853*** -0.00711* -0.00966 -0.00644
(0.00174) (0.00432) (0.00270) (0.00431) (0.00688) (0.01060)
invstratiolag1 -0.225*** -0.301*** -0.234*** -0.247*** -0.335*** -0.197***
-0.00476 -0.0103 -0.00763 (0.01300) (0.02110) (0.03630)
leverage -0.00830*** 0.00665 -0.0102*** -0.00393 -0.00347 -0.0208*
(0.00198) (0.00497) (0.00319) (0.00423) (0.00744) (0.01110)
mlevlag1 -0.0273*** -0.0144*** -0.0346***
(0.00178) (0.00398) (0.00289)
cash -0.00350* -0.00355 -0.0131*** -0.00443 -0.00701* 0.002
(0.00188) (0.00232) (0.00502) (0.00349) (0.00378) (0.01300)
cashlag1 0.0302*** 0.0200*** 0.0424*** 0.0205*** 0.00904*** 0.0269**
(0.00174) (0.00214) (0.00409) (0.00317) (0.00328) (0.01200)
tangibility 0.0890*** 0.108*** 0.0968*** 0.0837*** 0.0645*** 0.0898***
(0.00217) (0.00669) (0.00359) (0.00743) (0.01340) (0.01920)
TobinQ 0.00170*** 0.000990*** 0.00300*** 0.00142* 0.00119 -0.00111
(0.00024) (0.00033) (0.00051) (0.00079) (0.00086) (0.00321)
TobinQlag1 0.00195*** 0.00186*** 0.00256*** 0.00328*** 0.00297*** 0.00257
(0.00023) (0.00030) (0.00051) (0.00053) (0.00059) (0.00228)
salegr 0.0219*** 0.0165*** 0.0211*** 0.0168*** 0.0103*** 0.0174***
(0.00080) (0.00124) (0.00144) (0.00161) (0.00196) (0.00483)
Constant -0.0268*** -0.0235*** -0.0213*** -0.0241*** -0.00867*** -0.0165
(0.00160) (0.00302) (0.00345) (0.00244) (0.00255) (0.01010)
Observations 45,691 10,493 10,377 7,059 2,052 1,455
R-squared 0.171 0.197 0.194 0.262 0.26 0.295
Number of id 8,492 3,198 3,111 2,528 1,183 782
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We present the results before 2008 in the first three columns ;the last colunms contains the results with
shocks after 2008. The dependent variable is the change of investment of firm i from t-1 to t scaled
down by the last year’s total asset Ai,t−1:(Investmenti,t − Investmenti,t−1)/ATi,t−1. The column “all”,
represents the whole sample; “non-constrained” represents the financial non-constrained firms defined as
the lower 25% quantile of KZ firms; while “constrained ” means the financial constrained firms which
lies on the upper 75% quantile of KZ.We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constrained
measures of firms in our analysis. Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short
term debt+long term floating debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t
(∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1: exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt=(floating debt/assets)×interest_change=(DLTPi,t +
DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 × ∆rt. Where ∆rt=rt-rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US. ; where i
stands for firm and t is time index.exposurei,t−1×∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the
∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the floating debt amount over last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage
ratio which is the total debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of share×price
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Table 11: Acquisition Probit Model with interest rate shocks (∆rt)
Aquisition
EQUATION VARIABLES All Conconstrained Constrained
acquisition exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt 4.571* -9.875 7.680**
(2.508) (7.089) (3.780)
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 6.677** 15.12** 5.937
(2.600) (7.220) (4.025)
rchange 71.11*** 39.77 109.5**
(25.090) (40.160) (49.600)
rchangelag1 5.451 9.982 0.0567
(4.463) (8.053) (8.794)
exposurei,t−1 1.870*** 1.763*** 1.572***
(0.06560) (0.17200) (0.09140)
invstratiolag1 0.16 0.176 0.0448
(0.20600) (0.59600) (0.30400)
leverage 0.269*** 0.590*** -0.151*
(0.05060) (0.14300) (0.08060)
cashlag1 0.0712 0.00865 0.286**
(0.05340) (0.08470) (0.11300)
tangibility -0.153*** -0.572*** -0.0401
(0.03650) (0.14500) (0.05400)
TobinQ -0.0918*** -0.0819*** -0.152***
(0.01290) (0.02180) (0.02540)
TobinQlag1 0.0455*** 0.0539*** 0.0182
(0.00843) (0.01360) (0.01610)
salegr 1.062*** 0.926*** 1.027***
(0.02960) (0.05610) (0.04840)
Constant -0.974*** -1.016*** -0.713***
(0.03690) (0.06190) (0.07630)
Observations 46,423 12,765 13,362
In this table, we present the probit model with acquisition which is the dependent variable is defined
as follows: acquisition=1 if firm have acuisitions at year t; otherwise acquisition=0. The column “all”,
represents the whole sample; “non-constrained” represents the financial non-constrained firms defined as
the lower 25% quantile of KZ firms; while “constrained ” means the financial constrained firms which
lies on the upper 75% quantile of KZ.We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constrained
measures of firms in our analysis. Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt (FDi,t =short
term debt+long term floating debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest rate at t
(∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1: exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt=(floating debt/assets)×interest_change=(DLTPi,t +
DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 × ∆rt.. Where ∆rt=rt-rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US. ; where i
stands for firm and t is time index.exposurei,t−1×∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i multiplying the
∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the floating debt amount over last period total asset. Mlev is the market leverage
ratio which is the total debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of share×price
per share). invstratiolag1 represents the lag one of the dependent variable: the change of investment.
Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1.. Tangibility is PPENT/Ai,t−1. Salegr is the sale growth of firm i between t
and t-1.TobinQ is the market value of firm i over the book value of firm i at time t; Tobinlag1 is the lag
one of TobinQ.We also contol rchange (∆rt) and rchanglag1 (∆rt−1) .
40
Table 12: Acquisitions with different shocks(∆rt)
Aquisition
Positive Negative
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Constrained
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -4.329*** -1.691 -4.564* 1.579** -5.553* 2.335*
(1.62100) (6.39900) (2.65300) (0.78700) (2.92600) (1.22100)
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 0.681 -1.5 -0.192 1.727*** 3.541 1.873**
(1.16300) (4.61100) (1.89100) (0.58300) (2.20500) (0.88500)
exposurei,t−1 0.481*** 0.602*** 0.406*** 0.395*** 0.441*** 0.359***
(0.02820) (0.09830) (0.04480) (0.02270) (0.07960) (0.03500)
leverage 0.194*** 0.15 0.104** 0.173*** 0.292*** 0.0195
(0.02770) (0.09910) (0.04730) (0.02060) (0.07590) (0.03340)
mlevlag1 -0.427*** -0.381*** -0.423*** -0.369*** -0.436*** -0.301***
(0.02430) (0.08080) (0.04110) (0.01880) (0.06400) (0.03050)
cashlag1 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.236*** 0.209*** 0.141*** 0.226***
(0.02060) (0.03780) (0.05080) (0.01890) (0.03660) (0.04180)
tangibility 0.317*** 0.378*** 0.404*** 0.292*** 0.305*** 0.373***
(0.02510) (0.10800) (0.04440) (0.02130) (0.10100) (0.03520)
TobinQ -0.0123*** -0.0266*** 0.000596 -0.00636** -0.0133** -0.00606
(0.00279) (0.00565) (0.00630) (0.00299) (0.00612) (0.00613)
TobinQlag1 0.0031 0.00932* -0.00166 -0.00423 6.29E-05 -0.0116*
(0.00268) (0.00510) (0.00601) (0.00284) (0.00568) (0.00594)
salegr 0.197*** 0.162*** 0.198*** 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.162***
(0.00992) (0.02310) (0.01900) (0.00931) (0.02310) (0.01600)
Constant -0.0192 0.0307 0.0463 -0.0393*** -0.0409 0.0474*
(0.01680) (0.04480) (0.03570) (0.01490) (0.04150) (0.02780)
Observations 29,992 7,231 7,388 34,637 7,719 8,073
R-squared 0.088 0.061 0.122 0.082 0.058 0.103
Number of id 8,486 3,027 4,990 8,933 3,084 4,638
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In this table, we present the within estimator model with acquisition which is the dependent variable is
defined as follows: acquisition=1 if firm have acuisitions at year t; otherwise acquisition=0. The first
three columns represnt the negative shocks while the last columns presents the positive shocks. The
column “all”, represents the whole sample; “non-constrained” represents the financial non-constrained
firms defined as the lower 25% quantile of KZ firms; while “constrained ” means the financial constrained
firms which lies on the upper 75% quantile of KZ.We recall that KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the
constrained measures of firms in our analysis. Independent variable:stexposurei,t, is the floating debt
(FDi,t =short term debt+long term floating debt) of firm i at time t multiplying the change of interest
rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1: exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt = (floatingdebt/assets)× interest change =
(DLTPi,t +DLCi,t)/ATi,t−1 ×∆rt. Where ∆rt=rt-rt−1is the change of short term interest rate in US.
; where i stands for firm and t is time index. exposurei,t−1 × ∆rt−1 is the floating debt at t of firm i
multiplying the ∆rt−1. exposurei,t−1 is the floating debt amount over last period total asset. Mlev is the
market leverage ratio which is the total debt (DLC+DLTT) over the market asset (total debt+number of
share×price per share). invstratiolag1 represents the lag one of the dependent variable: the change of
investment. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1.. Tangibility is PPENT/Ai,t−1. Salegr is the sale growth of firm i
between t and t-1.TobinQ is the market value of firm i over the book value of firm i at time t; Tobinlag1 is
the lag one of TobinQ.We also contol rchange (∆r and rchanglag1 (∆r ) which are ommitted because
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Table 13: Short-term debts and interest shocks (∆rt)
INVESTMENT
All Positive N
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonco
short debt×△rt -0.132** 0.203** -0.17 0.854*** -0.0588 1.662*** -0.421*** 0
(0.06060) (0.09570) (0.11000) (0.17100) (0.37400) (0.35100) (0.09260) (0.
short debt×△rt−1 -0.182*** 0.0271 -0.255*** -0.483*** 0.0851 -0.851*** -0.263*** 0
(0.05400) (0.08350) (0.09180) (0.14500) (0.36900) (0.25000) (0.07010) (0.
shortdebt -0.000789 0.000201 0.0011 -0.00327*** 0.000714 -0.00493* -0.000809 -1.8
(0.00059) (0.00082) (0.00153) (0.00100) (0.00139) (0.00299) (0.00092) (0.
invstratiolag1 -0.200*** -0.283*** -0.200*** -0.180*** -0.289*** -0.156*** -0.203*** -0.2
(0.00376) (0.00918) (0.00667) (0.00620) (0.01580) (0.01170) (0.00531) (0.
leverage -0.00615*** -7.68E-05 -0.0130*** -0.0254*** -0.00545 -0.0331*** -0.0215*** -0
(0.00135) (0.00289) (0.00261) (0.00180) (0.00460) (0.00401) (0.00154) (0.
cash -0.000574 0.00243 -0.000438 -0.000193 0.00672** 0.00515 -0.00389 -0
(0.00169) (0.00203) (0.00514) (0.00249) (0.00312) (0.00790) (0.00274) (0.
cashlag1 0.0293*** 0.0177*** 0.0437*** 0.0300*** 0.0144*** 0.0483*** 0.0321*** 0.0
(0.00154) (0.00191) (0.00391) (0.00234) (0.00304) (0.00629) (0.00244) (0.
tangibility 0.0745*** 0.0804*** 0.0796*** 0.0822*** 0.0765*** 0.0809*** 0.0683*** 0.0
(0.00153) (0.00487) (0.00284) (0.00230) (0.00739) (0.00442) (0.00223) (0.
TobinQ 0.00160*** -1.74E-05 0.00239*** 0.000794*** -0.000188 0.000925 0.000247 -0
(0.00021) (0.00028) (0.00050) (0.00030) (0.00041) (0.00076) (0.00037) (0.
TobinQlag1 0.00198*** 0.00212*** 0.00181*** 0.00293*** 0.00202*** 0.00327*** 0.00317*** 0.00
(0.00021) (0.00027) (0.00051) (0.00030) (0.00040) (0.00074) (0.00034) (0.
salegr 0.0241*** 0.0165*** 0.0211*** 0.0237*** 0.0180*** 0.0206*** 0.0259*** 0.0
(0.00064) (0.00106) (0.00123) (0.00098) (0.00165) (0.00201) (0.00100) (0.
Constant -0.0174*** -0.0163*** -0.0202*** -0.0166*** -0.00694** -0.0107** -0.0201*** -0.0
(0.00130) (0.00240) (0.00331) (0.00141) (0.00277) (0.00435) (0.00158) (0.
Observations 70,397 12,927 15,455 32,518 6,175 8,505 37,879 8
R-squared 0.167 0.18 0.185 0.154 0.174 0.153 0.157 0
Number of id 9,830 3,631 6,630 8,366 2,707 4,895 8,662 2
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In this table, we present the long term floating debt and short term floating debt The column “all”, represents the whole
sample; “non-constraint”represents the non-constraint firms which is the lower 25% quantile of KZ firms; while “constraint
” means the constraint firms which lies on the upper 75% quantile of KZ. KZ is the (Kaplan-Zingales index) the constraint
measure of firms. Dependent variable is the change of investment of firm i from t-1 to t scaled down by last year’s total asset
Ai,t−1; where i stands for firm and t is time index.stexposurei,t−1 is lag one of stexposurei,t: the floating debt at t of firm
i multiplying the ∆rt−1. Shortdebti,t,× ∆rtis the short term debt of firm i at time t multiplied by the change of interest
rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1. Where rtrepresents the monthly fed funds rate. Short debt1 is : the short term debt
at t of firm i multiplying the ∆rt−1. Cash is the cashi,t/Ai,t−1and cashlag1 is its lag. Tangibility is PPENT/Ai,t−1. Mlev
is the market leverage ratio of firms: total debt / themarket value of firms. TobinQ is the market value of firm i over the
book value of firm i at time t; Tobinlag1 is the lag one of TobinQ. Salegr is the sale growth of firm i between t and t-1.
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Table 14: Long-term floating debts and Interest shocks (∆rt)
INVESTMENT
All shocks Positive Negative
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Con
f long debt×△rt -0.189*** -0.109 -0.145 -0.11 -0.411 0.19 -0.368*** -0.028 -0
(0.05600) (0.13400) (0.09330) (0.17300) (0.47500) (0.31300) (0.09400) (0.21500) (
f long debt×△rt−1 0.0992* -0.0713 0.173* 0.182 0.254 0.118 0.0762 -0.0369
(0.05460) (0.09150) (0.10300) (0.12700) (0.36600) (0.23100) (0.07020) (0.14000) (
flongdebt 0.0017 -0.00293 -0.0024 0.00413 0.00364 0.00414 -0.000284 -0.00262 -0.
(0.00138) (0.00291) (0.00245) (0.00270) (0.00617) (0.00528) (0.00238) (0.00554) (
invstratiolag1 -0.211*** -0.280*** -0.209*** -0.188*** -0.243*** -0.154*** -0.214*** -0.307*** -
(0.00432) (0.00826) (0.00847) (0.00718) (0.01450) (0.01580) (0.00617) (0.01190) (
leverage -0.00529*** 0.00139 -0.00895*** -0.0219*** -0.00176 -0.0346*** -0.0177*** -2.20E-05 -0.
(0.00161) (0.00322) (0.00330) (0.00213) (0.00519) (0.00531) (0.00180) (0.00398) (
cash -0.00442*** -0.00268 -0.00593 -0.00283 0.00134 0.00256 -0.00736*** -0.00203
(0.00159) (0.00169) (0.00578) (0.00234) (0.00264) (0.00935) (0.00258) (0.00279) (
cashlag1 0.0265*** 0.0174*** 0.0326*** 0.0266*** 0.0133*** 0.0363*** 0.0292*** 0.0173*** 0.
(0.00147) (0.00158) (0.00441) (0.00221) (0.00250) (0.00753) (0.00235) (0.00258) (
tangibility 0.0792*** 0.0953*** 0.0847*** 0.0912*** 0.113*** 0.0899*** 0.0692*** 0.0730*** 0.
(0.00185) (0.00477) (0.00380) (0.00286) (0.00757) (0.00624) (0.00270) (0.00729) (
TobinQ 0.00153*** 0.000296 0.00286*** 0.000927*** 0.000356 0.00095 0.000863** 0.000394
(0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00055) (0.00029) (0.00037) (0.00087) (0.00034) (0.00041) (
TobinQlag1 0.00195*** 0.00172*** 0.00192*** 0.00231*** 0.00125*** 0.00264*** 0.00271*** 0.00184*** 0.
(0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00056) (0.00028) (0.00034) (0.00091) (0.00033) (0.00038) (
salegr 0.0220*** 0.0155*** 0.0190*** 0.0213*** 0.0143*** 0.0181*** 0.0232*** 0.0165*** 0
(0.00069) (0.00093) (0.00151) (0.00107) (0.00154) (0.00258) (0.00109) (0.00154) (
Constant -0.0236*** -0.00899*** -0.0184*** -0.0251*** -0.0187*** -0.0190*** -0.0172*** -0.0183***
(0.00147) (0.00265) (0.00437) (0.00172) (0.00272) (0.00462) (0.00177) (0.00269) (
Observations 54,805 15,333 16,877 25,626 7,357 7,597 29,179 7,976
R-squared 0.168 0.181 0.189 0.147 0.144 0.149 0.16 0.195
Number of id 9,147 3,851 5,454 7,673 3,009 3,825 7,950 3,042
In this table, only the short-term debt int Table 10 is replaced by the long-term floating debt.f_long_debt is the long
term floating debt of firm i at time t multiplied by the change of interest rate at t (∆rt) scaled down by Ai,t−1:
DLTPi,t ×∆rt/ATi,t−1. F_long_debt×△ rt−1 is equal to DLTPi,t ×∆rt−1 scaled down by Ai,t−1. flonglong debt is
DLTPi,t/ATi,t−1. And all the other variables are the same in Table10.
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Table 15: R&D and Interest rate shocks (∆rt)
INVESTMENT
All shocks Positive N
VARIABLES All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonconstrained Constrained All Nonc
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt 0.122* 0.337 0.196** 0.0553 -0.265 0.193 0.0457
(0.06550) (0.24600) (0.08130) (0.22600) (0.79900) (0.38300) (0.10300) (0
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 -0.170*** 0.205 -0.178** -0.299* -0.0352 -0.425 -0.140*
(0.06590) (0.21900) (0.08270) (0.15900) (0.56800) (0.26800) (0.07830) (0
exposure 0.00549*** -0.00927 0.00732*** 0.0133*** 0.00666 0.0104* 9.67E-05
(0.00185) (0.00591) (0.00225) (0.00367) (0.01180) (0.00592) (0.00298) (0
RDlag1 -0.0631*** -0.0931*** -0.0535*** -0.0527*** -0.0605*** -0.188*** -0.0392*** -0
(0.00536) (0.01030) (0.00921) (0.00856) (0.01580) (0.02220) (0.00773) (0
leverage 0.00414* 0.00436 0.00424 0.00656* 0.000252 0.00151 0.00151 0
(0.00218) (0.00750) (0.00279) (0.00379) (0.01310) (0.00559) (0.00278) (0
cash 0.00741*** 0.00604* 0.0106** 0.0118*** 0.00269 0.0243*** -0.00642** -
(0.00197) (0.00358) (0.00454) (0.00288) (0.00518) (0.00939) (0.00292) (0
cashlag1 0.0220*** 0.0246*** 0.0312*** 0.00700** 0.0127** 0.0276*** 0.0359*** 0.
(0.00182) (0.00334) (0.00338) (0.00276) (0.00492) (0.00766) (0.00263) (0
tangibility 0.0166*** 0.0392*** 0.0109*** 0.0181*** 0.0404** 0.0221*** 0.0151*** 0
(0.00236) (0.01110) (0.00307) (0.00364) (0.01610) (0.00630) (0.00320) (0
TobinQ 4.25E-05 -6.32E-05 0.000128 0.000935*** 0.00190*** 0.000832 -0.00125*** -0
(0.00025) (0.00050) (0.00041) (0.00035) (0.00072) (0.00078) (0.00039) (0
TobinQlag1 0.00487*** 0.00609*** 0.00372*** 0.00433*** 0.00531*** 0.00155* 0.00436*** 0.0
(0.00024) (0.00047) (0.00042) (0.00034) (0.00068) (0.00083) (0.00037) (0
salegr 0.0182*** 0.0257*** 0.0123*** 0.0176*** 0.0195*** 0.00706*** 0.0155*** 0.
(0.00072) (0.00152) (0.00108) (0.00110) (0.00221) (0.00226) (0.00108) (0
Constant -0.00574*** -0.0153*** -0.00799** -0.00787*** -0.0131* -0.0119*** -0.00661*** -0
(0.00218) (0.00550) (0.00357) (0.00258) (0.00674) (0.00458) (0.00229) (0
Observations 35,922 10,471 10,046 16,932 5,157 4,608 18,990
R-squared 0.092 0.134 0.075 0.078 0.103 0.07 0.084
Number of id 5,980 2,713 2,999 5,036 2,136 2,357 5,193
In this table, the dependent variable is replace by RD: (XRDi,t-XRDi,t−1)×∆rt/ATi,t−1. All the other variables are the
same as previous tables.
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Table 16: Invetment and Interest shocks with long-rate control
INVESTMENT
All Positive
VARIABLES All Constrained Nonconstrained All Constrained Nonconstrained All Co
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt -0.216*** -0.225 -0.232 0.634** 0.597 0.792 -0.216*
(0.07110) (0.16300) (0.15300) (0.29300) (0.59800) (0.75400) (0.12000) (0
exposurei,t−1 ×∆rt−1 -0.0868 -0.268 -0.14 0.058 -0.34 -0.0247 -0.13
(0.07280) (0.18900) (0.14800) (0.28000) (0.63200) (0.69000) (0.08590) (0
exposure 0.0123*** -0.00348 0.00832* -0.00314 -0.0047 -0.00925 0.0142*** -
(0.00195) (0.00410) (0.00433) (0.00448) (0.00929) (0.01080) (0.00359) (0
exposure_longrate 0.633*** 0.506 1.497*** -0.318 -0.659 0.591 0.631***
(0.16300) (0.44200) (0.34200) (0.47000) (0.98900) (1.15500) (0.20900) (0
exposure_longrate1 0.132 0.0954 -0.124 -0.201 0.0723 -0.537 0.0236
(0.14900) (0.46200) (0.30900) (0.47600) (1.09100) (1.13700) (0.19100) (0
invstratiolag1 -0.213*** -0.298*** -0.212*** -0.189*** -0.297*** -0.148*** -0.216*** -0
(0.00488) (0.01020) (0.01120) (0.00817) (0.01490) (0.02220) (0.00704) (0
leverage -0.0216*** 0.0027 -0.0284*** -0.0203*** -0.00563 -0.0361*** -0.0206*** 0
(0.00161) (0.00378) (0.00403) (0.00268) (0.00584) (0.00785) (0.00230) (0
cash -0.00765*** -0.00789*** -0.0119* -0.00570* -0.00609* -0.00994 -0.0114*** -0
(0.00215) (0.00249) (0.00714) (0.00315) (0.00356) (0.01220) (0.00350) (0
cashlag1 0.0354*** 0.0184*** 0.0421*** 0.0349*** 0.0205*** 0.0487*** 0.0350*** 0.
(0.00205) (0.00236) (0.00605) (0.00306) (0.00350) (0.01110) (0.00327) (0
tangibility 0.0820*** 0.0807*** 0.0955*** 0.0907*** 0.0859*** 0.103*** 0.0691*** 0.
(0.00212) (0.00592) (0.00500) (0.00328) (0.00770) (0.00874) (0.00314) (0
TobinQ 0.00119*** 0.00124*** 0.00162* 0.000942** 0.00127** 9.18E-05 0.00106** 0.
(0.00031) (0.00039) (0.00092) (0.00044) (0.00056) (0.00146) (0.00053) (0
TobinQlag1 0.00360*** 0.00270*** 0.00503*** 0.00314*** 0.00275*** 0.00443*** 0.00395*** 0.0
(0.00029) (0.00037) (0.00085) (0.00043) (0.00054) (0.00143) (0.00048) (0
salegr 0.0226*** 0.0159*** 0.0184*** 0.0219*** 0.0177*** 0.0145*** 0.0244*** 0.
(0.00081) (0.00118) (0.00192) (0.00127) (0.00177) (0.00357) (0.00130) (0
Constant -0.0273*** -0.0184*** -0.0333*** -0.0264*** -0.0158*** -0.00774 -0.0242*** -0
(0.00185) (0.00307) (0.00554) (0.00223) (0.00325) (0.00837) (0.00215) (0
Observations 44,106 11,111 10,036 20,697 4,882 4,436 23,409
R-squared 0.165 0.187 0.2 0.143 0.169 0.169 0.163
Number of id 8,176 3,147 4,026 6,725 1,855 2,640 6,970
In this table, all the variables are the same as in Table5, except the additional variable exposure_longrate=
(DLTPi,t+DLCi,t)×∆rlongt/ATi,t−1, where rlongt is the long-term risk free interest rate from federal fund reserve.
exposure_longratel= (DLTPi,t+DLCi,t)×∆rlongt−1/ATi,t−1
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1 Introduction
This paper empirically studies the effect of the monetary policy on the insurance industry.
Since 2007, interest rates had gradually declined to historical lows and kept that lows until
2015. This prolonged low-interest rate environment had an impact on many segments of
the economy, especially in the insurance industry. For instance, life insurers are adversely
impacted by interest rates because of the guarantees and policyholder options in many
of the products they sell. As a result, life insurers face a considerable amount of interest
rate risk, particularly those with a larger amount of interest-sensitive policies in their
mix products. Meanwhile, insurance companies are holding large proportions of interest
related investment assets, such as sovereign debts and corporate bonds, etc.
After the financial crisis, the Fed implemented a number of unusual monetary policy
measures aimed at keeping rates low, including purchasing a number of bonds (quantita-
tive easing) and lengthening the average maturity of treasuries held in its bond portfolios.
The goal of these measures was to lower long-term interest rates, resulting in a flatter
yield curve, in the hopes of avoiding deflation, reducing the unemployment rate, lowering
mortgage rates and stimulating the U.S. economy. Starting from the end of 2015, the
target fed rates were re-raised again. The effect of interest rate changes is mainly investi-
gated on banks. However, there is little known about how the interest rate changes affect
the insurance companies, which will be analysed by this paper.
Estimating the reactions of equity prices to the monetary policies is complicated by
the fact that the market is unlikely to respond to the policy that was already anticipated.
Distinguishing between expected and unexpected policies is therefore essential for discern-
ing their effects. In this paper, we estimate the reactions of insurance companies’ equity
prices to the monetary policies by a measure of “level surprise” interest rate changes and
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an unexpected slope shock of yield curve, constructed by using Fed funds futures’ data, as
proposed by Kuttner (2001) and English et al (2014). From the fact that financial insti-
tutions may engage with “riding on the yield curve”, we know that the difference between
annual long-term rate and short-term rate (called slope of the yield curve) can affect fi-
nancial firms’ investment behaviours and profits. Therefore, the surprising changes in the
target rates do have shocks on the slope of the yield curve, the so-called slope surprise in
this paper. To remove the other effects in the economy, we use the daily abnormal stock
returns which exclude the general 3 Fama-French factors.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we empir-
ically document the effect of the shocks in fed funds target rates on the stock returns
of insurance companies. Insurance companies are exposed to interest risk: when interest
rates increase surprisingly by 1%, it boosts the abnormal returns of insurance companies
by around 2.259***%; when the slope of fed rate increases surprisingly by 1%, the insur-
ance companies gain more abnormal returns by 1.627***%. In other words, the firms’
equity values increase with the positive slope shocks, which is contrary to the response of
banks.
Also, we investigate how the reaction of stock returns to these interest rate surprises
varies with insurance firms’ characteristics: firm size, profitability, leverage, book-to-
market, the difference between short-term assets and debts. Gomez, Landier, Sraer, and
Thesmar (2016) construct the income gaps of banks which measure the difference between
the bank’s assets and liabilities that mature within a year. In this paper, similar to their
income gaps, we capture the sensitivity of insurance companies to the interest rates by
defining a variable called “exposure, which consists of the short-term assets and liabilities
that are sensitive to interest rate variations. We find that insurance firms’ abnormal
returns respond positively with the high exposure level of the last period to the interest
rate, which means that the insurance companies with higher exposure level to the interest
rate (defined as “exposure” in the section III.1) will gain more abnormal returns when
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positive interest shocks come. They found that banks with larger income gaps respond to
a monetary policy tightening by lending relatively more and gain more, which is similar
to our results on insurance companies. Besides the exposure, we don’t find any significant
evidence on firms’ size, leverage and profitability.
Besides the level of exposure to interest risk, to further examine the transmission of
monetary policy to insurance companies through the financing channel, we investigate
the extent to which insurance companies’ returns vary with the maturity of the debt.
We construct a variable called “debt maturity”, which is the sum of the product of each
long-term debts value and its length of the remaining maturity. We find that firms with
long-term debts of longer maturity benefit more if the unanticipated changes of interest
rate arrive on a slope rather than on a level.
Moreover, life insurance companies on average have a longer debt maturity compared
to multi-line insurance and P&C insurance companies. Life insurance companies are very
sensitive to the shocks on both the level and the slope of interest rates. Specifically,
for a life insurer with a larger proportion of long-term debt maturating in the long run,
a 1% increase on the slope of the interest rates will increase the abnormal returns by
around 4.59**%, while P&C companies are not affected through the financing cost of the
long-term debt.
Finally, the different reactions to the interest rate shocks between banks and insurance
companies, documented in this paper, can be a supportive evidence for the diversification
in financial conglomerates. Complementary to the results of English et al (2014), where
an unanticipated increase in fed funds rates on both the level and slope will depreciate
the banks’ share prices, we find a contrary impact on insurance companies. The larger the
maturity gap, which measures the mismatch between assets and liabilities, the more the
banks will benefit, which confirms the banks’ “riding on the yield curve”. However, in this
paper, we find that insurance companies benefit more from the interest rate shocks if they
have a longer maturity of debts. Because the increase of interest rates will lead to a higher
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cost for firms to generate long-term debts, their values will be depreciated by an increase of
financing cost, if they have a long-term debt maturating in the near future. When interest
rate shocks arrive, both banks and insurance companies are affected but in a different
direction, a benefit from diversification can be obtained for financial conglomerates that
are engaging in these two businesses.
Beyond contributing to the literature on the reactions of insurance companies to the
interest rate risk, this paper also provides strong implications for policymakers. The
transmission of monetary policies on insurance companies is more effective if insurance
companies seek financing through long-term floating obligations but less effective if their
long-term debt will maturate in the far future. Furthermore, the opposite reactions of
banks and insurance companies to the same monetary policy which also be taken into
account prudentially. We also find that due to the fact that Euro-zone is not one country,
firms in Europe are less sensitive to the monetary policy made by the European Central
Banks compared to firms in the US.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review, and Section 3 describes the data resources and main variables and discusses the
baseline results. In Section 4, we turn to the analysis of insurance firms’ characteristics
and interest rate risk and show the main results. In Section 5, a comparison between
banks and insurance companies is discussed. Robustness tests and policy implications are
presented in Section 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Reviews
Documenting interest rate shocks on stock returns of financial institution could be a
possible channel to reflect the efficiency of monetary policy of central banks. Jensen
and Johnson (1995), Jensen et al. (1996), Thorbecke (1997), Rigobon and Sack (2004),
Gurkaynak et al.(2005), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), English et al(2014) claimed
that FOMC announcements have significant effects on U.S. equity indexes, as well as other
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financial asset prices. Even earlier, Flannery and James (1984) supported the conventional
wisdom that financial intermediaries are exposed to the interest rate risk because they
engage in maturity transformation. These papers contribute more to banks rather than
insurance companies, which play a different but also a key role in the financial sector.
Staking and Babbel (1995) studied the relationship between capital structure, interest
rate sensitivity and market value in the insurance industry. It is shown that the market
value of equity at first grows but then later declines as leverage increases. Interest rate
risk has the opposite effect. Equity value first declines with interest rate risk. But then
rises at high levels of interest rate risk. This fluctuation is interpreted as a general market
aversion to risk that is difficult for the individual investor to hedge at low to medium
levels of interest rate risk. However, high levels of interest rate risk are shown to reward
those firms that operate in markets characterized by significant information asymmetries
regarding the financial condition of individual firms. Different from their paper that
measures the equity value by TobinQ, while we will use abnormal returns to measure
the variations of insurances’ value. But, we can use their measure as a robustness check
method to enhance our arguments.
Joskow, P. L. (1973) said that the property-liability insurance industry in the United
States is subject to a considerable degree of regulations, many of which are centred on
maintaining the solvency of individual insurers and the integrity of the insurance industry.
Because regulations have a significant influence on the operations and practices of the
insurance industry, if we want to isolate the impact of monetary policies, it’s better to
find a way to eliminate the potential effect of these regulation effects. But overall, since
we are studying the insurance industry that is facing the same regulations, the lack of
dealing with the regulation shocks will have no significant influence on our estimates.
When analyzing the interest rate sensitivity of a portfolio of assets, the most widely
used measure, in part due to its simplicity, is the Macaulay duration of the portfolio.
However, several alternative measures of duration exist. Bierwag (1978) demonstrates
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that the appropriate duration measure hinges upon the stochastic process underlying
interest rate movements. Different measures are appropriate to alternative possible shifts
in the yield curve. In addition, default and credit risks have an impact upon a portfolio’s
effective duration, as analyzed by Babbel, Merrill, and Panning (1997). Further issues
of calculating the appropriate duration in the face of spreads between short-term and
long-term yields are taken up by Khang (1979) and Bierwag, Kaufman, and Latta (1987).
For example, in examining interest rate risk, Staking and Babel (1995) rely on simple
Macaulay duration to calculate the duration of assets and liabilities. The ”duration of
surplus” [D.sub.S] depends upon the duration of the firm’s assets and liabilities1. As
shown in their paper, using [D.sub.S] as a measure of interest rate risk is appropriate
if the interest rate associated with the firm’s assets is equal to the rate on liabilities.
However, if there is a positive spread between the two rates, an alternative specification
of interest rate risk is necessary. In this paper, we focus on the channel of long-term debts
to study the effect of monetary policies.
Kirti, D. (2017) states that bank-dependent firms exposure to floating rates is a compo-
nent of the Bernanke & Gertler (1995) balance-sheet channel of monetary policy. Bernanke
& Gertler (1995) show that firms financial health weakens when rates rise, as interest
expense rises relative to cash flows, and connect this to the effect of monetary policy
on business fixed investment. We construct the variable exposure that incorporates the
floating debt of firm to verify the interest shocks on insurance companies through this
channel.
In this paper, we find opposite response of banks and insurance companies to the same
policy, which motivates the thinking of diversification in financial conglomerates which
operate both the insurance business and banking business at the same. The conglomerate
1 [D.sub.S] = [D.sub.A]− [D.sub.L])A/S + [D.sub.L]
Where: [D.sub.A]= a weighted-average of the Macaulay durations of the firm’s assets, [D.sub.L]= a
weighted-average of the Macaulay durations of the firm’s liabilities, A = the market value of assets, and
S = the market value of surplus, which is the difference between the market value of assets (A) and the
market value of liabilities (L).
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of companies is a controversial topic. A large number of literatures argue that the benefits
of the conglomerate are from different sides: the scale of economies, debt capacity and tax
shield and the creation of the internal capital market. Regulators are a bit strict about
the cross-sector combinations, especially to those in the finance sector that is a key and
sensitive department in the whole economy. At the same time, corporation diversification
may bring dark sides as well, such as the agency problem. Until now, some papers are
dedicated to the diversification risk and income variations of banks with non-banking
activities, while mixed results are obtained on this topic.
On one hand, a number of arguments can be made in favour of a more integrated
financial services industry (Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007), Slijkerman et al (2013)).
Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) simulated mergers between BHCs firms in non-banking
financial industries and found that banks’ mergers with insurance or property & casualty
insurance firms may reduce risk. Lelyveld and Knot (2008) found that there was no
universal diversification discount for EU. On the other hand, different opinions are offered
as well (Denis et al (2007), Schmid and Walter (2006), De Jonghe (2010) and Brunnermeir,
Dong, and Palia (2012)). The earlier literature (Lang and Stulz (1994), Servaes (1996))
showed significant diversification discount: firms that engage in multiple activities are
valued less. Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) found that diversification of bank
loans across sectors and industries does neither necessarily improve return nor reduce
risk.
3 Interest Rate Surprises and Insurance Companies’
Stock Returns
In this section, we present the baseline results concerning the reactions of insurance com-
panies’ stock returns to unexpected interest target rate changes induced by monetary
policy actions. First, we define the interest rate surprises used in the paper and other
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important variables. Then, we present the baseline results of the interest rate surprises
on stock returns.
3.1 Data Resources and Main Variables
3.1.1 Interest Rate Shocks
Our analysis covers the period from 1989 to 2017, which includes 100 interest rate adjust-
ment announcements of FOMC2. It’s available from Fed fund reserve bank of New York.
In next section, we will separate the sample before and after 2008 financial crisis, because
the interest rate target level has little variations (0-0.25%) post the crisis (up to 2017)
which is generally considered as unconventional policy period.
We decompose the observed target fed funds rate changes △fft into two components
like English et al.(2014):
△fft = △ff
e
t +△ff
u
t (1)
where △ff et is the expected change and △ff
u
t is the unexpected change in the target
rate associated with the FOMC announcement at time t. As stated in Kuttner (2001) the
surprise component△ffut , called “level surprise”, is the difference between the announced
new target rate and the expectation derived from federal funds future contract rates 3.
That is, the unexpected change is calculated as the change in current-month federal funds
future-contract rate the day before and after the FOMC announcement4. Therefore, this
2In fact, during this period there are 262 announcement dates related to target fed funds rate by
FOMC; only 100 of them are with interest target variations.
3Note: the data comes from the website of CME(Chicago Mercantile Exchange) and CBOT(Chicago
Board of Trade).The link is: http://www.quandl.com/c/futures/cme-30-day-fed-funds-futures.
4As the statement in English et al (2013): the federal funds futures contracts have a payout that is
based on the average effective funds rate that prevail over the calender month specified in the contract.
These target surprise , as they are commonly referred in the literature, have been used extensively to
examine the effects of interest rate changes on asset prices (for example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), and
Ammer et al. (2010)). However, Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show some evidences of the risk premiums
in the prices of federal funds futures contracts, which implies that these prices may not represent unbiased
expectations of the future trajectory of the funds rate. Importantly, they also show that the method due
to Kuttner (2001) does not suffer from this bias because any constant risk premium embedded in futures
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level surprise can be a validate measure of unanticipated interest target rate shocks.
In Figure 1, the evolutions of fed funds target rates (blue line), effective fed rates
(red line in Panel A) and long-term treasury rates (red line in panel B) are presented in
panel A and B. Specially in Panel B, we can see a lot of differences between the annual
long-term treasury rates (red line) and the annual short-term fed funds target rates (blue
line). This makes us think of the famous buying long, then selling as short actions.
Therefore, we are interested on the conventional wisdom riding the yield curve, so we
follow the literature to construct a slope shock, defined as the unexpected change in the
slope of the yield curve following each FOMC announcement. We define the unexpected
slope shock in the following way: the difference between the change of long-term treasury
yield and the change of fed funds target rate; that is
slope shock = △ymt −△ff
u
t
where △ymt is the unexpected change of of long term treasury rate
5, m=2, 5, 10, 20
years. Reasonable bounds on expected changes in bond yields are on the order of less
than one-tenth of a basis point, so we simply use the actual change in the yield to measure
its corresponding unanticipated component6. In panel C and D we show the evolutions of
level surprises (△ffut ) and slope shocks (△y
m
t −△ff
u
t ) respectively.
3.1.2 Abnormal Return
In order to verify the reactions of insurance’s stock prices to the interest rate shocks, we
use the stock daily returns from the CRSP, which includes the stock market information
of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The potential problem of using daily returns to measure
the effect of FOMC announcement is that other news occur during the day of FOMC
announcement can influence the stock prices of insurance companies. So we need to
prices is effectively differenced out. And although there is evidence that this risk premium is in fact time
varying, it appears to fluctuate primarily at business cycle frequencies, a frequency that is far too low to
matter over the the narrow window used to calculate the target surprises.
5Data resource is the same as fed funds effective rate Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
6From English et al (2013).
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Interest rates and related shocks in USA 1989-2017
Figure 1: Note: data from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System and CME.
Sample period 1989-2017. Interest level surprise=change of 30-days fed funds future
contract rate around the announcement of FOMC. Slope shocks=(change of long term
interest rate -unexpected interest shocks) 56
assume that during the day of announcement there is no other important news affecting
the stock market; in the robustness check, we try to remove the dates with big events.
Therefore, we are using the abnormal returns from which the effect of market factor and
two other common factors are deducted; that is, using the Fama-French 3-factor model7
to compute the abnormal returns. Using the following model:
Ri,m −Rf,m = β1,m × (Rm,m −Rf,m) + β2,m × SMBm + β3,m ×HMLm + ǫi,m (2)
in each month m and the previous 24 monthly returns, we compute the rolling βˆi,m
(i = 1, 2, 3). Then we obtain the daily abnormal stock returns at each day t:
R˜i,t = Ri,t −Rf,t − βˆ1,m × (Rm,t −Rf,t)− βˆ2,m × SMBt − βˆ3,m ×HMLt
Even though we cannot totally eliminate all the other potential news influencing the stock
returns on that day, it’s still a validate measure to capture the effect of fed funds rate
shocks on that day. One possible explanation (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)) is that the
high-frequency interest rate surprises induced by monetary policy actions are uncorrelated
with other economic news or developments elsewhere in the economy. Thus, these interest
rate shocks allow us to identify more cleanly the response of stock prices to interest rate
changes by circumventing the difficult issues of endogeneity and simultaneity that plague
the common practice of using the observed interest rate changes, which are correlated
with other news about economic conditions (English et al.(2013)). If possible, it’s better
to use the intra-day stock price, which is around the time point of announcement and the
variations of interest rate shocks around the same time point. Because of data limitations,
we can’t get fully access to these so high-frequency data. However, we can replace them
by daily stock returns and daily interest variations around the announcements.
Naturally, in order to measure correctly the effects of fed funds shocks, we drop the
7Fama, E. F.; French, K. R. (1993)
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extreme values from the sample (upper 1% and lower 1%). We can access the daily 3
factors’ data easily from Kenneth website8. In addition, in order to compute the abnormal
returns we need to compute the rolling beta for each factor; therefore, we eliminate those
firms lasting less than 3 years from the sample.
3.1.3 Annual Firm Level Data
Another interesting part of this paper is to investigate the firm characteristics that may
affect the sensitivities of stock returns to interest rate shocks. We get access to the firm
balance sheet data from Compustat of WRDS9, which facilitates us to look at whether the
size of companies, the extent of financial constraint or the degree of exposure to interest
rate risk will affect the insurance companies’ responses to those fed rate shocks or not.
Since it’s impossible to have the firm’s total asset, debt level and other balance sheet
items month to month, we can only use annual data to examine these sensitivities.
Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix I provide the summary statistics of all the variables.
The first table indicates that the average abnormal return of the sample is insignificant
negative (with the mean -0.0092 and standard error 2.293 ), which is different from the
daily stock return with the mean 0.0791 and standard error 3.274. This dissimilarity
implies us that it’s necessary to eliminate other factors from daily returns in order to
look at the effect of monetary policies on insurances’ returns. Furthermore, the mean
and median value of abnormal returns are quite small and getting close to 0, so we will
eliminate the top 1% and bottom 1%. After trimming all these values, we still have 394
companies in insurance industry.
3.2 Baseline Results
In this section, we are showing the basic model used to show the response of stock returns
to those interest rate shocks defined in the above section.
8http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
9http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/
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The basic model is specified as below:
R˜i,t = γ0 + γ1△ff
e
t + γ2Level Surpriset + γ3Slope shockt + νi + i.year + ǫi,t (3)
where R˜i,t is the daily abnormal return of stock i in insurance industry at date t ; △ff
e
t
is the expected federal fund interest rate; △ffut is the level surprise (unexpected change)
of fed funds target rate; and (△ymt −△ff
u
t ) is the slope shock of fed funds rate. All these
variables10 are well defined in the previous sub-section. νi represents the fixed effect of
each firm and ǫi,t is the error term.
We estimate this model by OLS. Each announcement of FOMC occurs regularly at
2:15 pm. The current day abnormal return R˜i,t will not affect the interest rate target
level that will be announced. The problem of possible omitted variables will be discussed
more concretely in the next section. For the expected part of the variations △ff et , we are
expecting to get an insignificant result. Under the assumption that market is efficient,
then the expected variations are already included in the asset prices and it will not bring
any benefit to our abnormal returns. Therefore, the first hypotheses is γ1 ≃ 0.
Notice that our data is regularly spaced daily return, so the error terms might be se-
rially correlated. Meanwhile, at the firm level, it is likely to exhibit a complex pattern of
cross-sectional dependence. Therefore, the standard error structure is possible to be het-
eroskedastic, auto-correlated up to some lags, and possibly correlated between the groups
because we are in panel finance world (so the error term can exhibit cross-sectional depen-
dence). So we need to correct the standard error by using some econometric techniques.
In our paper, we mainly use HAC estimator for standard error, which are clustered by
firms. In the appendix we present other methods, such as Driscoll-Kraay 11 and Newey
10All these interest related variables are set to be 0 for those dates without announcement.
11Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional (”spatial”) and
temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. This nonparametric technique of esti-
mating standard errors does not place any restrictions on the limiting behavior of the number of panels.
Consequently, the size of the cross-sectional dimension in finite samples does not constitute a constraint
on feasibility - even if the number of panels is much larger than T. However, note that the estimator
is based on large T asymptotic. In our sample, we have 78 periods. Therefore, theoretically, we can
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West estimator, to correct the standard error as well.
In the insurance industry, there are 5 types of sub-industries: Insurance Brokers, Life &
Health Insurance, Multi-line Insurance, Property & Casualty Insurance and Reinsurance.
Insurance brokers are the only one who work as an intermediary in this sector: They
provide services to help insurers (real insurance companies who sell the insurance contracts
) and policyholders (customers who buy the insurance contracts) to achieve the contracts
but not the guys who provide the insurance policies. We are expecting different reactions
to interest shocks according to different sub-sectors of industry, which will be discussed
later in the next section.
As presented in Table 4, we find that the estimates of expected changes are quite
small (compared the absolute values to other variables), closed to 0 and insignificant at
all. The positive and consistent constant term shows that the companies in insurance
industry have fixed abnormal returns on stock market. In other words, without any
other exogenous shocks, the expectation of the insurance stocks’ abnormal returns will be
positive; the market is not efficient enough to incorporate all the available information.
Meanwhile, the unexpected fed funds target shocks do have no positive and significant
effect on the abnormal stock returns for all regressions; but it affects insurance companies’
values through the slope variations of yield curve. When the yield curve slope increases
surprisingly 1% at m=5, it will induce the stock returns of insurance industry gains around
1.223%*** on life insurance companies, and 1.759%*** on P&C firms. The unanticipated
level increases 1% would lead to significant increase on abnormal returns on life, multi-line
and P&C insurance companies. However, both broker insurance and re-insurance firms
are not significantly react to the level surprise and slope shocks of interest rates; therefore,
the rest of the analysis will focus on the last three sub-sectors.
In the last two columns of Table 3 in the appendix, I show the results of 3-day cu-
mulative abnormal returns’ reactions to the interest shocks. Until now, we can state that
apply this method to an appropriate data set. More details of the applications in Daniel Hoechle (Robust
Standard error for panel regressions with cross-sectional dependence).
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the unexpected interest rate shocks (including level surprises and slope shocks) induced
by the monetary policies do affect the insurance companies’ stock returns. When a posi-
tive unanticipated interest rate shock arrives, insurance companies’ stock returns increase.
Contrary to banks’ negative reactions to positive interest rate surprises found by English
et al(2014), the interesting positive reactions to an increasing interest rate motivates us
to further investigate insurance companies’ behaviors to these interest rate risk.
4 Insurance Firm Characteristics and Interest Rate
Risk
From the dataset we present in Section II.A, in this section we will consider the list
of balance sheet variables to figure out how these interest shocks influence stock returns
across different insurance companies. Firstly, we will present the related firm characteristic
variables. Then we will show the related model and do the estimation and analysis.
4.1 Exposure Level and Interest Rate Risk
One direct possible channel that we are considering is through the debts and assets, which
are interest rate related. The total floating debt is the sum of the short-term debt and
long-term floating debt (Chava and Purnanandam (2006)):
floating debt = DLC +DLTP
where DLC (in Compustat) is the total amount of short-term debts (due in one year).
DLTP represents the amount of long-term debt on which the interest rate fluctuates with
the prime interest rate. This item includes any long-term debt tied to a fluctuating or
floating interest rate. The interest payments of these two debts depend on the current
interest rates. From the definition above, we know that total floating debt measures the
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extent to which a firm’s interest payment are sensitive to interest rate paid changes. If the
interest rate paid increases, the borrowing cost increases for firms. The interest payment
changes could be measured by the interaction of total floating debt and the change of
borrowing rate. We know that the interest-rate paid by the company can be modeled
as the risk-free rate plus a risk component (risk premium), which itself incorporates a
probable rate of default (and amount of recovery given default). Therefore, we could use
total floating debt to measure the part of firm exposure to risk-free rate variations. From
Mishkin and Eakin (2009), they measure the impact of short term risk-free rate shocks
△rt on firms by calculating: total floating debt × △rt. However, we are studying the
insurance companies which are quite different from normal firms (non financial firms).
Under the industrial regulation of U.S., insurance companies are constrained a lot on
their investment behaviors and current asset holdings. Normally, insurers will hold a
large amount of cash, cash equivalents or short-term investment; therefore, we need to
capture these possible variables which can affect the interest shock sensitivity of insurance
companies. So we will consider
exposure = total floating debt− cash− cash equivalence
which measures the level exposed to interest rate shocks. At the same time, in order to
avoid the individual effects of interest rate change and floating debt (that will disturb the
result of exposure×△rt effect) , we control for the variations of interest rate and floating
debt level. We scale down all the variables by firms’ total assets of last period ATi,t−1. In
summary, in the analysis we will control for △rt and exposurei,t and consider:
exposurei,t × interest shockt =
(
total floating debti,t−1 − cashi,t−1 − cash equivalencei,t−1
total assetsi,t−1
×△rt)
In our paper, △rt represents the interest related shocks: △ff
u
t or (△y
m
− △ffut ).
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Furthermore, one may claim that we should include the short-term investment assets.
The companies that hold a lot of assets sensitive to interest rate would like to buy
those derivatives hedging the varied interest rates. On the contrary, the firms that
hold a lot of assets, which are not sensitive to interest variations, would not like to use
those derivatives to hedge these variations, but prefer those products by gaining prof-
its through the variations. Therefore, we can also consider the exposure level with the
short-term investment to check the robustness of the results. That is to say: exposure =
total floating debt− cash− cash equivalence− short term invertment. Then the variable
of interest becomes:
exposurei,t−1 × interest shockt =(total floating debti,t−1 − cashi,t−1 − cash equivalencei,t−1
− short term invertmenti,t−1)×
1
total assets
×△ffut
Short-term investment12 includes different kinds of current assets. In the robustness check,
we also include last year’s long-term debt due13 in one year into the exposure component,
which may capture more exact sensitivity level to interest rates.
Notice that, we are using the floating debts and cash of the last period. Since financial
annual reported data is time point data and collected at the last moment of last year,
they can present well the initial level of cash and leverage that are exposed to the interest
rate shocks at time t.
4.2 Maturity and Interest Rate Risk
The exposure level that we present in last section III.1 is a straightforward measurement to
capture the effect of interest rate variations to insurance companies, but it has some lim-
itations. In the literature of monetary policy transmission, researchers propose maturity
12Look at the item details in Appendix II D.
13 exposurei,t×interest shockt = (
total floating debtt−‘+long debt due in one yeart−1−casht−1−cash equivalencet−1−
total assets
×
△ffut )
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transformation channel to analyze the interest rate shocks on financial firms. As stated
in the literature reviews, it is proved to be a conventional wisdom that financial interme-
diaries are exposed to interest rate risk because they engage in maturity transformation.
Therefore, the mismatch in the maturity or repricing time between firms’ assets and their
liabilities, the so-called repricing/maturity gap, is to measure the degree to which a firm
engages in maturity transformation. Different from the literature, we construct a variable
Debt Maturity to examine the influence of interest rate shocks on insurance companies
through the financing channel. In our paper, we measure the average weighted maturity
of a firm i’s long-term debt as:
Maturityi,t =
N∑
n=1
di,n,t ×DDn,
where di,n,t is the amount of long-term debt of firm i maturating in year n at time t
over firm i’s total debt; DDn is the rest of the maturity of firm i’ di,n,t; n represents the
maturity year.
This is another method to measure the effect of interest shocks through balance sheet
channel, while it demands a lot of information out of balance sheet.
4.3 Other Variables and Interest Shocks
When facing the shocks from economics, people always look at the behaviors of large firms
which can represent the moving direction of the market. For example, at the beginning
of 2008 financial crisis, when Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the
US, announced its bankruptcy, people started to be scare and market begun to collapse.
Thus, the size of the company does matter a lot in many cases. Naturally, we expect
that firm size can affect the extent of valuation sensitivity to interest rate shocks. The
expected sign of the effect is ambiguous now, because one may think that large insurance
companies will face a higher level of risk (higher internal rate of return are expected, so
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more risk is taken) and are more sensitive to interest rate shocks. Meanwhile, one can
also claim that larger insurers owing better management group, which can hedge well the
related interest rate risk, are less sensitive to those interest rate shocks. Therefore, we
are not sure yet about the expected sign of size effect on the sensitivity of firm values to
interest rate variations.
Similarly, TobinQ (Book to market value) can be related to the effect of interest rate on
firm’s value. TobinQ can present the investment opportunity, which is proved in Hayashi
(1982) q-theory. Therefore, in order to control the effect of investment opportunity on
firms’ value, we have to consider last period’s TobinQ. If the investment opportunities are
not controlled, the increase of abnormal returns might be induced by the firms’ investment
opportunity (which lead to higher and better investment, so higher value can be gained).
Thus by eliminating the effect from investment opportunities on firms’ abnormal returns,
we can have better estimates of interest rate shocks on firms’ valuations. In the section of
robustness check, we replace TobinQ by sale growth to represent firms’ opportunity, and
the result is put in the supplementary tables.
We also take into account firms’ profitability and leverage ratios to study their reactions
to interest rate shocks.
4.4 Results
After the statements of all the variables, now we will specify our model based on the
baseline model in Section II. The model in this section is specified as :
R˜i,t = γ1 + γ2level surpriset + γ3slope shockst + γ4i.group(FirmCharacti,t)×△ff
u
t
+γ5i.group(FirmCharacti,t)× slope shockt + νi + i.year + γi ×Xi,t + ǫi,t (4)
where R˜i,t is the daily abnormal return of stock i in insurance industry at date t (t is the
date of announcement by FOMC), △ff et is the expected federal fund rate, △ff
u
t is the
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level surprise of fed fund rate and (△ymt −△ff
u
t ) is the slope surprise of fed fund rate.
i.group(FirmCharacti,t) can be: i.group(sizei,t) , i.group(mlevi,t) , i.group(B/Mi,t),
i.group(ROAi,t)
14, i.group(exposurei,t−1) and i.group(Maturityi,t−1)
15 where we divide
firms into 3 groups every year according the firm characteristics. Xi,t are other control
variable (including log(size), B/M and leverage ROA ). νi represents the fixed effect of
each firm and ǫi,t is the error term.
Given the equation above, the parameters of interest are γ3s and γ4s; the benchmark
group of the estimations is the firms who are grouped into group 1 according to their level
of firm characteristics. γ1 and γ2 measure the average abnormal return variations of firms
in group 1 when there is a 1% increase on level surprises or slope shocks of interest rates.
In Table 5-9 in Appendix I, we present the results that insurance companies abnormal
returns vary with their sizes, leverages, profitability, B/Ms and exposures. From Table 5,
we have an insignificant estimate on γ1 = 0.387, which means that firms whose exposure
levels are small are not sensitive to the interest rate shocks. In other words, only firms
with a large difference between assets and liabilities that are sensitive to interest rates will
be affected by the interest rate shocks. On average, when interest rates are augmented
by 1% unanticipatedly, firms in the middle group of exposure will increase their abnormal
returns by 2.17%* (γ1 + γ
gr=2
3 = 0.387 + 1.789) while firms with the largest exposure
level (Exposure gr=3) will have a 2.861%** increase on their abnormal returns around
the announcement dates. From the last 3 columns in Table 5, we learn that life insurance
companies who have a large exposure to interest rate risk will benefit the most (3.772%**)
compared to the other two sub-sectors if there is an increase on the level of interest rate
surprisingly. Nevertheless, both multi-line and P&C insurance firms are sensitive to slope
shocks in interest rates if they have a large level of exposure (γ4 = 3.825%∗∗, γ4 = 1.727%∗,
respectively).
14Using the past three years’ cumulative ROA to divide the sample into 3 groups every fiscal year.
15 i.group (exposure) represents 3 dummy variables of the 3 groups; and each dummy group interact
with △ffut . In robustness check section, we are presenting the results of this model without grouping
the sample. That is, using the exposure level itself to do the estimation.
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Except for exposure, we dont find any significant evidence of firms abnormal returns
varying with other characteristics (γ3s and γ4s are insignificant from Table 6 - Table 9).
For instance, Table 6 shows that γ1 = 2.226*** and γ3 = 0.276, 0.119. In other words,
the firm of the smallest size on average will increase 2.226***% if level surprise is 1%
and firms with larger size (either in size gr2 or 3) show no significant difference, neither
statistically (t-values are 0.32 and 0.14) nor economically (0.276 and 0.119). Firms with
a higher level of leverage are not more sensitive to interest rate shocks than firms with a
lower leverage if these firms are not borrowing at a floating interest rate in the long-run
or if the exposure level of their assets is compensating their exposure level of liabilities.
Similar results are applied to firms profitability and B-to-M.
In Table 10, we show how the insurance companies sensitivity to interest rate shocks
varies with their long-term debt maturity. From column (1) to (5), we add more control
(Firm Characteristics ×△ff et and Firm Characteristics △Slope) in the regression. We
find significant estimates on the slope shocks in interest rates rather than on the level
surprises. On average, 1% unexpected increase in interest rate slopes will boost the
returns of insurance companies with a long-term debt maturating in the far future more
than firms with long-term debts maturating in the next 2 years by 2.393%**. Especially,
this effect is very significant for life insurance companies and multi-line firms (4.594%**
and 6.811%**, in Table 11). These two tables tell us that, on average, a surprisingly
increase in the interest rates slopes will lead to a negative abnormal (-1.111) returns
for insurance companies whose long-term debt will maturate soon; however, if insurance
companies finance their investments by long-term debts which will maturate in the very
far future, the increase in interest rates in slopes wont have a negative effect on them but
a significantly positive one. There might be two possible explanations: first, these firms
don’t have to refinance their investments by paying a higher financing cost in the short
run; furthermore, these firms holding a lot of long-term debts may have a lot of assets
that benefit from the increase of interest, which may attenuate the positive effect of the
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interest rate increase.
4.4.1 Negative v.s. Positive Interest Rate Shocks
Interest rate shocks can be positive or negative. In this sub-section, we would like to
understand whether firms react differently to positive or negative interest rate shocks or
not. In Table 12, we learn that insurance companies are more sensitive to positive interest
rate shocks rather than negative shocks. On average, a 1% increase in level surprise or
slope shocks will boost insurance companies by 3.088%*** or 1.89%**, both of which are
much larger than the estimates overall in Table 3; Table 12 and Table 4 show clearly
the difference across sub-sectors. Interestingly, the right columns in Table 12 indicate
that only P&C firms are sensitive to negative shocks, and that the rest of the insurance
companies are not reactive to the decreases in interest rates. One possible reason is that
given the long-term debt held by insurance companies, especially for a life insurer, due to
the lower financing costs they don’t use more debts to finance new investment, so their
values are not affected by the negative shocks.
4.4.2 Conventional and Unconventional Policy
As we all know, monetary policy makers care a lot about the economic evolution, we can
not neglect the effect from the economic circle. But we can still do better estimation
and forecast by analyzing more details under the economic background. In Lamber and
Ueda (2014), they define the conventional monetary policy period as the period before
August 2007 while the so-called unconventional policy period to be starting after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 16, 2008. They argue that for banks the
effects of unconventional policies could differ from those of conventional policies both
quantitatively and qualitatively. In this paper, we set the divided point at 2008, i.e., the
time before 2008 is conventional policy period and the time after 2008 is unconventional
policy period. In Table 17, we see great difference between these two periods, while for
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conventional period, we have the similar result as those with the whole period. Notice
that the unconventional period has much less observations. Furthermore, they have the
opposite sign of the parameter of interest. Therefore, we confirm the conclusion as in
Lamber and Ueda (2014) that the effects of unconventional policies could differ from
those of conventional policies both quantitatively and qualitatively. We also obtain the
same conclusion as before: insurance companies take benefit after the unexpected interest
shocks.
4.4.3 Sub-sectors in Insurance Industry
As we all know, monetary policies makers care a lot the economic evolution, we can not
eliminate all the effect of circle economic. But we can still do better estimation and
forecast by analyzing more details under the economic background. In Lamber and Ueda
(2014), they define the conventional monetary policy period as the period before August
2007 while the so-called unconventional policy period starts after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers on September 16, 2008. They that the effects of unconventional policies could
differ from those of conventional policies both quantitatively and qualitatively to banks. In
this paper, we set the divided point at 2008; i.e., before 2008 is conventional policy period
and after 2008 is unconventional policy. In Table 14, we see a great difference between
these two periods across sub-sectors. Both the conventional period and unconventional
periods, we have the similar positive result as those with the whole period. Notice that
the unconventional period has much fewer observations as a whole.
Before 2008, P&C firms positively reacted to the increase of interest rate shocks in
both the level and slope; however, after the financial crisis, the effect disappears and also
the number of these firms become smaller. To the opposite, life insurance companies are
much more sensitive to interest rate shocks after 2008. In other words, during the period
of crisis, the consecutive decreases in interest rates reduced the abnormal returns of the
insurance companies. For multi-line firm, they respond positively and significantly to the
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level surprises in interest rates during the conventional period but then are only sensitive
to the slope shocks after the financial crisis. We the same conclusion as before: different
sub-sectors of insurance companies do benefit through different channels to the interest
rate shocks.
4.4.4 Comparison with Banks
In this sub-section, we extend our analysis to investigate the correlations between all
the banks and different types of insurance companies. The matrix below presents the
correlations of gross revenue between banks and insurance companies. It shows that, apart
from the gross return of banks and full line insurance companies, accounting measures of
activity in the banking and various insurance industries do not seem highly correlated;
insurance brokerages are even negatively correlated with banks.
In line with the literature, we find that when there is a positive interest rate shock
that will depreciate the stock prices of banks. As shown in Table 15, 1% increase in level
or in slope will lead a decrease on banks abnormal return around 0.253%* and 1.49%**
respectively. The absolute impact are much smaller than what English et al (2014) have
found by using intra-day data.
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4.4.5 Comparison to Euro-Zone
Interest Rates in EZ The interest rate sample in EZ covers the period 1999-2015 with
119 interest rate announcements, including 21 actual interest rates adjustment. From the
two upper graphs in Figure 2, we observe that the short-term interest rates (1-month,
3-month, 1-year, and 2-year rates) follow the same trend as the target rate set by the
European Central Bank. Moreover, after the financial crisis, the market interest rates are
virtually equal to the target rate. On the other hand, in the lower graph on the left, the
evolution of long-term interest rates differs from the evolution of short-term rates: the
correlation with the target rate appears weaker. As a result, in our analysis, it is necessary
that we investigate not only the role of interest rates but also the role of the slope of the
yield curve.
Interest rates and related shocks in Europe 1989-2017
Figure 2: Note: data from European Central Bank website, datastream and CME Interest
level surprise=change of 30-days fed funds future contract rate around the announcement
of FOMC. Slope shocks=(change of long term interest rate -unexpected interest shocks)
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Table 16 presents the baseline results in Euro-zone; it shows that banks and insurance
companies react oppositely to the same policy. When there a 1% increase in the level of
interest rate, banks’ equity values will depreciate by 1.056%*** while those of insurance
companies will boost around 0.926%**. Both these two industries are less sensitive to
the slope shocks in interest rates. Compared to the US, firms (banks and insurance
companies) are less responsive to unexpected policies. One possible reason is that the
Euro-zone was created only in 2001, which is pretty short to make the European Central
Banks as efficient as the Fed in the US. Another possible reason is that the long-term
interest rates of Euro-zone are computed by the average treasury rates across the Euro-
zone countries. Every country issues their own sovereign debts and determines their own
rates independently. In a word, due to the fact that Euro-zone is not one country, firms
in Europe are less sensitive to the monetary policy made by the European Central Banks
compared to firms in the US.
5 Robustness check
5.1 Daily returns as dependent variable
In the whole paper, we are using abnormal return which already deduct other information
from the market; now we are using daily return as abnormal return in the model. If we
are using the noisy measure of the abnormal return, will we have the same robust results
as those in Table 5 or not? Theoretically, in continuous time background, the returns
within a really short interval can be treated as abnormal return. In many papers, people
use hourly intraday return as abnormal return for stocks. Therefore, it is naturally to
treat daily return as a rough abnormal return.
Table 2 of Appendix II showing that, we get the same results as those in Table 3-4 (real
abnormal returns). That is , when interest rate increase surprisingly, buying insurance
companies will gain an abnormal return. But buying firms with higher exposure level
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will make you gain less abnormal returns. Even though there is a positive slope shocks,
insurance companies can not gain by riding on the curve as other financial intermediaries.
5.2 Using different long-term treasury rates
In the main tables, we use 5-year treasury rates to construct the slope shocks; we also
replace 5-year rates by 2-year, 10-year and 20-year rates and similar results can be ob-
tained (see Table 17 and Table 20). Other long-terms debt whose maturity is not clear is
considered in Table 19.
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6 Conclusion
We examine the insurance companies’ equity valuations to unexpected interest variations
promoted by FOMC announcements. All the results show that those policy-induced slope
shocks and level surprises do have a large and significant impact on insurance compa-
nies’ stock returns. Furthermore, companies with more exposure will have more positive
abnormal returns to an unanticipated increase in interest rates than those having less
exposure, where exposure is a measure of the difference between interest-related assets
and liabilities. We also document the fact that insurance companies whose long-term debt
maturating in the longer future will benefit more from the positive interest shocks and
those whose long-term debt maturating in the near future will have a negative abnormal
return due to an surprisingly increase on interest rate.
Finally, we have the following policy implications for insurance companies. Firstly, we
obtain similar implications with the results of Chodorow-Reich, G. (2014, March): the
introduction of unconventional policy in the winter of 2008-09 had a strong and benefi-
cial impact on insurers and especially on life and P&C insurance companies, consistent
with the positive effect on legacy asset prices dominating any impulse for additional risk
taking. However, we find the strong and clear supporting evidence for the difference be-
tween conventional monetary policies and unconventional monetary policies on insurance
companies. Interestingly, life insurance companies respond the most to these unexpected
shocks on the slopes among all the companies; reinsurance and insurance brokers are not
affected by these federal fund target rate shocks. Finally, although an increase on slope
shocks in interest rate leads to the conventional wisdom riding on the yield curve for
banks, which implies a negative relationship between the long-term debts and interest
rate increase for banks, insurance companies do the opposite.
74
7 Reference
Agustin, H., &Rahman, F. A. THE CAUSE AND SOLUTION OF GLOBAL FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS: A PERSPECTIVE OF ISLAM.
Bernanke, B. S., &Kuttner, K. N. (2005). What explains the stock market’s reaction
to Federal Reserve policy?. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1221-1257.
Brickley, J. A., &James, C. M. (1986). Access to deposit insurance, insolvency rules
and the stock returns of financial institutions. Journal of Financial Economics, 16(3),
345-371.
Bierwag, G. O., Kaufman, G. G., &Khang, C. (1978). Duration and bond portfolio
analysis: An overview. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 13(04), 671-681.
Bierwag, G. O., Kaufman, G. G., &Latta, C. M. (1988). Duration models: a taxonomy.
Chava, S., &Purnanandam, A. (2010). Is default risk negatively related to stock
returns?. Review of Financial Studies, hhp107.
Chodorow-Reich, G. (2014, March). Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy on
Financial Institutions. In Brookings Panel on Economic Activity Conference Draft.
Eeles, R. A., Al Olama, A. A., Benlloch, S., Saunders, E. J., Leongamornlert, D.
A., Tymrakiewicz, M., ... &Maier, C. (2013). Identification of 23 new prostate cancer
susceptibility loci using the iCOGS custom genotyping array. Nature genetics, 45(4),
385-391.
Fama, E. F., &French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks
and bonds. Journal of financial economics, 33(1), 3-56.
Hayashi, M. (1983). Determination of electron-xenon total excitation cross-sections,
from threshold to 100 eV, from experimental values of Townsend’s . Journal of Physics
D: Applied Physics, 16(4), 581.
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional
dependence. Stata Journal, 7(3), 281.
Jensen, G. R., Mercer, J. M., &Johnson, R. R. (1996). Business conditions, monetary
75
policy, and expected security returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 213-237.
Joskow, P. L. (1973). Cartels, competition and regulation in the property-liability
insurance industry. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 375-427
Lambert, F., &Ueda, K. (2014). The Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policies on
Bank Soundness (No. 14-152). International Monetary Fund.
Landier, A., Sraer, D., &Thesmar, D. (2013). Banks’ Exposure to Interest Rate Risk
and The Transmission of Monetary Policy (No. w18857). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Neri, S. (2004). Monetary policy and stock prices: theory and evidence (Vol. 513). B.
d’Italia (Ed.). Banca d’Italia.Kuttner, K. N. (2001). Monetary policy surprises and inter-
est rates: Evidence from the Fed funds futures market. Journal of monetary economics,
47(3), 523-544.
Staking, K. B., &Babbel, D. F. (1995). The relation between capital structure, interest
rate sensitivity, and market value in the property-liability insurance industry. Journal of
Risk and Insurance, 690-718.
76
A Appendix
Figure 3: Note: data from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System and CBOT.
Sample period 1989-2017. Future Rate: 30-days fed fund future contract rates.
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Figure 4: Note: data from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System. Sample period
1989-2017. Interest rates of treasury securities with different maturities.
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Table 1: Summary of Related Interest Rates
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N P25 P75
Target Rate 3.2641 2.7552 10986 0.2500 5.5000
Effective Rate 5.2812 3.9576 17564 1.7800 7.6700
Future Rate 3.2788 2.6379 7414 0.4518 5.3572
Bill1m 1.2175 1.5380 4165 0.0600 1.7300
Bill3m 3.9909 3.1648 9060 0.9400 5.8800
Bill6m 4.1782 3.2657 9060 1.0200 6.1800
Bond1 5.1879 3.4111 14043 3.0000 7.0500
Bond2 5.4024 3.7818 10451 1.8400 7.7900
Bond3 5.6174 3.2616 14043 3.4400 7.4800
Bond5 5.8893 3.1041 14043 3.7700 7.7000
Bond7 6.3072 3.1374 12173 3.8800 8.0100
Bond10 6.2308 2.8695 14043 4.1600 7.8200
Bond20 4.7476 1.5639 6125 3.3400 5.9500
Bond30 6.9120 2.9939 9279 4.5100 8.7300
Target Change -0.0270 0.2177 262 -0.2500 0.2500
Diff effective -0.0603 0.2457 261 -0.1000 0.0100
Level Surprise -0.0188 0.0739 255 -0.0413 0.0183
Slope Shock2 0.0070 0.0725 255 -0.0249 0.0390
Slope Shock5 0.0089 0.0879 255 -0.0377 0.0457
Slope Shock10 0.0126 0.0912 255 -0.0343 0.0532
Slope Shock20 0.0141 0.0892 201 -0.0321 0.0502
Slope Shock30 0.0150 0.0878 223 -0.0319 0.0529
Summary statistics are based on the daily data from Board of federal fund reserve and CBOT during 1989-2017. All the
variables wares % as unit. Std. Dev. is the standard deviation of the variable. N is the number of observations. daily
return is the daily stock returns of insurance industry. P25 and P75 are the 25th and 75th percentiles of the data. Target
Rate is the target interest rate set by Fed. Effective Rate is the effective interest rate on the market and Future Rate is the
30-days fed fund future contract rates. Bond1 to Bond30 are the return rates of bonds with different maturities.
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Table 2: Summary of Stock Returns and Firm Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N P25 P75
Panel A: Insurance Companies
AT 15072.62 54511.52 4120 314.19 7638.19
Debt 1031.67 5345.04 4165 3.75 360.29
Fdebt 424.86 3600.77 4185 0.00 69.93
Size 7.3313 2.2531 4130 5.7306 8.9351
ROA 0.0437 0.0580 3429 0.0181 0.0662
BM 0.9199 0.1663 3986 0.8567 1.0234
Cash 0.0450 0.0621 2878 0.0056 0.0608
Blev 0.0797 0.1097 4167 0.0141 0.0965
Mlev 0.1911 0.1921 4159 0.0384 0.2747
Dividend 0.0063 0.0084 3784 0.0000 0.0087
Interest 0.0071 0.0192 3512 0.0012 0.0078
TobinQ 1.1491 0.4088 3986 0.9771 1.1672
Exposure -0.0064 0.0776 2876 -0.0292 0.0146
Ret 0.0647 2.4744 2248544 -0.8942 0.9615
Retx 0.0571 2.4751 2248658 -0.9036 0.9472
Ab ret 0.0102 2.8364 1640133 -1.1018 1.0500
Panel B: Banks
AT 6196.47 27845.02 17346 445.76 3418.57
Debt 1166.30 5649.91 16924 31.41 459.10
Fdebt 2285.94 22145.87 17117 7.30 248.31
Size 7.2042 1.5552 17357 6.0978 8.1370
ROA 0.0221 0.0162 16952 0.0167 0.0266
BM 0.9689 0.0628 17283 0.9381 1.0075
Cash 0.0356 0.0313 15249 0.0150 0.0469
Blev 0.1345 0.1121 16922 0.0545 0.1880
Mlev 0.4609 0.2444 16890 0.2820 0.6494
Dividend 0.0033 0.0032 15131 0.0014 0.0047
Interest 0.0286 0.0276 579 0.0054 0.0463
TobinQ 1.0377 0.1045 17283 0.9926 1.0660
Exposure 0.0331 0.0746 15024 -0.0120 0.0634
Ret 0.0559 2.2382 4199460 -0.9605 1.0227
Retx 0.0467 2.2388 4199541 -0.9704 1.0122
Ab ret 0.0070 1.9521 3279089 -1.0102 0.9863
Summary statistics are based on daily stock returns and annual balance sheet variables of US insurance companies during
1989-2017 from WRDS. Std. Dev. is the standard deviation of the variable. N is the number of observations. Ret is the
daily stock returns of insurance industry. P25 and P75 are the 25th and 75th percentiles of the data. AT is the total asset
of firm i; Fdebt is the floating debt of firm i; Size is the log of the total asset; ROA is the return on asset of firm i; BM is
the book-to-market of firm i; cash is the cash over the total asset of firm i; Blev is the book leverage of firm i; Mlev is the
market leverage of firm i; dividend is the dividend amount over total asset of firm i; Exposure is the total floating debt net
of cash at hand over total asset of firm i. Ret is the daily stock return of firms; Retx is the daily stock return excluding the
dividends; Ab ret is the abnormal return excluding the 3 Fama-French factors.
The number of the firms in the sample of different sector: Commercial banks 1,551; Thrifts&Mortgage finance 351; Insurance
Brokerage 58 ;Life Insurance 123 ;Multi line 25; P&C Insurance 175; Reinsurance 13
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Table 3: Daily stock returns and interest rate shocks in US
ab ret ab ret ab ret 3day ab ret 3day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level Surprise 0.741∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 1.966∗∗∗ 2.259∗∗∗
(3.28) (3.14) (5.95) (6.52)
Slopeshock m 0.723∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗∗ 1.627∗∗∗
(3.46) (3.17) (6.31) (5.82)
Expected Change -0.356∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗ -0.192∗
(-5.55) (-4.47) (-5.19) (-1.83)
Constant -0.002 0.034 -0.006∗∗ 0.060
(-0.99) (0.50) (-2.06) (0.55)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 23966 23966 22411 22411
R2 .0160 .0183 .0215 .0264
In this table, the dependent variable in column (1) & (2) is the daily abnormal return of all the companies in Insurance
industry in US; it is the daily stocks abnormal returns net of 3 common factors of Fama-French. In the third column, the
dependent variable is 3-days cumulative abnormal return. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund
target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference
of long-term treasury rate (m takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) changes
and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate.Expected change (△ffe
t
) is the variations of fed fund rate expected
by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 4: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US across sub-industries
Broker Life Multi-line P&C Re-insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Level Surprise 0.784 1.968∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗ 2.529∗∗∗ 1.588
(0.60) (3.24) (3.13) (4.97) (0.79)
Slopeshock m 1.737∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 1.911 1.795∗∗∗ 0.826
(1.91) (2.67) (1.65) (4.50) (0.52)
Expected Change -0.008 -0.305 -0.060 -0.191 -0.143
(-0.02) (-1.57) (-0.19) (-1.24) (-0.26)
Constant 1.033∗∗ 0.098 -0.160 -0.054 -0.132∗∗∗
(2.28) (0.76) (-1.10) (-0.32) (-4.97)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 1587 6044 2101 11905 774
R2 .0485 .0292 .0365 .0276 .0572
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the
variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock m (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury
rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected
level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. The
standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 5: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US through Exposure
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 0.387 -0.033 -1.033 -0.191
(0.51) (-0.03) (-1.28) (-0.17)
Slopeshock m 0.717 1.707 -1.107 -0.209
(1.28) (1.52) (-1.34) (-0.28)
Exposure gr2 × level surprise 1.789∗ 1.946 0.757 2.657∗∗
(1.90) (1.31) (0.54) (2.02)
Exposure gr3 × level surprise 2.474∗∗ 3.772∗∗ 1.868 2.212
(2.44) (2.28) (1.24) (1.57)
Exposure gr2 × slopeshock5 0.297 -1.375 1.899 1.420
(0.38) (-0.93) (0.89) (1.55)
Exposure gr3 × slopeshock5 0.856 -0.855 3.825∗∗ 1.727∗
(1.09) (-0.58) (2.22) (1.70)
Exposure group2 0.042 0.097 0.056 0.043
(0.89) (1.42) (0.35) (0.66)
Exposure group3 -0.042 0.051 -0.185 -0.078
(-0.72) (0.59) (-1.23) (-1.02)
Expected change -0.142 -0.264 -0.257 -0.074
(-1.12) (-1.23) (-0.55) (-0.53)
Constant 0.077 -0.060 -0.009 0.114
(0.90) (-0.43) (-0.05) (1.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 13255 3753 1459 7123
R2 .0352 .0534 .05521 .0374
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks returns net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the
variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock m (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury
rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level
surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. Exposure
measures the level of direct exposure to interest rate variations; firms are divided into 3 groups according to the level of
exposure. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 6: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US across firm size
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 2.226∗∗∗ 2.008∗ 2.632 2.274∗∗
(3.03) (1.72) (1.29) (2.23)
Slopeshock m 1.434∗∗ 2.479∗∗ 1.603 0.744
(2.39) (2.30) (0.71) (0.97)
Size gr2 × level surprise 0.276 -0.564 -1.873 1.045
(0.32) (-0.36) (-0.84) (0.90)
Size gr3 × level surprise 0.119 0.168 0.405 -0.007
(0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (-0.01)
Size gr2 × slopeshock5 0.091 -1.904 -2.283 1.637
(0.12) (-1.59) (-0.80) (1.55)
Size gr3 × slopeshock5 -0.115 -1.791 1.184 0.597
(-0.16) (-1.48) (0.51) (0.60)
Size group2 -0.057 -0.102 -0.177 -0.031
(-0.80) (-0.93) (-0.90) (-0.31)
Size group3 -0.168 -0.258 -0.091 -0.157
(-1.53) (-1.46) (-0.33) (-1.00)
Expected change -0.161 -0.171 -0.047 -0.174
(-1.42) (-0.92) (-0.14) (-1.10)
Constant 0.083 0.124 0.098 0.085
(0.66) (0.71) (0.25) (0.46)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 18675 5723 1900 11052
R2 .0278 .0323 .0388 .0302
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. Size is the total assets of firms; firms are clarified into
3 groups according to the size. Size group2 indicates whether the firm belongs to group 2 or not according to its size. The
standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 7: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 2.313∗∗∗ 0.705 1.745 3.283∗∗∗
(4.06) (0.84) (0.98) (4.25)
Slopeshock m 1.324∗∗ 0.221 0.698 2.033∗∗∗
(2.46) (0.27) (0.33) (2.91)
Mlev gr2 × level surprise 0.156 1.989 -0.192 -0.831
(0.20) (1.43) (-0.07) (-0.84)
Mlev gr3 × level surprise 0.054 1.421 2.026 -0.995
(0.07) (1.28) (1.20) (-0.91)
Mlev gr2 × slopeshock5 0.369 0.759 0.105 0.081
(0.52) (0.66) (0.04) (0.09)
Mlev gr3 × slopeshock5 -0.119 1.846∗ 1.962 -1.508
(-0.16) (1.72) (0.82) (-1.54)
Melv group2 -0.110∗∗ -0.058 -0.274 -0.100∗
(-2.50) (-0.77) (-1.51) (-1.67)
Mlev group3 -0.030 0.049 -0.093 -0.041
(-0.51) (0.45) (-0.52) (-0.55)
Expected change -0.160 -0.166 -0.069 -0.176
(-1.42) (-0.90) (-0.21) (-1.11)
Constant 0.004 -0.006 -0.042 0.010
(0.04) (-0.04) (-0.20) (0.07)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 18675 5723 1900 11052
R2 .0279 .0324 .0389 .0305
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected Change
(△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. Mlev is the debt amount over firms’ total assets(market
value). The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 8: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US with M-to-B
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 2.304∗∗∗ 1.879∗∗ 3.022∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗
(4.59) (2.23) (3.42) (3.34)
Slopeshock 1.009∗∗ 0.174 1.302 1.316∗
(1.99) (0.23) (1.05) (1.83)
BM gr2 × level surprise 0.259 0.968 -1.689 0.183
(0.35) (0.76) (-0.96) (0.18)
BM gr3 × level surprise -0.145 -0.937 -0.533 0.379
(-0.19) (-0.72) (-0.24) (0.37)
BM gr2 × slopeshock5 0.735 1.700∗ -0.421 0.480
(1.01) (1.69) (-0.21) (0.46)
BM gr3 × slopeshock5 0.511 1.196 0.641 0.173
(0.71) (1.16) (0.30) (0.17)
BM group2 0.001 0.020 -0.008 0.003
(0.01) (0.19) (-0.08) (0.04)
BM group3 0.009 -0.001 -0.179 0.053
(0.15) (-0.00) (-1.29) (0.68)
Expected change -0.157 -0.162 0.026 -0.189
(-1.42) (-0.86) (0.09) (-1.24)
Constant -0.042 -0.019 -0.110 -0.048
(-0.38) (-0.11) (-0.70) (-0.30)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 19275 5797 2032 11446
R2 .0268 .0324 .0366 .0286
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated
and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 9: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US with ROA
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 3.447∗∗∗ 2.382 3.892 3.784∗∗∗
(4.44) (1.62) (1.39) (3.91)
Slopeshock m 1.871∗∗∗ 2.346∗∗ 2.590 1.541
(2.77) (2.52) (1.26) (1.60)
ROA gr2 × level surprise -0.669 0.085 -3.019 -0.534
(-0.68) (0.04) (-0.99) (-0.45)
ROA gr3 × level surprise -1.105 0.473 -0.884 -1.831
(-1.01) (0.27) (-0.22) (-1.29)
ROA gr2 × slopeshock5 -0.457 -1.260 -2.974 0.287
(-0.54) (-0.86) (-1.38) (0.24)
ROA gr3 × slopeshock5 -0.942 -0.490 -3.157 -0.891
(-1.02) (-0.39) (-0.99) (-0.68)
ROA group2 -0.016 0.022 0.022 -0.052
(-0.26) (0.19) (0.18) (-0.73)
ROA group3 -0.055 -0.295∗ 0.104 -0.021
(-0.84) (-1.89) (1.19) (-0.25)
Expected change -0.150 -0.316 0.193 -0.133
(-0.94) (-1.19) (0.44) (-0.61)
Constant -0.008 0.074 -0.198 0.013
(-0.07) (0.39) (-1.51) (0.08)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 12863 3474 1478 7911
R2 .0299 .0351 .0458 .0339
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated
and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 10: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US with different debt maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Level surprise 1.845∗∗∗ 1.724∗ 1.670 1.759 1.782
(3.00) (1.69) (1.33) (1.26) (0.88)
Slopeshock 0.289 0.262 0.555 0.023 -1.111
(0.58) (0.35) (0.61) (0.02) (-0.67)
Maturity gr2 × level surprise 0.900 0.671 0.696 0.657 0.487
(1.03) (0.72) (0.76) (0.71) (0.35)
Maturity gr3 × level surprise 0.681 0.674 0.719 0.680 1.008
(0.72) (0.70) (0.74) (0.70) (0.80)
Maturity gr2 × slopeshock5 1.542∗∗ 1.422∗ 1.458∗ 1.404∗ 1.671
(2.17) (1.76) (1.84) (1.77) (1.43)
Maturity gr3 × slopeshock5 1.761∗∗ 1.758∗∗ 1.784∗∗ 1.718∗∗ 2.393∗∗
(2.14) (2.11) (2.15) (2.09) (2.27)
Expected change -0.237∗ -0.236∗ -0.238∗ -0.237∗ -0.223
(-1.75) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.24)
Constant 0.070 0.159 0.089 0.096 0.133
(0.60) (1.13) (0.59) (0.62) (0.76)
Size× Interest surprise No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mlev× Interest surprise No No Yes Yes Yes
BM× Interest surprise No No No Yes Yes
ROA× Interest surprise No No No No Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 15300 15300 15300 15300 10546
R2 .0320 .0323 .0325 .0327 .0354
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated
and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 11: Daily stock returns to interest rate shocks in US for life insurance
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 1.782 0.179 -1.003 1.008
(0.88) (0.04) (-0.25) (0.35)
Slopeshock -1.111 -0.151 -2.212 -1.683
(-0.67) (-0.04) (-0.77) (-0.71)
Maturity gr2 × level surprise 0.487 -0.885 1.572 0.822
(0.35) (-0.35) (0.79) (0.44)
Maturity gr3 × level surprise 1.008 1.878 6.604∗∗∗ 0.457
(0.80) (0.76) (3.00) (0.26)
Maturity gr2 × slopeshock5 1.671 0.908 1.764 1.767
(1.43) (0.40) (0.83) (1.10)
Maturity gr3 × slopeshock5 2.393∗∗ 4.594∗∗ 6.811∗∗ 1.060
(2.27) (2.29) (2.23) (0.77)
Expected change -0.223 -0.459∗ 0.046 -0.147
(-1.24) (-1.71) (0.10) (-0.54)
Constant 0.133 0.309 -0.720∗∗ 0.165
(0.76) (1.03) (-2.27) (0.65)
Size×Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mlev× Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
BM×Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
ROA× Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 10546 2890 1419 6237
R2 .0354 .0548 .0645 .0390
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. Maturity is the weighed maturity of long-term debts;
the sample is divided into 3 groups according to the level of debt maturity. Interest surprise includes the level surprises
and slope shocks of interest rates; Size is the log of total assets at last period; Mlev is the market leverage of firms at last
period; Firm Characteristics incorporates Size, Mlev, ROA, BM of last period. The standard errors are corrected by HAC
estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
89
Table 12: Daily stock returns to positive and negative interest rate shocks
Positive Negative
Life Multi-line P&C Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level Surprise 2.541 ∗∗ 5.505∗ 3.681∗∗∗ 2.256 1.796 -2.690∗
(2.01) (1.86) (3.25) (1.21) (0.66) (-1.89)
Slopeshock m 1.307∗ 3.769∗∗ 2.203∗∗∗ 0.052 -2.036 0.599
(1.75) (2.42) (3.54) (0.03) (-0.65) (0.62)
Expected Change -0.556∗∗ -0.458 -0.413∗ 0.700 2.767 -1.972∗∗∗
(-2.) (-0.97) (-1.95) (0.70) (1.36) (-3.15)
Constant 0.061 -0.136 -0.049 0.708 -0.115 0.760
(0.49) (-0.94) (-0.29) (0.85) (-0.23) (1.46)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 4947 1769 9813 1097 332 2092
R2 .0368 .0448 .0337 .1144 .1824 .1013
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are
the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock 2 (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference of 2-year treasury
rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate; Slopeshock 10 is the difference of 10-year long-term
treasury rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed
fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are
in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 13: Daily stock returns to positive and negative interest rate shocks
Positive Negative
Life Multi-line P&C Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level surprise -3.513 1.409 5.061 -0.762 -13.513 -4.755
(-0.36) (0.22) (1.26) (-0.10) (-1.47) (-0.91)
Slopeshock -3.637 4.707 -0.513 -6.629 -18.582∗ -0.010
(-0.54) (1.11) (-0.18) (-1.04) (-2.13) (-0.00)
Maturity gr2 × level surprise 0.366 -10.224 -3.979 -4.036 18.487∗∗∗ 4.767
(0.08) (-1.69) (-1.25) (-0.90) (4.58) (1.37)
Maturity gr3 × level surprise 2.368 2.962 -1.271 -7.079 11.793∗ 0.642
(0.46) (0.59) (-0.43) (-1.38) (2.15) (0.20)
Maturity gr2 × slopeshock5 1.869 -10.249∗∗ -0.125 -0.271 25.459∗∗∗ 3.018
(0.54) (-2.40) (-0.07) (-0.07) (6.95) (1.05)
Maturity gr3 × slopeshock5 6.014∗ 4.388 0.646 -2.999 14.380∗∗ 1.355
(1.97) (1.54) (0.39) (-0.67) (2.80) (0.51)
Expected change -1.141∗∗∗ -0.840 -0.544 2.798∗ 4.600∗∗ -1.661∗
(-3.24) (-1.60) (-1.62) (1.75) (2.28) (-1.74)
Constant 0.222 -0.691∗∗ 0.091 0.271 -2.492 0.914
(0.67) (-2.41) (0.33) (0.22) (-1.56) (0.78)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2495 1260 5493 518 197 985
R2 .0619 .0756 .0480 .2499 .4298 .1871
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are
the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock 2 (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference of 2-year treasury
rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate; Slopeshock 10 is the difference of 10-year long-term
treasury rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed
fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are
in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 14: Daily stock returns to positive and negative interest rate shocks
Before 2008 After2008
Life Multi-line P&C Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level Surprise 1.201∗ 3.283∗∗ 2.877∗∗∗ 4.758∗∗ 0.104 1.293
(1.76) (2.83) (4.79) (2.27) (0.04) (1.03)
Slopeshock m 0.431 1.676 2.070∗∗∗ 9.333∗∗∗ 7.311∗∗∗ 0.316
(0.86) (1.38) (4.47) (3.49) (3.16) (0.20)
Expected Change -0.205 -0.197 -0.203 -0.590 -0.254 -0.160
(-0.88) (-0.40) (-1.12) (-1.23) (-0.35) (-0.45)
Constant 0.363∗∗ -0.064 0.156 0.057 -0.158 -0.006
(2.53) (-0.23) (1.33) (0.46) (-1.21) (-0.03)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 4779 1387 8857 1265 714 3048
R2 .0315 .0385 .0286 .0503 .0507 .0430
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are
the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock 2 (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference of 2-year treasury
rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate; Slopeshock 10 is the difference of 10-year long-term
treasury rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed
fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are
in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 15: Banks’ Daily stock returns to positive and negative interest rate shocks
ab ret ab ret 3days
(1) (2)
Level surprise -0.253∗ -0.460∗∗
(-1.80) (-2.52)
Slopeshock -1.494∗∗∗ -1.489∗∗∗
(-10.31) (-8.44)
Expected change -0.099∗∗∗ -0.031
(-2.59) (-0.65)
Constant -0.020∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(-1.69) (-3.92)
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observation 2871883 2725324
R2 .0012 .0039
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are
the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of 5-year treasury
rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund
rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are in the
parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 16: Daily stock returns to positive and negative interest rate shocks in EZ
Banks Insurance
(1) (2)
Level surprise -1.056∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗
(0.208) (0.441)
Slopeshock -0.298 0.608
(0.196) (0.421)
Expected change -0.448∗∗∗ 0.220
(0.060) (0.127)
Constant -0.107∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗
(0.020) (0.044)
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observation 55551 11385
R2 .0012 .0039
Num of firm 2292 411
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in Euro-zone; it is the daily stocks
return net of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate
which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of 5-year
treasury rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of
fed fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. Standard
errors are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 17: Robustness Tests with Different Long-term Treasury Rates
Life Multi-line P&C Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level Surprise 1.847∗∗∗ 3.025∗∗∗ 2.320∗∗∗ 1.954∗∗∗ 2.644∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗
(3.46) (3.87) (4.97) (2.85) (2.17) (4.26)
Slopeshock 2 1.183∗∗∗ 2.028∗∗ 1.692∗∗∗
(2.63) (2.19) (4.36)
Slopeshock 10 1.140∗∗ 1.373 1.760∗∗∗
(2.07) (0.95) (3.48)
Expected Change -0.346∗ -0.110 -0.230 -0.254 0.027 -0.120
(-1.75) (-0.35) (-1.48) (-1.34) (0.09) (-0.78)
Constant 0.107 -0.146 -0.042 0.099 -0.159 -0.053
(0.83) (-0.99) (-0.25) (0.78) (-1.09) (-0.32)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 6044 2101 11905 6044 2101 11905
R2 .0292 .0368 .0275 .0290 .0352 .0271
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Level surprise (△ffu
t
) is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are
the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates. Slopeshock 2 (△ym −△ffu
t
) is the difference of 2-year treasury
rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate; Slopeshock 10 is the difference of 10-year long-term
treasury rate changes and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate Expected Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed
fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated and clustered by firms. T-values are
in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 18: Robustness test: Time Trend
ab ret ab ret ab ret 3 days ab ret 3 days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target Change -0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.153∗∗∗ -0.021
(-7.52) (-1.33) (-5.28) (-0.37)
SMB 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(18.92) (12.04) (18.78) (15.34)
HML 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(19.99) (12.09) (20.05) (14.93)
Market 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(32.33) (24.34) (32.17) (29.61)
Constant 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.001
(15.71) (2.49) (13.88) (0.19)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Observation 129,038 29,709 125,975 28,968
R2 .1021 .1479 .0898 .1722
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US; it is the stocks return net
of 3 common factors of Fama-French. Target Change is the variations of Fed funds target interest rates on the FOMC
announcement dates. SMB, HML and Market are the daily 3 Fama-French factors. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 19: Robustness: with other long-term debt
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 2.525 -1.802 -4.535 5.127
(0.82) (-0.27) (-0.50) (1.17)
Slopeshock 0.080 -3.397 4.285 1.853
(0.04) (-0.74) (0.68) (0.58)
Maturity gr2 × level surprise -0.215 0.483 4.587 -1.609
(-0.14) (0.17) (1.46) (-0.78)
Maturity gr3 × level surprise 1.288 5.510 9.070∗∗ -1.088
(0.72) (1.54) (2.19) (-0.42)
Maturity gr2 × slopeshock5 1.062 2.282 0.595 0.108
(0.84) (0.92) (0.29) (0.06)
Maturity gr3 × slopeshock5 2.202 8.228∗∗∗ 4.129 -0.275
(1.61) (3.28) (1.32) (-0.15)
Other × level surprise -0.587 5.230 4.143 -4.676
(-0.28) (1.29) (0.68) (-1.42)
Other × slopeshock5 -0.962 5.983∗∗ -7.705∗ -3.676
(-0.58) (2.01) (-1.86) (-1.46)
Expected change -0.200 -0.496∗ 0.027 -0.072
(-1.08) (-1.69) (0.06) (-0.26)
Constant 0.111 0.363 -0.742∗∗ 0.124
(0.59) (1.10) (-2.33) (0.45)
Size×Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mlev× Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
BM×Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
ROA× Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 9820 2760 1365 5695
R2 .03881011 .0592482 .07206968 .04463542
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated
and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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Table 20: Robustness: taking m=10
Insurance Life Multi-line P&C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level surprise 0.703 -2.354 -11.027 2.788
(0.20) (-0.37) (-1.13) (0.59)
Slopeshock -1.724 -3.813 -2.929 -0.453
(-0.64) (-0.81) (-0.40) (-0.12)
Maturity gr2 × level surprise 0.280 1.328 6.229 -1.211
(0.15) (0.41) (1.55) (-0.48)
Maturity gr3 × level surprise 2.201 6.559 11.784∗∗ -0.357
(1.02) (1.54) (2.57) (-0.12)
Maturity gr2 × slopeshock5 1.450 2.938 2.217 0.384
(0.95) (1.04) (0.79) (0.17)
Maturity gr3 × slopeshock5 2.998∗ 8.827∗∗∗ 6.573∗ 0.531
(1.71) (2.75) (1.85) (0.22)
Other × level surprise 0.468 3.921 9.784 -2.840
(0.25) (1.14) (1.70) (-1.04)
Other × slopeshock10 0.208 4.563∗ -0.845 -1.793
(0.15) (1.86) (-0.20) (-0.89)
Expected change -0.163 -0.537∗ 0.082 -0.004
(-0.87) (-1.84) (0.16) (-0.02)
Constant 0.107 0.352 -0.734∗∗ 0.125
(0.57) (1.07) (-2.37) (0.45)
Size×Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mlev× Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
BM×Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
ROA× Interest surprise Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 9820 2760 1365 5695
R2 .03826786 .05924775 .06729506 .04367973
In this table, the dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of insurance companies in US. Level surprise (△ffu
t
)
is the unexpected change of fed fund target rate which are the variations of 30 days fed fund future contract rates.
Slopeshock m (△ym − △ffu
t
) is the difference of long-term treasury rate changes (m can takes the value 2, 5 or 10; m
represents the maturity of long term treasury yield) and unexpected level surprise of fed fund target rate. Expected
Change (△ffe
t
) is the variation of fed fund rate expected by people. The standard errors are corrected by HAC estimated
and clustered by firms. T-values are in the parentheses.
(∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01)
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I conduct an empirical analysis of the changes in banks’ risk-taking due to
stress tests which act as tighter regulatory constraints. After the financial crisis in 2008,
both US and European authorities conducted a series of stress tests to limit the risk-taking
of banks and to strengthen their capital structures. However, the regulator’s objective
of limiting risk-taking may not be aligned with the bank’s private interests, which may
then lead to regulatory arbitrage: if banks face tighter constraints on their investments,
they may wish to strategically take more risks which deviates from the regulator’s aim.
Therefore, understanding the impact of potential new constraints on banks’ risk-taking is
critical for both regulators and policymakers.
The European market suffered a sovereign debt crisis during 2010-2011, resulting in
sustained negative effects on the real economy. In 2013, the GDP of all 17 Eurozone
countries fell by 0.5% and the Eurozone was mired in recession.1 The Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis2 highlighted the nexus between governments and banks with potential adverse
consequences in the supply of credit to the real economy. Therefore, the European Banking
Authority (EBA3) was mandated to conduct EU-wide stress tests in a bottom-up fashion,
using consistent methodologies, scenarios and key assumptions developed in cooperation
with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the European Central Bank (ECB) and
the European Commission (EC).
In the 2011 stress test, regulators start to incorporate EU sovereign risk into the banks’
risk measures, using two test scenarios: a baseline scenario and an adverse scenario. In
the adverse scenario,4 most of the sovereign bonds are downgraded below their current
credit rating levels as hypothetical shocks in order to increase banks’ risk exposure: AAA
sovereigns (no downgrade), AA and A (two notch downgrades), BBB or below (four notch
1See Acharya and Steffen (2014).
2See Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli (2017).
3In this paper, I use EBA to represent the banking union (EBA, ESRB, EC, and ECB).
4See the Methodological Note - Additional guidance of 2011 stress test (Page 5-6) and more in Ap-
pendix 3 C.1.
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downgrades). In the 2014 test,5 the measure6 of sovereign risk is also linked to their credit
ratings.
Since the EBA includes the EU sovereign risk in the measure of banks’ risk exposure
and requests banks to recapitalize, the stress tests act as tighter regulations imposed on
banks’ investments. In this paper, I develop a model along the lines of Glasserman and
Kang (2014) to understand the potential effect of the stress tests on banks’ risk-taking.
The model predicts that banks which are marginally regulatory constrained (i.e., closer
to the binding regulatory constraint) do more regulatory arbitrage than unconstrained
banks (safe banks, i.e., far above the binding constraint) and fragile banks (i.e., below the
binding constraint) after the tests.
Using the EBA database, I test the model’s predictions with a difference-in-difference
approach. After the announcement of the test, if banks are able to raise capital before
submitting their test reports to the central banks, then this recapitalization is included
into the final CET 1 (Common Equity Tier 1) ratio, which is called the adjusted CET 1
ratio. In the 2011 test,7 banks fail the test if their adjusted CET 1 ratio under adverse
scenario is lower than 5%; banks are said by the EBA to “marginally pass the test” if
they have an adjusted CET 1 ratio of 5%-6%; and banks successfully pass the test if their
adjusted CET 1 ratios are larger than 6%.
In the literature, Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016), Efing (2016), Becker and
Ivashina (2015), and Ellul et al. (2011) use the capital ratios to define two groups: regula-
tory constrained firms and unconstrained firms. Instead, I divide tested banks into three
groups according to their CET 1 ratios without including the recapitalization conducted
after the announcement of the tests. An additional group of “marginal banks” (i.e., banks
5See the Methodological Note EU-wide stress test 2014, page 15 and more in Appendix 3 C.2.
6The sovereign risk is incorporated into the Risk Weighted Assets directly through the parameter of
the model. Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD) were calculated for five portfolios
(financial institutions, sovereign, corporate, consumer credit retail, and retail real estate) by using regres-
sion model elasticities linked to the macro variables, national supervisory inputs, the ECB Monetary and
Financial Institutions database, and the LGD database at Moody’s.
7The criteria of the 2014 test can be found in Section 3. In the 2014 test, the criteria to pass the test
is based on the unadjusted CET 1 ratios
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that are marginally regulatory constrained according to the EBA) is very important in
order to test for a non-monotonic relationship between banks’ regulatory arbitrage and
the tightness of their capital constraint. Banks are supervised differently by local central
banks after the release of test results based on whether banks successfully pass the test,
marginally pass the test or fail the test.
Banks engage in regulatory arbitrage on the investment of sovereign bonds by shifting
their holdings of sovereign bonds with the same credit rating from low-yield (lower than
the median) to high-yield. This is because, on a given credit rating, banks can choose
assets with higher yields without increasing the level of risk measured by the regulations.
For instance, consider two sovereign bonds with an AA credit rating in the market: French
and Belgian sovereign bonds. Belgian sovereign bond yields are higher than those of the
French. Suppose that prior to the test, a marginal bank M holds 70% French and 30%
Belgian sovereign bonds and a safe bank S holds 60% French and 40% Belgian sovereign
bonds. Assume that after the test, bank M shifts to hold 30% French and 70% Belgian
sovereign bonds, while bank S continues to hold 60% French and 40% Belgian sovereign
bonds in its basket. Then, bank M does regulatory arbitrage on the AA credit sovereign
bonds while bank S does not, and this shifting is not incorporated into the risk exposure
and CET 1 ratios.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, I find that marginal
banks do risk-shifting more aggressively on sovereigns with the same credit rating than
safe banks and fragile banks: on average, they hold 146.9 and 172.48 more basis points of
riskier sovereign bonds over total sovereigns than the other two groups respectively. Given
that the average percentage of EU sovereigns over total assets in the sample is 12.68%,
such risk-shifting can be executed on this important proportion of banks’ assets.
Secondly, this paper also provides evidence that the home bias in EU sovereigns is
driven not only by pressure from local governments but also by the banks’ appetite for
8Both of these two estimates are statistically significant at the 5% significance level.
102
risk; as evidenced by the fact that banks gamble for the resurrection to earn extra returns,
as in Acharya and Steffen (2015), Crosignani (2015) and Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli
(2017). For instance, in the same country with a poor economy, the marginal banks are
holding more risky home sovereigns than the safe banks.
Thirdly, I find that crowding out between sovereigns and corporate lending exists
among the tested banks. Fragile banks cut their lending to corporates 6.27%* more than
safe banks after the 2014 test. Banks increase the investment proportion of sovereigns
(with very low risk-weights) while they decrease the proportion of loans (with very high
risk-weights).
Finally, this paper also detects an indirect effect of stress tests in the corporate bond
market on banks which are not tested. I find that if an untested bank is located in a
country with negative information shocks from the stress test, then its financing cost on
the corporate bond market will be higher than a bank which is located in a country with
positive information shocks.
The findings in this paper have implications for policymakers. In particular, my find-
ings show the potentially perverse effect of rating-based risk measures. Under the extended
Basel III to be executed in 2018, the leverage ratio which is not a rating-based measure,
becomes a mandatory part. This will prevent banks doing regulatory arbitrage within the
risk-weighting categories. The existence of banks’ regulatory arbitrage identified in this
paper favors the implementation of this regulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review, and Section 3 describes the stress test. In Section 4, I discuss the data, while in
Section 5, I develop the theoretical predictions and summarize the testable hypothesis.
The econometric strategies and main results on banks’ risk-taking are shown in Section
6. The analysis of corporate bond market and stock market reactions are discussed in
Section 7 with robustness tests in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Risk Shifting and Regulatory Arbitrage
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlighted the shareholder’s incentive to engage in
risk-shifting behavior to transfer wealth from bondholders, many studies have attempted
to identify the ways to mitigate this agency problem. These include debt covenants (Smith
andWarner (1979)), debt maturity (Barnea et al. (1980)), convertible debt (Green (1984)),
and managerial compensation (Brander and Poitevin (1992); John and John (1993)).
Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2015) provide the empirical evidence on risk-shifting in the
lending behavior of a large subprime mortgage originator. The implication of my paper
that marginal banks under the stress test engage in risk-shifting to the depositors on the
sovereign bonds is consistent with their paper. Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2015) also
show that firms would like to choose the assets whose returns are more correlated with
their probability of default. New Century originated more loans in regions where real
estate prices are correlated with the return of its “legacy” assets. In my paper, the fact
that banks will shift the risk into the assets (e.g., home sovereign bonds) that are related
to their survival is consistent with the results of Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2015).
Banks are able to do risk-shifting without violating the regulations by increasing the
level of risk, which is called regulatory arbitrage. The evidence that certain financial firms
use regulatory arbitrage to increase risk can be found in different types of investments.
Efing (2016) provides evidence for regulatory arbitrage within the class of asset-backed
securities based on the individual asset holding data of German banks. Conditional on
ratings, insurance companies choose insurance portfolios which are systematically biased
toward higher yield and higher CDS bonds (Becker and Ivashina (2015)). Banks can also
take more risks by putting assets off-balance sheet (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)).
Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016) predict that banks wanting to take more risks than
permitted by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage. Besides,
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Houston, Lin, and Ma (2011) find strong evidence that banks have transferred funds to
markets with fewer regulations. This paper studies banks’ risk-shifting on sovereign bond
investments.
It is evident that banks may do regulatory arbitrage. However, there is no single driv-
ing force behind regulatory arbitrage that is widely accepted. On the one hand, Spamann
(2010) argues that regulatory arbitrage is driven by misaligned managerial incentives that
lead banks to take on excessive risk. Other researchers argue that exploiting too-big-
to-fail subsidies is a major determinant of regulatory arbitrage by large banks (Acharya
and Richardson (2009), Carbo-Valverde, Kane, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2013)). On the
contrary, Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016) find strong evidence that the too-big-to-
fail status is not the main driver of regulatory arbitrage. I find no evidence to support
the concept that larger banks would do more regulatory arbitrage, which supports the
findings of Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016).
2.2 Holding of EU Sovereigns and Home Bias in EU
The significant increase in the holdings of home sovereigns from 2010 to 2015 in EU
banks is noticeable and well documented. There are two main branches of explanations
for this trend. Uhlig (2014) proposes the “moral suasion” hypothesis whereby the banks’
rapidly increasing balance sheet exposures to the domestic sovereign debt during the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis led both academics and policymakers to speculate that
this development was partly the result of domestic sovereigns putting pressure on some
banks to extend material support to the government. The estimates of Ongena, Popov,
and Van Horen (2016) consistently suggest that collusion between banks and sovereigns (or
“moral suasion”) took place during the sovereign debt crisis. De Marco and Macchiavelli
(2016) and Becker and Ivashina (2014) also support the “moral suasion” theory.
Other researchers suggest that banks follow a “carry trade” strategy to gamble for
the resurrection to earn extra returns, as suggested by Acharya and Steffen (2015) and
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Crosignani (2015). Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli (2017) show the evidence that in GI-
IPS9 countries, the banks with low regulatory capital increase their holdings of distressed
public debt more than the others. In my paper, I show that not only would the banks
in the GIIPS countries with low regulatory capital increase their holdings of distressed
public debt more than the others, but also the banks with low regulatory capital outside
the GIIPS countries.
2.3 Stress Testing and Information Disclosure
There are two distinct channels documented by the literature through which financial
shocks propagate across institutions. The first channel is the direct linkage between banks:
when two parties write a financial contract such as a swap agreement, a negative shock to
one party can be transmitted to the other as soon as one is unable to honor the contract
Giglio et al. (2011). Direct linkages of this type can propagate distress, because, once
defaulted upon, the creditor bank may lack the funds required to deliver on its obligations
to third parties (Duffie (2013), Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci (2016), Diebold and
Yılmaz (2014)).
The second channel is the indirect linkage between banks through the common assets
held across banks. Tressel (2010) claims that cascade effects can be triggered by bank
losses or contractions of interbank lending activities. After the shocks on assets or on
the liabilities of banks, global de-leveraging of international banking activities can occur.
Also, Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2015) show that fire sales propagate shocks
across bank balance sheets.
The information released by EBA on the stress tests is vast, and how it is transmitted
and affects the market is highly relevant. Camara, Pessarossi, and Philippon (2016)
show that the stress tests are informative. Petrella and Resti (2013) focus on the 2011
EU-wide stress test by using the event study method, and they find that stress tests
9 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain
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produce valuable information for market participants and can play a role in mitigating
bank opaqueness. Goldstein and Sapra (2012) emphasize that the disclosure of stress test
results can achieve the macro-prudential role of helping to stabilize the financial system
as a whole, but may not necessarily achieve the micro-prudential role of providing market
discipline for specific individual banks.
Cardinali and Nordmark (2011) study the stock market reaction to the 2010 and 2011
EU stress tests. They find that the test results in 2010 are relatively uninformative for
investors and that the announcement of the methodology to be used in 2011 triggers
negative CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) for tested banks, while non-tested insti-
tutions are roughly unaffected. Also, Petrella and Resti (2013) show that the abnormal
returns of tested banks are strongly related to some stress test outputs and that stress
tests have provided investors with relevant information. On the contrary, Candelon and
Sy (2015) show that the 2011 EU exercise is the only EU-wide stress test that results
in a significantly negative market reaction. The comparison with past exercises suggests
that the qualitative aspects of the governance of stress tests may matter for stock market
participants more than the technical elements, such as the level of the minimum capital
adequacy threshold or the extent of data disclosure. In this paper, I also assess the direct
effect and indirect effect of the information disclosure from the stress test on the corporate
bond market.
3 EU-wide Stress Tests
The stress tests are run under general macro-economic scenarios across all countries in
the EU. The results shed light on the sensitivities of the European banking sector to a
general economic downturn and movements in external variables, such as interest rates,
economic growth and the unemployment rate.
There are two types of scenarios in the tests: (1) a baseline scenario, which is primarily
based on the European Commission forecast, and (2) an adverse scenario, which assumes
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the existence of a series of external economic shocks, such as a set of EU shocks tied
to the persistence of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, a global negative demand shock
originating in the US, and a USD depreciation to all currencies. Based on these two types
of scenarios, EBA calculates the exposure levels of banks to different types of risk in future
years, including credit risk, market risk, sovereign risk, and securitization risk. 10
After the announcement of the test in Jan 2011, banks have three months to raise new
capital (recapitalization) before submitting their reports to the local central banks. The
EBA then releases the test results on 15th July 2011 and re-supervises banks who have
not successfully passed the test. A similar time line for the 2014 EU stress test can be
found in Appendix II B.
Criteria to pass the test. The criteria to pass the test is based on the Common
Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) ratio, which is defined as:
CET1 ratio = CET1
RWA
,
where Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) is assessed according to the Basel III,11 and RWA,
referring to risk weighted asset,12 consists of exposure to the debtors, probability of default
and loss given default.
10Based on the static balance sheet in 2010, the 2011 EU-wide test provided exposures to different risks
in 2011 and 2012. The 2014 EU-wide stress test, based on the 2013 balance sheet data, provided the
exposure values in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016.
11Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (December
2010), page 13.
12See definition of RWA of 2011 test and 2014 in CRR/CRD 3 and CRR/CRD 4 respectively.
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Criteria to pass the tests
CET 1 Successfully passed Marginally passed Failed
2011 test > 6% 5% ∼ 6% ≦ 5%
2014 test > 6.5% 5.5% ∼ 6.5% ≦ 5.5%
For a bank to pass the 2011 stress test, the adjusted CET 1 ratio under the adverse
scenario for the bank has to be greater than 5%. If the CET 1 ratio is between 5% and
6%, the bank is said to marginally pass the test. If the CET 1 ratio is greater than 6%,
the bank is defined by the EBA to pass the test successfully. Meanwhile, a bank passes
the 2014 stress test if its CET 113 ratios under adverse scenarios and baseline scenarios
are greater than 5.5% and 8% respectively. A bank marginally passes the 2014 test if its
CET 1 ratio under the adverse scenario is between 5.5% and 6.5%, and successfully passes
the 2014 test if the ratio is higher than 6.5%.
After the 2011 test, the EBA recommends that marginally passed banks whose CET
1 ratios under the adverse scenario are above but close to 5%, and which have sizable
exposure to EU sovereigns under stress, take specific steps14 to strengthen their capital
positions. These banks are expected to plan remedial actions within three months. The
plans need to be fully implemented within nine months (by April 2012).
In contrast, failed banks whose final CET 1 ratios are below the 5% threshold, must
first promptly remedy the capital shortfall. Then national supervisors should ensure
that these banks are requested to present a plan to restore the capital position to their
competent authorities within three months. The remedial measures that should be agreed
with the competent authority have to be fully implemented by end of 2011. Similar actions
are taken after the 2014 stress test.
13Unlike the 2011 test, in the 2014 test the criteria of passing the test is based on the CET 1 ratio
before the recapitalization.
14Including necessary restrictions on dividends, de-leveraging, issuance of fresh capital or conversion of
lower quality instruments into CET1 capital.
109
4 Summary Statistics
Banks’ investment portfolios during 2010-2015 are available from the EBA15 public database.
European sovereign bond yields to maturity and daily stock returns can be extracted from
DataStream during the same period. In addition, the European sovereign debt auctions,
corporate bonds daily returns from 2007 to 2016 and sovereign bond outstanding amounts
from the Eikon database are available. The Infinancial database and the Oribis bank focus
provide most of the European banks balance sheet data. Finally, three daily Fama-French
European factors are extracted from Kenneth French website.
4.1 Sample of Banks in the Dataset
There are two stress tests in the estimation sample, which are performed in 2011 and 2014
respectively. The EBA requires local central banks to capture at least 50% of the national
banking sectors in each EU member state, as expressed in terms of total consolidated
assets. In the end, the 2011 EU-wide stress test is carried out on a group of banks
covering over 65% total assets of the EU banking system and the 2014 stress test covers
more than 70% of total EU banking assets.
Banks have been included in the tests in descending order of their market shares based
on the total assets of each Member State. As the tests are conducted at the highest level of
consolidation, the tests cover all subsidiaries and branches operating in foreign countries.
If the total assets of the tested banks in every Member State are more than 50% then no
other bank has to be included from that Member State; unless they wish to do so on a
voluntary basis.
Ninety banks16 are tested in 2011 and 123 banks are tested in 2014; 72 banks are both
included in the two tests and 51 new banks appear in the 2014 test. In other words, 18
banks are excluded from the sample in 2014, due either to bankruptcy or mergers. Using
15http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing
16The list of tested banks is in Appendix III.
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the database provided by EBA, we can trace the portfolios held by 71 tested banks17 after
the test. In September 2011, December 2011, June 2012, and December 2012, the EU
capital exercise provides us with further information about the banks after the 2011 stress
test. Also, for the second test, the EBA releases the banks’ data in the following months:
June 2013, December 2013, December 2014, and June 2015.
4.2 Distribution of Banks across Regions
After the announcement of the test in 2011, tested banks can re-capitalize new funds
to increase their current CET 1 ratios. Between January and April 2011, a further net
amount of EUR 50 billion18 of capital is raised. This evidence shows that banks know their
CET 1 ratios before submitting reports to the national central banks, and they can raise
capital before submitting their final and adjusted CET 1 ratios. In this paper, I divide the
sample into three groups according to the CET 1 ratios before the recapitalization: safe
banks (CET 1 ratio higher than 6%), marginal banks (CET 1 ratio between 5%-6%), and
fragile banks (CET 1 ratio below 5%). This ratio does not include the re-capitalization
induced by the test; in other words, the grouping CET 1 ratio does not depend on the
test.
As shown in the time-line in the last section, banks may carry out recapitalization after
the announcement of the test. In the released reports, the results of the test are based
on the CET 1 ratios computed after the adjustment (i.e., including the re-capitalization
amount before the end of April 2011). If the tested banks have not adjusted their capital
after the announcement of the test, 20 banks would have failed the test and 13 banks
17Six Greek banks were addressed in the Greek program so the their data is not available immediately
after the 2011 test (in September 2011, December 2011).
18EUR 46 bn net of reimbursement of capital support was received from governments, as shown
in the report of the results in 2011 from http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/EBA
ST 2011 Summary Report v6.pdf. This was achieved through: (i) the issuance by the banks of common
equity in the private market; (ii) government injections of capital or the provision of other public facil-
ities; (iii) conversion of lower-quality capital instruments (such as hybrid instruments) into CET1; and
(iv) restructuring plans approved by all competent authorities and fully committed which was factored
into the results.
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Figure 1: Test results before and after recapitalization
Note: On the left-hand side, CET 1 ratio before re-capitalization; on the right-hand side,
the test results of 2011 stress test, adjusted CET 1 ratio including the recapitalization
during Jan and Apr, 2011.
would have marginally passed the test. More details are shown in Figure 1. Similarly, in
the 2014 stress test (see Appendix 2 B), the unadjusted CET 1 ratio is lower than the
adjusted value on average. Differing from the 2011 test, the test results in the 2014 test
are not based on the adjusted CET 1 ratios, but on the unadjusted values.
Taking into account these capital-raising actions implemented by the end of April 2011,
eight banks fall below the capital threshold of 5% CET 1, with an overall CET 1 shortfall
of EUR2.5 bn. In the 2014 test, there are 24 banks with a CET 1 below 5.5% before the
recapitalization and only 14 banks below the threshold after the recapitalization during
the period from January to September, 2014.
After the 2008 financial crisis, banks located in different countries face different chal-
lenges, especially the five Eurozone nations that are considered to have a weaker economy:
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (called GIIPS in this paper). On 10th May
2010, European leaders approved a 750 billion Euro stabilization package to support these
nations. Figure 219 shows the number of different groups of banks distributed in GIIPS
19The distribution of the 2014 test can also be found in Appendix 2 B.
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Figure 2: Distribution of banks across regions
Note: Fragile banks’ CET 1 ratio (before re-capitalization) lower than 5 % under the
adverse scenario in the 2011 test; marginal banks’ CET 1 ratio between 5 % and 6 %; safe
banks’ CET 1 ratio higher than 6 %.
and non-GIIPS countries.
4.3 Annual Accounting Variables
Safe banks are on average much larger than marginal banks, which are in turn slightly
larger than fragile banks. The growth of total assets is similar across groups prior to the
tests (see Figure 3). Furthermore, fragile banks have much higher ratios of loans to total
assets compared to the other banks (0.7, 0.6688 and 0.5734, respectively). Regulatory
constrained banks lend more but have lower return rates on assets.
From the criteria to pass the stress test, we know that if a bank wants to increase
its capital ratio, it has several options: first, increasing its capital ratio by generating
new funds; and second, cutting RWA by either selling risky assets or shifting assets from
risky ones into less risky ones. Both the generation of new funds and the re-balancing
of portfolios are very costly and time-consuming, while selling risky assets is the fastest
way to re-increase the capital ratio. After selling risky assets whose expected returns are
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Figure 3: The evolution of some variables in tested banks
Note: The left graph shows the evolution of total asset at t scaled down by last year’s
total asset
TAi,t
TAi,t−1
. The right graph shows the evolution of
loani,t
TAi,t
.
generally high, banks can pay back the debt holders and may end up with smaller sizes.
There are two possible reasons to do so: either to lower the leverage ratio or to avoid the
high cost when keeping low return assets. From Figure 3, we find that after two tests, the
total size and the return on asset20 of the fragile banks are smaller, and the lending rate
is decreasing, which may infer that those banks sell assets with high risk-weights.
4.4 Credit Exposures
Banks are required to assess the impact of given macroeconomic scenarios (baseline and
adverse) on their future credit risk losses and credit qualities. There are seven classes
of credit exposure defined according to the counter-parties, shown as follows: central
governments or central banks, institutions, corporates, retail, equity, securitization, and
others. After the 2011 test, there is no further data disclosed on the credit exposure.
Since this data is available after 2014 test, I focus more on the second test in the analysis
of banks’ credit exposure.
From Figure 7 in Appendix 2 , we see the decreasing trend of credit exposures to central
20In Figure 6
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banks or government, corporates and retails. The above figure explains that fragile banks
and marginal banks keep the exposure to central banks or local government around the
test, while safe banks decrease this percentage after the test. Fragile banks cut their
lending to financial institutions around 10% while the other two groups of banks hold
it almost unchanged. All groups of banks reduce their holdings of retail loans after the
test which are in general of shorter maturity compared to corporate loans. Interestingly,
fragile banks reduce their exposure to corporates (from 24% to 16.5%) more than safe
banks (from 19% to 17%).
4.5 Sovereign Exposures
Unlike the other types of banks’ credit exposures, such as exposures to corporates, retails
and institutions, the sovereign exposures of banks differ in that the counter-parties of the
sovereigns are the same for every bank. Therefore, a shock to the sovereign bond i will
produce the same effect for every bank.
Figure 8 of Appendix II shows the average of (
Sovereigni,t
totalasseti,t
). The average percentages
of gross sovereign exposures, loans and advances, asset for sales and held for trading
are constant for all banks. However, the following graphs show that banks are changing
the maturity structure of the portfolios; after the stress tests, banks are increasing the
percentage of longer term sovereigns and shorting more on the short-term assets. The
bottom graphs in Figure 8 shows that the amount of assets for sale drives the maturity of
sovereign exposures to the longer term, while those of loans and advances which represent
a large percentage of sovereign exposures are much less volatile across time. As shown
in Figure 9 of Appendix II, safe banks are holding their shares of long-term sovereigns
constant.
In Table 1, I present the average percentages of higher yield sovereigns over total
sovereigns within one credit rating21 across groups, before and after the tests. Marginally
21There are six credit ratings: AAA, AA, A, BBB, B and C.
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Table 1: Summary of sovereign bonds
Before After Difference
Group Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff(t) t-value
Safe banks
RA=1 17.006 18.213 26.502 30.698 9.49** 1.944
RA=0 82.994 73.498
Marginal banks
RA=1 31.504 22.661 68.471 45.127 36.97*** 2.351
RA=0 68.496 31.529
Fragile banks
RA=1 27.714 22.024 30.034 36.218 2.32 0.229
RA=0 72.286 69.966
DID (2-1) 14.497* 8.183 41.97*** 11.152 27.47** 1.99
DID (2-3) 3.789 10.355 38.44** 14.645 34.647* 1.93
The sovereign bonds defined as RA=1 are those sovereign bonds with higher yields than the
median in one credit rating, while the sovereign bonds defined as RA=0 have yields lower than
the median prior to the test. The first two columns are the mean and standard deviation of
sovereign bond percentages Sovereign(i,t,RA=1)
TotalSovereigni,t
prior to the test; the middle two columns are
the percentages of sovereign bonds after the test; the last two columns present the differences
between before and after the test and their t-values. DID(2-1) shows the difference-in-difference
between marginal banks and safe banks. DID(2-3) includes the difference-in-difference between
marginal banks and fragile banks.
constrained banks have increased much more aggressively on the holding of higher yield
sovereigns on one credit rating than other groups.
In Figures 10 and 11 of Appendix II, I observe that the number of GIIPS sovereign
exposures is not decreasing; while it even shows a slightly increasing trend over the period,
especially for the marginal banks and failed banks. Constrained banks (fragile banks and
marginal banks) tend to take more risky assets. In the right-hand graph of Figure 10 the
percentages of the risky debts are at first decreasing then increasing afterwards among
the constrained banks.
Meanwhile, I also document the variations of non-GIIPS sovereign bond holdings.
Apparently, safe banks are holding less non-GIIPS sovereign bonds after the test, while on
average the remaining marginal banks are not decreasing their shares of those sovereign
bonds. The holding variations between groups again confirms the different investment
strategies taken by banks when they face a poor economy or strict supervision from
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regulators.
4.6 Summary of Corporate Bond Market
In Table 5, the summary statistics of banks’ corporate bonds are presented. The corporate
bond yields of tested banks are on average lower than those of non-tested banks; similar
results are shown between non-constrained and constrained banks. Two different bid-ask
spreads (in percentage) are also presented in the summary table. The first spread is
computed using composite prices22 and the second spread using evaluated prices.23
5 Economic Hypothesis
I develop the economic hypothesis in this section based on an extension of the model of
Glasserman and Kang (2014). In contrast to their model, I introduce fragile banks and
punishment from regulators into the model. Banks’ risk-taking behavior can be explained
by a standard version of maximizing expected payoffs given different levels of appetite for
risk. There are two periods and N assets in the economy.
5.1 Banks without Regulatory Constraints
Without regulatory constraints, banks maximize their value function V by choosing an
optimum portfolio x (x ∈ RN+ ) at time t = 0 according to Glassman and Kang (2014):
max
x
V (x) = µTx− γ
2
xTΣx.
The parameter γ reflects the unregulated bank’s concern for risk, µ is the expected
excess return of banks’ assets and Σ represents assets’ covariance matrix. Banks have the
optimal portfolio x∗0 if they are unregulated:
22 Thomson Reuters receives bond prices from multiple contributors. The bid and ask (CMPB &
CMPA) composite values will be the average from all the available contributors’ bid and ask quotes.
23Thomson Reuters Pricing Service (TRPS) evaluated prices are provided daily for a global universe of
fixed income securities using evaluation models developed and maintained by the Fixed Income Pricing
Service team at Thomson Reuters.
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⇒ x∗0 = Σ
−1µ
γ
5.2 Regulator’s Objective
The regulator’s objective is to stabilize the market by minimizing the risk in the banks’
portfolios. This minimization problem is equivalent24 to the maximization function under
regulation constraints at t = 1 (the model is shown in Appendix 3 C.3). The optimal
portfolios chosen by the regulators, denoted y∗1 (see C.3.1), can be implemented by im-
posing a required capital ratio on banks and assigning different risk-weights (w) to banks’
assets.
5.3 Banks under Regulatory Constraints
In the stress tests, banks that cannot meet the regulatory constraints will be punished
by the regulators through the reconstruction of their capital under force. Under the
reconstruction process, failed banks have to either generate new capital at a high cost or
sell risky assets at depreciated prices. Six of the eight failed banks in the 2011 tests were
eventually acquired or merged with other banks.
In this setting, banks that cannot meet the regulatory constraints may face a punish-
ment P with probability 1 − π, where π ∈ [0, 1),25 and P can be the loss from capital
reconstruction. K is the required capital level and w is the risk-weights assigned to the
assets in order to exercise the regulators’ optimal choice.
The objective function for all types of banks at t = 1 becomes:
max
x
V (x) = π(µTx− γ
2
xTΣx) + (1− π)P

π = 1 if xTw ≤ K
π ∈ [0, 1) if xTw > K
.
24Under the assumption that the return of x is normally distributed. Regulators’ minimization of
banks’ probability of default can be transformed into the minimization problem of risk level.
25P and pi can be a function of x. To simplify the solutions of the model, I assume that P is independent
of x and pi is a constant.
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At t = 1, for banks that are able to meet the regulatory constraints, the objective
function under regulation constraints is:
max
x
µTx− γ
2
xTΣx
s.t. xTw ≤ K
⇒ x∗1 = 1γΣ−1µ− (w
TΣ−1µ−γK)+
wTΣ−1w
1
γ
Σ−1w.
If the regulatory constraints are not binding, then banks choose x∗1 = x
∗
0. Banks are
very solid from the regulators’ viewpoint (holding enough adequate capital), in the sense
that whether the regulations26 arrive or not will not affect those banks’ optimal portfolio
choices.
However, if the regulatory constraints are binding, we have x∗1 6= x∗0. Regulators can
set optimal risk-weights27 w∗ = αµ, which allows x∗1 to meet the following two conditions
at the same time:
(1) x∗1 = y
∗
1, banks choose the portfolios which coincide with regulators’ optimal choice;
(2) x∗1 =
KΣ−1µ
αµTΣ−1µ
is proportional to x∗0 =
Σ−1µ
γ
, banks’ relative mix of assets unchanged.
5.4 Banks’ Regulatory Arbitrage
Practical obstacles prevent the implementation of w∗ = αµ in the real economy. In
the Basel framework, regulators design the risk-weights (w = αδ) linear to the standard
deviation of the category of assets δ rather than their expected returns µ. Therefore,
binding banks can always take extra risks by selecting the assets with higher yields within
the same risk-weights without making the constraint tighter (See C.3.3). The deviation
choice of the portfolio allows banks to take the extra risk without violating the regulations
in the real economy; we call this banks’ regulatory arbitrage. That is equivalent to say
that banks do risk-shifting within the same risk-weights asset categories.
26It can also be applied to the tighter regulations case.
27Proposition 1 in Glasserman and Kang (2014).
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Proposition 1: (i) If banks’ regulation constraints are not binding (unconstrained by
regulations), then x∗1 = x
∗
0. Banks’ optimal portfolios are not changed by the regulations;
(ii) If banks’ constraints are binding and the optimal weights are linear to the risk, w =
αδ, then x∗1 6= x∗0. Constrained banks can deviate from regulators’ optimal choice y∗ by
conducting regulatory arbitrage.
Given these results, I expect that marginally regulatory constrained banks will conduct
more regulatory arbitrage than safe banks after the stress tests in the empirical studies.
Safe banks in this paper have relatively higher capital ratios than regulatory constrained
banks; a similar application can be found in the literature.28 In contrast to the literature
(only regulatory constrained banks and regulatory unconstrained banks are defined), I
define safe banks, marginally constrained banks and fragile banks in this paper. Fragile
banks have a capital ratio below the threshold required by the regulators.
If banks are fragile and have difficulty in meeting the regulatory constraints, they will
maximize the piecewise utility function within the second interval at t = 1. Proof is shown
in Appendix 3. At the optimal, there are two possible cases.
Proposition 2: (i) If P < P¯ 29, or Σµ
−1w
K
> γ > γ¯, fragile banks shift their portfolio
x (within the red line domain on the left-hand graph of Figure 4) in order to get a capital
level closer to K; (ii) If P > P¯ or γ < γ¯, fragile banks keep their optimal x∗1 = x
∗
0 just as
under the maximization case without constraints.
That is, fragile banks are not necessarily doing more regulatory arbitrage under the
punishment framework. If both P and π depend explicitly on x, the results still hold.
Taking the special case π = 0, the payoffs are similar to the typical risk-shifting
theory. Shareholders are protected by limited liability and want to take risks to maximize
their option-like payoff (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The expected payoff of banks’
shareholders behaves like a call option value, with its value increasing in the standard
deviation of the underlying assets x.
28Boyson, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2016), Efing (2016), Becker and Ivashina (2015), Ellul et al (2011)
29P¯ =
V ((x=K
w
))−V (x=x∗
0
))
1−pi , γ¯ =
( K
W
)TΣ( K
W
)−pi(x∗
0
)TΣx∗
0
2((1−pi)P− K
W
µ)−pix∗
0
µ)
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Figure 4: Banks’ V value and current asset values
Case (i) of Proposition 2 on the left-hand graph, Case (ii) of Proposition 2 on the right-hand
graph. Value function V is on the y-axis and asset portfolios x on the x-axis.
Figure 5: Banks’ expected net payoff and current bank value
The x-axis of the graphs is the current asset portfolio x; the y-axis of the upper graph is share-
holders’ net expected payoff; the y-axis of the lower graph is the derivative of the shareholders’
expected net payoff with respect to the standard deviation of their portfolios.
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As shown in Figure 5, banks prefer to take the most risk when their bank values are
closed to the strike price K30 (the required capital level); if regulatory constraints are
imposed on their investments, risk-shifting may occur. However, banks with underlying
asset values much smaller than K would have a relatively lower appetite for risk than
banks with relatively higher bank values. Banks31 with a much higher franchise value,
located on the right-hand side of the graph, take less risk and hold more capital, because
these banks have more to lose if they fail.
In summary, marginally regulatory constrained banks will engage in more regulatory
arbitrage after the stress test (acting as a tighter regulation imposed on banks) than
unconstrained banks. Since doing regulatory arbitrage may not make a difference on
fragile banks’ expected net payoffs, they may not do so. Fragile banks may want to
take less risky assets or generate more capital so as to meet the regulatory constraints.
Therefore, I have the following hypotheses to test:
Hypothesis 1 : Due to the stress tests, safe banks will conduct less regulatory
arbitrage than marginal banks which are more regulatory constrained compared to safe
banks; the difference in regulatory arbitrage between marginal banks and safe banks will
be greater in the 2014 test.
Hypothesis 2 : Fragile banks do less regulatory arbitrage than other banks after the
stress test, and may take less risk than other banks.
30 K is the outstanding debt amount under the classical option value theory. Here K is the required
capital level.
31(Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996), Repullo (2004)).
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6 Main Results on Banks’ Risk-taking
6.1 Econometric Strategy
I test the hypotheses stated in the last section as follows. Consider the following linear
fixed effect model:
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
=β1Post×Groupi ×RAj + β2Post×Groupi + β3Groupi ×RAj
+ β4Post×RAj + FE + Controls+ εi,j,t,
where Sovereigni,j,t is the amount of sovereign bonds of country j owned by bank i at
time t, and TSi,t denotes the total sovereign bonds of bank i at time t. The variable Post
is the time dummy such that Post = 0 if the time t is one year before the stress test and
Post = 1 otherwise. For each test, the time window is three years: (1) in the first test,
t=2010, 2011, 2012; (2) in the second test, t=2013, 2014, 2015. The group dummy Groupi
indicates three groups of banks which are divided according to their core capital ratios
under the adverse scenario before recapitalization: safe(>= 6%), marginal(5%− 6%) and
fragile(< 5%). I define RAj = 1 if, the yield spread of sovereign bond j is higher than the
median within the same risk-weighting category, and RAj = 0 otherwise. For instance, in
December 2010, the credit ratings of Spanish and Belgian sovereign bonds are AA+/Aa1
according to the Moody & Fitch reports. After computing the average spread yields of
Spanish and Belgian sovereign bonds by using the last year’s yields,32 we know that the
average yields of the Spanish sovereign bonds are greater than the average yields of the
Belgian bonds. Then, we have RAj = 1 if the sovereign bond is the Spanish bond and
RAj = 0 if the sovereign bond is the Belgian bond.
When estimating the parameters, I set marginal banks as the benchmark, so that
β1 measures the difference between safe banks (or fragile banks) and marginal banks in
32In the robustness check, the last three-month or six-month yields are used to define the variable RA.
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terms of the shifting of sovereign bonds within one credit rating before or after the test.
According to the hypotheses in the last section, I expect that the (2 × 1) column vector
of β1 should be negative. Banks’ fixed effect (FE) is absorbed, and the standard errors
are clustered at bank level.
6.2 Control Variables
Home bias effect. I define the dummy local country = 1 if the sovereign bond is
local and local country = 0 otherwise. In the regression, I include local country and its
interaction term with time trend local country × T imeTrend to rule out the home bias
effect.
Sovereign bond fixed effect. I use the dummy sovereignj and its interaction with
time trend (sovereignj × T imeTrend) to control for the sovereign bond fixed effect. In
the robustness check concerning the price shocks or supply shocks on the sovereign bonds,
I also include the price evolution and issued amount of the sovereigns to verify my results.
Credit rating. I define the dummy ratingLevel indicating six levels of credit ratings
of the sovereign bonds: AAA, AA, A, B, BBB and C. Then I use it to interact with
Groupi × Post to control for banks’ appetite for each credit rating.
Bank characteristics. Previous bank size logsizei,t−1, deposit rates
depositi,t−1
sizei,t−1
and loan
percentages
loani,t−1
sizei,t−1
which may affect the holding of the sovereign bonds are controlled in
the robustness check.
6.3 Main Results
In this subsection, I present the results of the empirical analysis of the banks’ risk-shifting
on sovereign bond investments. The holding of sovereign bonds captures an important
proportion of around 12.68% of the total assets in a bank.
124
6.3.1 Risk-taking on Sovereign Bond Investments
Difference across groups after the tests. From Proposition 3, I expect that the
coefficient β1, which measures the preference of high yield sovereign bonds over low yield
sovereign bonds, with the same crediting rating before and after the test across the groups,
is significantly negative. Table 8 shows that, compared to fragile banks, marginal banks
have on average shifted 21.4** more basis points (scaled down by total assets, 1.209 % if
scaled down by total sovereigns) from less profitable sovereign bonds to more profitable
sovereign bonds within the same credit rating after the 2011 test. This indicator of the
effect is the same but not pronounced in the comparison between safe banks and marginal
banks after the test.
Difference across groups prior to the tests. Prior to the stress test, banks can
take the level of EU sovereign bonds without constraints. Banks’ investment strategies
are different across the groups and they choose different optimal levels of the sovereign
bonds. Marginal banks may prefer Belgian government bonds to French government
bonds to the extent that are not necessarily different from safe banks prior to the 2011
test. In other words, within the same credit rating of sovereigns, I expect that the banks’
coefficient of the RA×Safe (or RA×Fragile) is not significant prior to the 2011 test. As
shown in Tables 6 and 26, the estimates are close to 0 (0.053 and 0.092) and insignificant
(t-value: 0.34 and 0.55). There is no significant difference in the holding of sovereign
bonds between safe banks and marginal banks (or between marginal banks and fragile
banks) due to the preference of high-yield sovereign bonds or low-yield sovereign bonds
in the same credit rating. These estimates coincide with the summary statistic results in
Table 1.
However, after the 2011 test, banks may change the investment strategies of EU
sovereign bonds for two main reasons. Firstly, due to the fact that EU sovereign bonds be-
come riskier, banks may want to re-balance their portfolios. Therefore, they may change
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their holdings across different credit-rating categories instead of within the same credit
ratings. For instance, shifting from a German bond to a Netherlands bond will not change
much in terms of the level of risk or future yields on their portfolios, since German bonds
and Netherlands bonds are all rated as AAA by different credit agencies. However, by
selling the Greek bonds (with a B rating) and buying the German bonds (AAA rating),
banks shift their portfolios across different credit ratings. Secondly, the constraints of
investment on these sovereign bonds becomes tighter. The EBA asks banks to provide
provisions on these bonds, which affects banks’ sovereign holdings and may motivate con-
strained banks to perform regulatory arbitrage. Therefore, in the 2014 test, the estimates
of RA× Safe (or RA× Fragile) may be significant. Table 8 shows that given sovereign
bonds with the same credit rating, marginal banks on average have around 35.4** to
36.1** more basis points in the holding of high yield ones than safe banks and fragile
banks.
Difference between first and second tests. In the 2014 stress test, the EBA values
the EU sovereign bond risk to be more important: the influence of the EU sovereign
risk on the risk parameters in the model directly affects every bank’s RWA value and
CET 1 ratio. In other words, the regulation becomes tighter on the sovereign bond risk.
Therefore, I expect to have larger estimates of parameters in the 2014 test which are
confirmed by the results in Table 8. After the 2014 test, marginal banks conduct more
regulatory arbitrage on sovereign bonds than safe banks, by holding more than 1.729
%** in sovereign bonds with higher yields than those with lower yields. This percentage,
which represents the shifting from low yield to high yield within the same credit rating,
is almost doubled compared to that in the 2011 test. Similar results can be found when
marginal banks and fragile banks are compared. These estimates test the hypotheses:
banks that are marginally constrained can take more risk by conducting more regulatory
arbitrage than unconstrained banks (safe banks), while fragile banks do not conduct more
regulatory arbitrage than other banks because they are unable to make a positive net
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payoff by shifting risk while leave the credit rating risk unchanged.
6.3.2 What Drives the Home Bias?
When banks’ fixed effects are not included (column (1) in Table 6 and Table 7), the esti-
mate of β1 is significantly more negative than those discussed in the last two paragraphs.
This estimate is reduced by half after the home bias effect is controlled for. One expla-
nation is that the home bias effect is very pronounced in EU sovereign bonds, especially
after the EU sovereign crisis. Becker and Ivashina (2014) state that at the end of 2013,
the share of government debt held by the domestic banking sectors of Eurozone countries
has more than doubled its level of 2007.
Is it the pressure from local government that leads banks to aggressively hold more
local sovereign bonds than previously held, as stated in Steven, Alexander, Neeltje (2016)?
Or do banks prefer to hold more sovereigns and follow a “carry trade” strategy to gamble
for the resurrection to earn extra returns, as suggested by Acharya and Steffen (2015)?
In my paper, I find that the estimate coefficient of the local dummy is 6.5%*, which
explains around 50% of the sovereign bond holdings.33 If it is only the pressure from the
local central banks that makes the banks hold more their home sovereign bonds, then the
estimates of localc × Groupj × Post should be insignificant. That is to say, there is no
difference between safe banks and marginal banks in the holdings of local sovereign bonds
before or after the test. In Tables 10 to 13, I present the home bias preference across
different groups in the two tests.
We find that marginal banks hold on average 3.869%* more home sovereign bonds
in total assets than safe banks located in the same country after the 2011 test. Similar
results can be found if I scale down bank i’s amount of sovereigns in country j by its
total sovereign bonds (presented in Table 11). However, fragile banks have a similar
preference on home sovereigns after the test as marginal banks, since the percentages of
33On average, banks hold 12.68% sovereign bonds in total assets.
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home sovereigns in total sovereigns are not significantly different (-6.04%, with t-value
-0.71 in Table 11).
Up to 2013, the holding of home sovereigns is very high (around 67.34%) on average.
Therefore, we expect the home bias effect will be insignificantly different across groups in
the 2014 test. The results in Table 12 confirm that the difference in the percentages of
local sovereigns in total assets between groups is not pronounced.
My results favor the ideas of Acharya and Steffen (2015), where banks bet on the
resurrection on sovereigns from the government in order to earn extra returns. Besides
the pressure from the local government, the banks’ preference for risk also plays a role in
the holdings of home sovereigns. Marginal banks have a greater appetite in the risk of
local sovereigns than safe banks.
6.3.3 Which Credit Rating of Sovereigns is Most Preferred Among Banks?
The estimates of Post×Safe×Level will show which credit rating the sovereigns belong
to are most preferred by banks after the test. Recall that Level indicates the credit
ratings of sovereigns. As shown in Table 8, banks have no distinct preference for the
different credit ratings of sovereigns after the 2011 tests. Marginal banks most prefer the
sovereigns in the BBB credit rating with the A34 credit rating preferred second compared
to safe banks after the 2014 test. In other words, they carry out more risk-shifting in
these two categories of sovereigns. Compared with safe banks, marginal banks hold on
average around 2.865%** and 1.185%** more in the sovereigns of credit rating BBB and
A respectively after the 2014 test. Additionally, marginal banks hold sovereigns more
aggressively (around 2.682%*) in the credit rating BBB than fragile banks after the test.
When the credit rating of the sovereigns is controlled, the β1 is still significantly
negative and the absolute effect in 2014 is still larger than in the previous test.
34The sovereigns in Czech, Malta, Poland and Slovakia have the A credit rating in both tests; those of
Bulgaria, Iceland, Latvia are also in both tests.
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6.3.4 Crowding out Corporate Lending?
The crowding out effect between sovereigns and lending to corporates is investigated in
the literature. The more a bank holds in sovereigns, the less it can invest in industrial
firms given the level of available funds. I have found that marginal banks are more active
in shifting the investment of sovereigns than the other two groups. In proposition 1,
I predict that safe banks are not going to decrease their optimal portfolios due to the
arrival of the test. They may not cut their loans, as they are considered as risky assets
and assigned higher risk-weights than sovereigns. In this regression, the benchmark is the
safe bank. According to the regulations, we have six categories of credit exposure: central
bank and local government,35 institutions,36 corporates, retail, equity and securitization.
In the following, I analyze the evolution trend of the different types of credit exposure
across groups.
In Table 15, the last two columns present the variations of lending to corporates across
groups after the 2014 test. TheMarginal×Post and Fragile×Post capture the difference
in credit exposure across groups after the test.
I find that fragile banks cut their lending to corporates 6.27%* more than safe banks.
The difference between marginal banks and safe banks for lending to corporates stays the
same. After the test, safe banks increase their credit exposure to corporates by 2.71%*.
One possible explanation is that fragile banks try to move their portfolios to safe positions
(K/W stated in Section Economic Hypothesis) by cutting their risky loans; the business
given up by fragile banks may be taken over by safe banks. An alternative explanation
is that fragile banks may be affected by a negative demand shock to loans from their
clients, so fragile banks have to involuntarily lower their lending amounts. Since the
counter-parties of corporates are different across groups, it cannot be concluded that the
variations on lending across groups are driven by the test. However, from Tables 15 and
16, we can see the variations of different types of credit exposures across different groups
35Central governments or central banks + regional governments or local authorities.
36Public sector entities + multilateral development banks + international organizations + institutions.
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before or after the test. Safe banks engage in fewer securitization activities after the test,
and expand their investments on lending to corporates, institutions and government.
7 Corporate Bond Market Reactions
The information released by the EBA on the stress tests is rich, and understanding how
the information is transmitted and affects the market is critical. Camara, Pessarossi,
and Philippon (2016) prove that the stress tests are informative. The reaction to stress
tests on the stock has been documented by different papers: Petrella and Resti (2013),
Cardinali and Nordmark (2011), and Candelon and Sy (2015). In this section, I investigate
whether or not corporate bond markets react in the same way as the stock market to the
information shocks from the stress tests.
7.1 Tested Banks’ Reactions
In this paper, I use the daily corporate bond yields issued by banks on the OTC market to
approximate banks’ financing costs.37 The higher the required return on bonds of bank i
on the market, the more banks need to pay to new bondholders so as to issue new bonds.
In the OTC market, Euro-denominated bonds are traded on average four times a day and
Sterling bonds are traded 1.5 times a day (Biais and Declerck (2013)). They also find
that it takes at least five trading days for the information content of a trade to be fully
impounded in market pricing. In this event study, the time-window around the released
information dates is from five days before to five days after. In the robustness check, time
windows vary from five days to three months.
Tested banks are affected by the direct information shocks from the tests on the
released report dates, 15th July 2011 and 26th October 2014 respectively. I define the
bank level information shocks as the difference between real CET 1 ratios and the expected
37I also use the issuance costs of banks to conduct the robustness check.
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CET 1 ratios, i.e., Shocki,t = CET1i,t − Et−1(CET1i,t), where Et−1(CET1i,t) is based
on the passed CET 1 ratios released by EBA and all the CET 1 ratios are the forecasted
capital ratios in two years under some hypothetical shocks. A positive Shocki,t means a
good information shock for bank i, indicating that bank i has a solid capital structure
from the regulators’ view and has less difficulty in refinancing on the market than other
banks affected by negative information shocks. Consider the following equation:
r(i, j, t) =β1Shocki,t × Post+ IssueSizei,t + SovereignY ieldj,t + lsizei,t−1 +ROAi,t
+ FE + Trend+ i.Location× Trend+ ǫi,j,t.
The dependent variable r(i, j, t) is the daily corporate bond yield of bank i at date t lo-
cated in country j. Post is the time dummy indicating before or after the test. IssueSizei,t
is the market size of bond i at time t; SovereignY ieldj,t is the sovereign bond yield of bank
i that is located in country j at date t. lsize is the log of total asset of bank i and ROA is
the return on assets of bank i. Trend controls for the time trend, and location × Trend
captures the country level time trend effect. FE controls for the banks’ fixed effect.
From Table 17, we see that r(i, j, t) is negative; for a tested bank, its financing cost
will decrease 90.6* basis points within five days around the released report date if its real
tested CET 1 ratio is higher than the expected ratio of 1%. I also consider the following
regression to investigate the different levels of sensitivities to shocks across groups:
r(i, j, t) =β1Shocki,t × Safe+ β2Shocki,t × Fragile+ IssueSizei,t
+ SovereignY ieldj,t + lsizei,t−1 +ROAi,t + FE + Trend
+ i.Location× Trend+ ǫi,j,t.
Marginal banks are treated as benchmarks. I expect that safe banks are less sensitive to
shocks compared to other group of banks, i.e., β1 < 0, and that the fragile banks are more
sensitive to the information shocks than marginal banks i.e., β2 > 0. Table 19 shows that
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if banks have a 1% higher CET 1 ratio than expected, then marginal banks’ financing
costs will be around 48.6** basis points lower, while the fragile banks’ financing costs on
the corporate bond market will decrease only 10.1* basis points. On the contrary, if the
real CET 1 is 1% lower than expected, then the marginal banks need to pay 48.6** more
basis points, and fragile banks need to pay 86.7* more basis points if they want to finance
on the corporate bond market.
7.2 Untested Banks
I expect that the untested banks may be affected by the information shock at country
level. For instance, given other factors as constant, an untested bank located in Spain
where five banks fail the test will face a higher financing cost after the 2011 test than an
untested bank of similar size located in Germany where no banks fail the test.
I define different information shocks to all the banks of country j using the information
of the tests:
(1) an average CET 1 shock: Shock(1) = CET1j,t − Et−1(CET1j,t);
(2) the number of marginally passed banks (M) and failed banks (F): Shock(2) = M +F ;
(3) the percentage of marginally passed banks and failed banks (with equal weights):
Shock(3) = (M + F )/Totalbanks;
(4) the percentage of marginally passed banks and failed banks with double weights:
Shock(4) = (M + F × 2)/Totalbanks.
The results of the first regression in this section (see Table 19), show that for untested
banks located in a country where there is an unexpected decrease in CET 1 ratio, their
financing cost will be 11.8* basis points higher than the untested banks located in a
country without negative information shocks. Column (2) of Table 21 implies that if
there is a bank which fails the test, the untested banks face an increase of 5.7** basis
points on the financing cost which is not economically statistically significant. In the
last column of Table 21, we learn that if 1% of tested banks fail the tests in a particular
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country, the untested banks located in that country will face an increase in financing costs,
of around 55.3* basis points, compared with other banks in countries with no shocks.
8 Robustness Check
In this section, I conduct a series of robustness checks to verify the consistency of the
main results.
8.1 Other Dependent Variables
In the same credit rating, I define the dependent variable as the difference between the sum
amounts of the sovereigns with higher yields and those with lower yields, S1,i,t − S0,i,t,
scaled down by the total sovereigns or the total assets. The dependent variable is an
approximation of the extent of risk-shifting in one credit rating. Consider the following
equation:
S1,i,t − S0,i,t
ATi,t
=β1Post×Groupi + β2Post× Level + β3Level + CountryFEi × Post
+ FE + Controls+ εi,t,
where S1,i,t is the sum amount of sovereigns whose yields are higher than the median in
one credit rating, and S0,i,t is the sum amount of sovereigns whose yields are lower than
the median in one credit rating. In Tables 24 and 25, the estimate of β1 shows the same
negative sign as that in the regression in Section 5 (see Table 8). Also, I scale down the
dependent variable by its total assets in order to check the robustness of the main results
(see Tables 26 and 27).
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8.2 Restricted to Banks with Low Variation on CET 1
I only include banks without changing groups after recapitalization so as to rule out
possible endogeneity problems from grouping. It may be of some concern that the results
are driven by the fact that banks that are closed to fail the test need to aggressively
increase their CET 1 ratios by adjusting all of their assets. Therefore, I keep only those
banks that have not adjusted CET 1 ratios to switch into other groups. If we only consider
banks that have not adjusted their CET 1 ratio more than 1 %, the results still hold (see
Table 28).
8.3 Combine Two Tests
I perform the estimation for each test separately in the main results due to the fact that
the samples are not exactly the same in the two tests. Now, I run the regression combining
the two tests. I define Post=0 if the dates are before the 2011 test, Post=1 if the dates
are between the first and the second test, and Post=2 if the dates are after the 2014 test.
In Tables 29 and 30, PostTest1 × RA × Safe and PostTest1 × RA × Fragile are the
estimates of β1 in the 2011 test. PostTest2×RA×Safe and PostTest2×RA×Fragile
are the difference of estimates of β1 in the 2014 test compared with the 2011 test. Both
results are consistent with the main results.
8.4 Time-dependent Credit Rating
Do sovereigns become riskier during the test? Specifically, since the credit ratings of the
sovereigns of Greece, Iceland and Ireland decrease after the 2011 test, it might therefore
be inappropriate to treat them in the same credit rating levels. However, most of the
sovereigns stay in the same category of credit ratings (see the summary in Table 35)
throughout the tests. To eliminate the concern that a small fraction of sovereigns with
time-dependent credit ratings may bias the estimates, I replace the time-independent
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RA by the time-dependent RA. In Tables 31 and 32, the results confirm that β1 is still
significantly negative with the effect stronger in the 2014 test.
8.5 Time Trend Effect
I test the time trend effect on the holding of sovereigns across groups of banks. One
potential problem is that the significant estimates are not driven by the test but only by
the time trend of holdings on some sovereigns. Therefore, in the following regression, I
investigate the evolution of different holdings of sovereigns across groups from 2010 to
2015.
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
= β1T imeTrend × Safe + β2T imeTrend × Fragile + β3Groupi × RA +
β4T imeTrend × RA + FE + T imeTrend + lsizei,j,t +localCountry + LocalCountry ∗
Post+ i.sovereignj ∗ Post+ i.sovereignj + T imeTrend+ εi,t.
If β1 and β2 are not significant, then there is no significant difference on holding
one specific sovereign across groups. In Table 33, the estimates of the coefficients on
T imeTrend×Safe and T imeTrend×Fragile are insignificant. In other words, the fact
that marginal banks conduct more regulatory arbitrage than safe banks is not driven by
the time trend effect of some sovereigns.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, I empirically show that marginally regulatory constrained banks (whose
regulatory constraint is closed to binding) shift their investment to those sovereign bonds
with higher yields in the same risk-weighting credit rating more aggressively than un-
constrained banks (safe banks, i.e., whose capital ratio is far above the regulatory level)
after the stress test. Such divergence of holdings across bank groups confirms the classical
regulatory arbitrage theory.
Interestingly, marginally constrained banks conduct more regulatory arbitrage than
fragile banks (i.e., whose capital ratio is below the regulatory level), and are willing to
perform risk-shifting in one credit rating. Also, compared to safe banks and marginally
constrained banks, fragile banks engage in less lending to corporates, which is assigned a
much higher risk weighting according to the Basel III Accord when computing the capital
ratios. These noteworthy facts demonstrate that safe banks are less constrained when
choosing their optimal portfolios and have no need to stop their long-term investments in
order to pass the regulators’ tests.
Furthermore, the home bias sovereign holdings are not entirely explained by pressure
from local government. The fact that banks gamble for the resurrection in order to earn
extra returns also plays a role in terms of the sovereign home bias.
Finally, besides tested banks, untested banks that are located in the country with
negative information shocks from the test will bear higher financing costs than banks that
are located in a country with positive information shocks; thus providing banking sectors
with an indirect means to transmit the effects of the stress test.
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A Appendix 1
Table 2: Summary credit exposure 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total 88411.656 112844.99 175.214 608658.563 459
Central 28443.738 39499.842 0.043 192846.422 451
Institution 12194.521 19228.164 2.69 112147.148 446
Corporate 17554.668 30513.429 0.383 220334.609 452
Retail 14284.066 24990.431 0.496 177929.813 440
Equity 1114.658 1817.761 0.044 15336.038 380
Securitization 1288.998 2407.65 0 18246.969 237
Others 6589.929 13243.329 0 120423.648 424
This table presents different classes of credit exposure values: Central (central banks and
local government), institutions (financial institutions), corporates, retail, equity(private
equity), securitization.
Table 3: Summary risk exposure amount 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total 36678.898 55917.456 62.147 317099.469 459
Central 1707.37 4094.434 0 29846.299 392
Institution 2166.636 4091.896 0 32045.1 446
Corporate 15831.729 27662.784 0.383 206555.078 452
Retail 8735.306 15452.46 0.201 112248.703 440
Equity 1591.457 2913.149 0.044 22770.42 379
Securitization 940.676 1902.56 0 13042.757 237
Other 4344.977 8171.403 0 72820.070 421
This table presents the risk exposure amounts (computed by adding risk weights)of differ-
ent credit exposure: Central (central banks and local government), institutions (financial
institutions), corporates, retail, equity(private equity), securitization.
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Table 4: Summary credit exposure in groups
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A Safe banks
Total 98347.048 123744.88 175.214 608658.563 343
Central 31650.827 42261.407 236.972 192846.422 336
Institution 13526.181 20162.067 2.69 112147.148 334
Corporate 18922.946 33295.672 23.266 220334.609 341
Retail 16275.589 27838.373 0.575 177929.813 327
Equity 1232.384 2003.683 0.044 15336.038 283
Secutization 1506.424 2659.665 1.848 18246.969 181
Others 7614.16 15070.752 0 120423.648 312
Panel B Marginal banks
Total 120721.976 89694.871 1997.403 301014.156 32
Central 42262.049 43826.642 9.664 145510.297 32
Institution 14737.563 25242.799 151.021 77775 32
Corporate 27731.162 29988.821 243.977 100017.555 32
Retail 16928.12 18558.242 34.9 59769.918 32
Equity 1527.813 1586.817 20.494 4971.985 26
Securitization 1121.95 1362.821 49.39 4212.173 25
Other 5753.89 7094.668 0.095 22295.063 32
Panel C Fragile banks
Total 35318.974 23172.457 4326.869 88774.023 82
Central 10162.144 9251.352 0.043 38112.262 81
Institution 5702.688 8157.159 22.465 53133 78
Corporate 7077.155 5845.307 0.383 24330.85 77
Retail 5270.17 5801.456 0.496 22696.471 79
Equity 497.852 561.881 6.777 2675.38 69
Securitization 154.225 183.068 0 816.218 31
Other 2864.983 2688.696 0.012 10318.343 78
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Table 5: Summary Corporate bond yields
Panel A
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
ry 4.033 2.142 88357
spread1 -2.629 6.645 77355
spread2 -1.38 4.684 80977
MV 2212.806 22551.888 102698
Panel B Untested banks
ry 4.324 2.083 10847
spread1 -3.568 8.178 11847
spread2 -1.795 5.998 10723
MV 10018.465 63312.776 12414
Panel B Tested banks
ry 3.993 2.148 77510
spread1 -2.46 6.314 65508
spread2 -1.317 4.446 70254
MV 1139.532 4226.114 90284
Panel C Safe banks
ry 3.99 2.204 32821
spread1 -2.299 4.63 32765
spread2 -1.238 2.731 31505
MV 1817.313 6097.206 38842
Panel D Marginal banks
ry 5.164 2.628 4405
spread1 -4.358 12.511 4880
spread2 -3.202 12.377 4086
MV 505.359 899.739 5349
Panel E Fragile banks
ry 4.538 2.252 5829
spread1 -5.3 7.355 6510
spread2 -2.366 2.936 5745
MV 531.569 613.485 8388
Ry is the corporate bonds yields of banks ( %). Spread1 and spread2 are the bid-ask spread
percentage of the corporate bonds; computed by different measures. MV is the total market
value of the corporate bonds.
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Table 6: European banks Regulatory Arbitrage in 2011 test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Post×Safe×RA -2.463 -2.288 -1.172* -1.221*
(1.821) (1.836) (0.591) (0.617)
Post×Fragile×RA -4.048* -4.027* -1.719** -1.773**
(2.154) (2.166) (0.675) (0.703)
Post×Safe 0.829 1.022 0.445* 0.465*
(0.706) (0.739) (0.231) (0.241)
Post×Fragile 1.537* 1.691* 0.604** 0.625**
(0.861) (0.908) (0.273) (0.286)
Safe×RA -1.577* -1.577* -0.731* -0.715*
(0.841) (0.844) (0.418) (0.416)
Fragile×RA -0.530 -0.530 -0.319 -0.315
(1.005) (1.009) (0.470) (0.466)
Post×RA 3.571** 3.531* 2.937*** 1.889**
(1.770) (1.779) (0.528) (.7669162)
RA -1.191 -1.191 -2.110*** 1.903**
(0.776) (0.779) (0.374) (0.942)
Post -1.222* -1.445** -2.165*** 1.274**
(0.684) (0.714) (0.221) (0.605)
lsize 0.0883** 0.577 0.146 0.133
(0.0405) (0.370) (0.240) (0.245)
Local c 29.07*** 29.61***
(2.085) (1.960)
Local c×Post 34.28*** 32.60***
(2.610) (2.519)
Constant 2.230*** -3.117 1.383 -3.044
(0.494) (4.471) (2.914) (3.056)
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post No No No Yes
Observations 7380 7380 7380 7380
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.656 0.803
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by its total
sovereigns during 2010 and 2012; Post=1 if after the 2011 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1,
if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within one risk-weighting category.
The benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s capital
ratio is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds
its own country’s sovereign bond. T-values are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and
p<0.1)
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Table 7: European banks Regulatory Arbitrage in 2014 test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Post×Safe×RA -2.133*** -2.132*** -1.087* -1.079*
(0.594) (0.595) (0.563) (0.551)
Post×Fragile×RA -3.002*** -3.000*** -1.487** -1.486**
(0.732) (0.735) (0.643) (0.629)
Post×Safe 0.897*** 0.868*** 0.162* 0.167*
(0.267) (0.266) (0.0897) (0.0902)
Post×Fragile 1.468*** 1.195*** 0.179 0.197
(0.309) (0.328) (0.279) (0.268)
Safe×RA -0.112 -0.113 0.618 0.576
(1.429) (1.434) (1.108) (1.118)
Fragile×RA 0.462 0.460 0.606 0.559
(1.748) (1.755) (1.244) (1.258)
RA -0.505 -0.505 -1.229 -1.850
(1.340) (1.345) (1.052) (2.131)
Post -1.071*** -1.068*** -0.0206 0.0389
(0.257) (0.255) (0.0702) (0.361)
lsize 0.00113 0.00127 -0.0158 -0.0158
(0.00773) (0.00119) (0.0174) (0.0174)
Post×RA 2.499*** 2.499*** 1.022* 1.762**
(0.563) (0.564) (0.530) (.651)
Local c 58.66*** 57.82***
(4.420) ( 4.513)
Local c ×Post -6.421** -6.719**
(2.858) (2.834)
Constant 2.514*** 2.487*** 1.326*** 0.536
(0.520) (0.165) (0.254) (0.747)
Observations 7308 7308 7308 7308
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.668 0.689
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by total assets
during 2013 and 2015; Post=1 if after the 2014 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the
sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within one risk-weighting category. The
benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s capital ratio
is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own
country’s sovereign bond.T-values are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 8: European banks Regulatory Arbitrage
2011 2011 2014 2014
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Post×Safe×RA -0.284* -1.209** -0.596** -1.729**
(0.155) (0.541) (0.253) (0.795)
Post×Fragile×RA -0.214** -1.752*** -0.465* -1.706*
(0.0990) (0.624) (0.253) (0.875)
Post×Safe 0.138 0.734 0.525** 1.393***
(0.151) (0.477) (0.260) (0.514)
Post ×Fragile 0.00713 0.261 0.180 0.701
(0.0735) (0.562) (0.202) (0.483)
Safe×RA 0.106 -0.633* -0.354** -1.206
(0.146) (0.347) (0.158) (0.793)
Fragile×RA 0.0139 -0.505 -0.361* -2.134**
(0.0721) (0.392) (0.193) (1.047)
RA 0.0939 0.959 0.690*** 2.715*
(0.167) (0.714) (0.228) (1.556)
Post 0.291*** 1.108** 0.203 0.632
(0.109) (0.480) (0.146) (0.503)
Local c 6.055*** 29.56*** 6.562*** 56.52***
(1.149) (1.955) (0.651) (4.248)
Local c×Post -0.668 33.09*** 1.291 -6.242**
(1.096) (2.488) (0.781) (2.703)
lsize -0.248*** -0.128 -1.752*** -0.00935
(0.0775) (0.314) (0.193) (0.0455)
Post×Safe×Level2 -0.841 -0.875 -0.0966 -0.262
(0.592) (1.179) (0.142) (0.636)
Post×Safe×Level3 0.163** -0.401 -0.198 -1.185**
(0.0757) (0.876) (0.262) (0.509)
Post×Safe×Level4 0.0550 -0.0221 -0.785** -2.865**
(0.0508) (0.324) (0.352) (1.184)
Post×Safe×Level5 0.0741 0.0485 -0.0872 -0.712
(0.0605) (0.437) (0.227) (0.569)
Post×Safe×Level6 0.191 0.513
(0.224) (0.481)
Post×Fragile×Level2 -0.272 -0.555 -0.0663 0.104
(0.324) (1.724) (0.117) (0.590)
Post×Fragile×Level3 0.137* 0.0950 0.00459 -0.162
(0.0705) (1.042) (0.0696) (0.442)
Post×Fragile×Level4 0.105 1.867* -0.509 -2.682*
(0.103) (0.984) (0.349) (1.477)
Post×Fragile×Level5 0.0581 0.331 0.205 -0.0866
(0.0576) (0.441) (0.425) (1.464)
Post×Fragile×Level6 0.303* 0.635
(0.164) (0.501)
Continue Table 3
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Table 9: Continue Table 8: European banks Regulatory Arbitrage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.787*** 1.036 20.60*** -2.812
(0.963) (3.975) (2.371) (1.973)
Leveli Yes Yes Yes Yes
Safe×i.Level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Safe×i.Level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,830 7,830 7,308 7,262
R-squared 0.483 0.787 0.455 0.735
The first two columns contain the results of 2011 test and the last two columns present those
of 2014. The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by
total assets and
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by his total sovereigns.
Before the test Post is equal to 0, otherwise equal to 1. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates
the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA, AA, A, BBB, B, C. The benchmark is marginal bank
whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s capital ratio is lower than 5 %. Safe
banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%.
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Table 10: European banks Home Bias on sovereign in 2011 test
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Local c×Safe×Post -3.769* -3.947* -3.869*
(2.011) (2.309) (2.155)
Local c×Fragile×Post -1.557 -1.472 -1.843*
(1.128) (1.208) (1.007)
Post×Local c 2.286** 2.517** 2.313**
(0.951) (1.125) (0.951)
Local c×Safe 0.968 1.320 1.164
(2.056) (2.298) (2.225)
Local c×Fragile 0.473 0.584 0.518
(1.254) (1.250) (1.275)
Local c 5.468*** 5.006*** 5.150***
(0.928) (1.049) (1.019)
Post×Safe 0.165 0.167 0.252
(0.116) (0.120) (0.201)
Post×Fragile 0.0236 0.0202 0.0691
(0.0492) (0.0490) (0.0678)
Safe×RA 0.0862 0.0735 0.0826
(0.123) (0.116) (0.112)
Fragile×RA -0.00645 -0.0126 -0.00388
(0.0653) (0.0693) (0.0673)
Safe×RA×Post -0.227* -0.218* -0.214*
(0.123) (0.115) (0.109)
Fragile×RA×Post -0.113** -0.112* -0.104*
(0.0556) (0.0593) (0.0539)
Post -0.0369 0.207** 0.132**
(0.0407) (0.101) (0.0606)
lsize -0.240*** -0.240*** -0.274***
(0.0794) (0.0797) (0.0916)
Constant 2.889*** 2.678*** 3.089***
(0.980) (1.004) (1.135)
RA Yes Yes Yes
RA×Post Yes Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post No Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level×Post No No Yes
Observations 7,830 7,830 6,322
R-squared 0.475 0.491 0.463
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by total assets during 2010 and 2012.
Post=1 if after the 2011 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the sovereign bond’s spread yield is higher than the median
within one risk-weighting category. The benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s
capital ratio is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s
sovereign bond. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA, AA, A, BBB, B, C. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 11: European banks Home Bias on sovereign in 2011 test
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Local c×Safe×Post -11.31** -10.69** -12.42*
(4.653) (4.989) (6.939)
Local c×Fragile×Post -1.098 -0.254 -6.041
(6.147) (6.315) (8.458)
Post 0.231* 0.923* 0.384
(0.120) (0.495) (0.480)
Post×Local c 43.28*** 42.16*** 45.41***
(3.795) (4.311) (6.435)
Local c×Safe -14.52*** -13.87*** -13.92***
(4.169) (4.128) (4.217)
Local c× Fragile -4.190 -3.890 -4.038
(4.926) (4.787) (4.891)
Post×Safe 0.900*** 0.893*** 1.580***
(0.225) (0.231) (0.423)
Post×Marginal 0.349 0.343 0.763
(0.272) (0.273) (0.481)
Local c 40.71*** 39.86*** 39.97***
(3.338) (3.376) (3.503)
RA 0.128 0.499 0.550
(0.126) (0.592) (0.595)
Safe×RA -0.303 -0.321 -0.367
(0.233) (0.238) (0.222)
Fragile×RA -0.236 -0.250 -0.330
(0.212) (0.222) (0.210)
Safe×RA×Post -1.249*** -1.274*** -1.309***
(0.332) (0.338) (0.370)
Fragile×RA×Post -1.229*** -1.273*** -1.382***
(0.454) (0.455) (0.459)
lsize -0.114 -0.114 0.0982
(0.313) (0.315) (0.236)
Constant 1.904 1.111 -1.502
(3.851) (3.950) (2.997)
RA Yes Yes Yes
RA×Post Yes Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post No Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level×Post No No Yes
Observations 7,830 7,830 6,322
R-squared 0.794 0.803 0.808
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by his total sovereigns during 2010 and
2012. Post=1 if after the 2011 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the sovereign bond’s spread yield is higher than
the median within one risk-weighting category. The benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%.
Fragile bank’s capital ratio is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own
country’s sovereign bond. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA, AA, A, BBB, B, C.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 12: European banks Home Bias on sovereign in 2014 test
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Local c×Safe×Post -3.441 -3.574 -3.520
(2.488) (2.283) (2.363)
Local c×Fragile×Post -3.540 -3.578 -3.523
(2.921) (2.773) (2.832)
Post×Local c 4.336* 4.379** 4.316*
(2.284) (2.081) (2.167)
Local c×Safe -2.518 -2.594 -2.272
(3.793) (3.682) (3.699)
Local c× Fragile 1.571 1.404 1.643
(4.274) (4.133) (4.151)
Local c 8.832** 8.775** 8.433**
(3.720) (3.607) (3.624)
Post×Safe 0.372*** 0.378*** 0.379***
(0.132) (0.128) (0.131)
Post×Fragile 0.118 0.121 0.121
(0.126) (0.120) (0.123)
Safe×RA -0.431 -0.430 -0.396
(0.336) (0.339) (0.342)
Fragile×RA -0.377 -0.377 -0.399
(0.351) (0.354) (0.354)
Safe×RA×Post -0.429** -0.431** -0.437**
(0.185) (0.188) (0.188)
Fragile×RA×Post -0.396*** -0.400*** -0.404***
(0.105) (0.107) (0.105)
Post -0.200* 0.184 0.189
(0.113) (0.152) (0.158)
lsize -1.833*** -1.833*** -1.833***
(0.133) (0.134) (0.134)
Constant 22.31*** 21.53*** 21.54***
(1.662) (1.651) (1.650)
RA Yes Yes Yes
RA×Post Yes Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post No Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level×Post No No Yes
Observations 5,771 5,771 5,771
R-squared 0.438 0.456 0.456
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by total assets during 2013 and 201.
Post=1 if after the 2014 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the sovereign bond’s spread yield is higher than the median
within one risk-weighting category. The benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s
capital ratio is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s
sovereign bond. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA, AA, A, BBB, B, C. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 13: European banks Home Bias on sovereign in 2014 test
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Local c×Post×Safe -9.017** -8.972*** -8.597***
(3.505) (3.090) (3.178)
Local c×Post×Fragile -13.48** -13.04** -12.71**
(6.296) (6.047) (6.002)
Local c ×Post 5.972** 5.597** 5.194**
(2.788) (2.201) (2.306)
Local c ×Safe -9.581 -10.07 -10.21
(15.80) (15.15) (15.41)
Local c ×Marginal 10.73 10.06 9.577
(17.19) (16.45) (16.77)
Local c 65.99*** 65.55*** 65.44***
(14.99) (14.39) (14.69)
Post×Safe 0.358* 0.355* 0.343
(0.206) (0.205) (0.207)
Post×Fragile 0.717** 0.707** 0.697**
(0.281) (0.279) (0.274)
Safe×RA -0.724 -0.716 -0.650
(0.803) (0.805) (0.787)
Fragile×RA -0.797 -0.787 -0.782
(0.780) (0.793) (0.779)
Safe×RA×Post -0.247 -0.244 -0.246
(0.327) (0.334) (0.342)
Fragile ×RA×Post -0.805** -0.818** -0.820**
(0.361) (0.367) (0.385)
Post -0.301* 0.0462 0.0760
(0.179) (0.424) (0.413)
lsize 0.0142* 0.0142* 0.0142*
(0.00822) (0.00825) (0.00825)
Constant 1.059*** -2.989 -2.972
(0.357) (1.829) (1.818)
RA Yes Yes Yes
RA×Post Yes Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post No Yes Yes
Groupi×i.Level×Post No No Yes
Observations 5,742 5,742 5,742
R-squared 0.733 0.748 0.750
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by his total sovereigns during 2013
and 2015;Post=1 if after the 2014 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than
the median within one risk-weighting category. The benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%.
Fragile bank’s capital ratio is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own
country’s sovereign bond. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA, AA, A, BBB, B, C.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 14: Credit exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES CreditEX CreditEX CreditEX CreditEX
post 0.288*** 0.283*** 0.246*** 0.249***
(0.0290) (0.0650) (0.0415) (0.0695)
Marginal×post -0.0587 -0.0585 -0.0701 -0.0701
(0.0893) (0.0840) (0.0517) (0.0459)
Fragile×post 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.515*** 0.515***
(0.0761) (0.0860) (0.102) (0.124)
post×GIIPS 0.127** 0.123**
(0.0466) (0.0469)
Marginal×post×GIIPS 0.168 0.175
(0.280) (0.282)
Fragile×post×GIIPS -0.458*** -0.454***
(0.119) (0.128)
lsize 0.0672 0.0542 0.128 0.123
(0.0934) (0.105) (0.0885) (0.106)
Constant -0.611 -0.445 -1.359 -1.286
(1.141) (1.299) (1.081) (1.317)
Year Effect No Yes No Yes
Bank Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 228 228 228 228
R-squared 0.737 0.741 0.748 0.751
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is the total credit exposure value of each bank. Post=1 after the 2014
test(year 2015) and post=0 before the test(2013). lsize is the log of last year total asset. Bench-
mark banks are safe banks.
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Table 15: Credit exposure to different types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Central Central Institution Institution Corporate Corporate
Marginal×Post 0.0186 0.0262 -0.00958 -0.00600 -0.0179 -0.0127
(0.0224) (0.0199) (0.00767) (0.00988) (0.0251) (0.0162)
Fragile× Post 0.0758** 0.0210 0.0795** -0.0124 -0.0516*** -0.0627*
(0.0309) (0.0830) (0.0375) (0.0113) (0.0141) (0.0355)
Post 0.0599*** 0.0533** 0.0358*** 0.0334*** 0.0526*** 0.0271***
(0.0177) (0.0251) (0.00868) (0.00962) (0.0160) (0.00912)
Post×GIIPS 0.0192 0.00457 0.0429***
(0.0221) (0.00822) (0.0118)
Marginal×post×GIIPS -0.0285 -0.0208 0.00542
(0.0810) (0.0241) (0.0729)
Fragile×post×GIIPS 0.0746 0.137** -0.00146
(0.0914) (0.0524) (0.0357)
lsize 0.00531 0.00670 0.0475** 0.0416* -0.0143 -0.000304
(0.0365) (0.0305) (0.0222) (0.0226) (0.0461) (0.0491)
Constant -0.00555 -0.0229 -0.556* -0.483* 0.225 0.0650
(0.450) (0.377) (0.275) (0.280) (0.572) (0.595)
Date Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
R-squared 0.522 0.529 0.677 0.708 0.690 0.700
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Central is the credit exposure to Central banks and central governments scaled down by
total assets; Institution is the credit risk amount exposed to institutions scaled down by
total assets; Corporate is the credit exposure to corporates scaled down by total assets.
GIIPS is a location dummy, GIIPS=1 if a locate locate in GIIPS country(Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Portugal, Spain).
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Table 16: Credit exposure to different types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Retail Retail Equity Equity Securi Securi
Marginal×post -0.0315 -0.0161 -0.00257* -0.00183*** 0.00115 0.00126
(0.0338) (0.0112) (0.00141) (0.000564) (0.00075) (0.00096)
Fraigile ×post -0.00369 0.00708 0.00229 0.00151* 0.000348 0.000320
(0.0240) (0.0591) (0.00165) (0.000793) (0.00116) (0.00146)
Post 0.0178 0.0145 0.00294*** 0.00296*** -0.00048 -0.000709
(0.0179) (0.0143) (0.000413) (0.000718) (0.00102) (0.00132)
Post×GIIPS -0.0257 -0.000181 0.000759
(0.0154) (0.00104) (0.000989)
Marginal×Post×GIIPS -0.102 -0.00420 1.84e-06
(0.108) (0.00450) (0.00165)
Fragile ×Post×GIIPS -0.00663 0.00120 -0.000284
(0.0581) (0.00247) (0.00102)
lsize 0.0133 0.00107 0.00835** 0.00806** 0.00055 0.000803
(0.0533) (0.0511) (0.00308) (0.00297) (0.00172) (0.00199)
Constant -0.112 0.0495 -0.1000** -0.0964** -0.00496 -0.00812
(0.658) (0.622) (0.0379) (0.0365) (0.0203) (0.0236)
Date Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
R-squared 0.634 0.643 0.810 0.812 0.350 0.351
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Retail is the credit exposure to retails scaled down by total assets; Equity is the credit risk amount
exposed to Equity scaled down by total assets; Securi is the credit exposure to securitization
scaled down by total assets. GIIPS is a location dummy, GIIPS=1 if a locate locate in GIIPS
country(Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain).
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Table 17: Corporate bond yields’ reaction to information shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t
shock1 -0.164*** -0.174*** -0.0683* -0.130*** -0.146*** -0.0630* -0.0906*
(0.0541) (0.0511) (0.0354) (0.0464) (0.0434) (0.0371) (0.0545)
Sovereign 0.692*** 0.626*** -0.0936 0.753*** 0.741*** -0.0192 0.714***
(0.141) (0.179) (0.137) (0.255) (0.255) (0.237) (0.228)
Bond size -0.290 -0.102 -0.256 -0.247 -0.0939 -0.204
(0.294) (0.268) (0.302) (0.296) (0.267) (0.272)
lsize 2.072* 0.701 1.851 0.634 1.481*
(1.103) (0.640) (1.142) (0.675) (0.835)
ROA 14.55 9.625 2.056 5.645
(12.91) (13.09) (8.893) (13.20)
Post -0.859**
(0.360)
Trend -0.0753*** -.0643428*** -.0631627*** -0.0726***
(0.00783) (.00424) (.00445) (0.00921)
GIIPS×Trend 0.00152
(0.0170)
Constant 2.802*** -20.46 -1.790 4.162** -18.25 -1.236 -13.48
(0.185) (13.38) (7.941) (1.808) (13.80) (8.376) (10.17)
Bank EF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location×Post No No No No No No Yes
Observations 3,719 3,021 3,021 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854
R-squared 0.724 0.763 0.872 0.774 0.780 0.873 0.833
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield of bank i at day t; shocki,t =
CoreT ierRatioi,t−Et−1(CoreT ierRatioi,t) which represents the information shock to the mar-
ket is the difference of real core capital ratio under adverse scenario and its expectation;
Table 18: Corporate bond yields’ reaction to information shocks(3m)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t ri,t
shock1 -0.315*** -0.328*** -0.186*** -0.164*** -0.331*** -0.176*** -0.152***
(0.0675) (0.0664) (0.0533) (0.0544) (0.0651) (0.0537) (0.0455)
Sovereign 0.473*** 0.387*** 0.0828 0.110 0.389*** 0.113* 0.0941*
(0.123) (0.112) (0.0643) (0.0692) (0.135) (0.0638) (0.0505)
issue size -0.420 -0.208 -0.199 -0.402 -0.192 -0.207
(0.298) (0.264) (0.266) (0.297) (0.263) (0.262)
ROA 8.640 -2.574 5.874 -30.52*
(6.741) (8.665) (8.044) (17.91)
lsize 2.342* 1.237* 2.437* 1.064 1.089*
(1.320) (0.678) (1.463) (0.727) (0.558)
Trend -0.0628*** -0.0643*** -0.0633*** -0.0676***
(0.00394) (0.00424) (0.00445) (0.00894)
GIIPS×Trend 0.000287
(0.0127)
Constant 3.520*** -22.34 -8.202 6.803*** -23.74 -6.245 -6.577
(0.195) (16.06) (8.381) (1.546) (17.84) (8.976) (6.851)
Bank EF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location×Trend No No No No No No Yes
Observations 31,744 24,327 24,327 22,928 22,928 22,928 22,928
R-squared 0.645 0.707 0.825 0.825 0.711 0.827 0.848
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield of bank i at day t; shocki,t =
CoreT ierRatioi,t−Et−1(CoreT ierRatioi,t) which represents the information shock to the mar-
ket is the difference of real core capital ratio under adverse scenario and its expectation;
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Table 19: Untested banks’ corporate bond yields’ reaction to information shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock -0.226∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.117∗ -0.118∗
(-3.81) (-5.17) (-2.09) (-2.21)
own sovereign yield 0.293∗ -0.011 -0.231∗∗∗ -0.123
(1.73) (-0.24) (-3.48) (-0.83)
issue size -12.088∗∗∗ -7.686∗∗∗ -7.468∗∗∗
(-9.79) (-4.82) (-4.48)
lsize -2.202 -0.700 -0.386
(-0.88) (-0.45) (-0.23)
ROA -126.567
(-0.80)
Constant 3.576∗∗∗ 82.943∗∗ 48.159∗ 43.901
(13.55) (2.78) (2.10) (1.78)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend No No Yes Yes
Observation 713 345 345 345
R2 .8076365 .9109562 .95518349 .96047013
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield of bank i at day t; shocki,t =
CoreT ierRatioi,t−Et−1(CoreT ierRatioi,t) which represents the information shock to the mar-
ket is the difference of real core capital ratio under adverse scenario and its expectation;
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Table 20: Untested banks’ Corporate bond yields’ reaction to information shocks(3
months)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock -0.331∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(-4.75) (-5.78) (-4.36) (-4.35)
own sovereign yield 0.349∗∗ 0.013 -0.078 0.025
(2.27) (0.27) (-1.46) (0.33)
issue size -11.861∗∗∗ -9.790∗∗∗ -9.318∗∗∗
(-10.26) (-5.06) (-5.50)
lsize -2.020 -1.226 -0.740
(-0.77) (-0.56) (-0.36)
ROA -200.905∗
(-2.07)
Constant 3.738∗∗∗ 81.182∗∗ 63.639∗ 56.682∗
(13.81) (2.68) (2.11) (2.00)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend No No Yes Yes
Observation 5912 2890 2890 2890
R2 .75155182 .88236829 .9046281 .92606128
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield of bank i at day t; shocki,t =
CoreT ierRatioi,t−Et−1(CoreT ierRatioi,t) which represents the information shock to the mar-
ket is the difference of real core capital ratio under adverse scenario and its expectation;
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Table 21: Untested banks’ Corporate bond yields’ reaction to information shocks(different
shocks)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock -0.117∗
(-2.09)
Shock2 0.057∗∗
(2.58)
Shock3 0.552
(1.80)
Shock4 0.533∗
(2.14)
own sovereign yield -0.231∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.67) (-3.25) (-3.33)
issue size -7.686∗∗∗ -6.270∗∗∗ -6.780∗∗∗ -6.707∗∗∗
(-4.82) (-3.65) (-3.95) (-3.94)
lsize -0.700 -0.211 -0.115 -0.136
(-0.45) (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.09)
Constant 48.159∗ 36.743 37.961 37.856
(2.10) (1.73) (1.69) (1.71)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 345 345 345 345
R2 .95518349 .95052136 .94675209 .94763693
The dependent variable is the corporate bond yield of bank i at day t; cshock1 =
CoreT ierRatioi,t−Et−1(CoreT ierRatioi,t) which represents the information shock to the market
is the difference of real core capital ratio under adverse scenario and its expectation; cshockj,t(2)
is the total number of marginal banks and fragile banks; cshockj,t(3) is the percentage of marginal
banks and fragile banks over the total banks of country j; (D) cshockj,t(4) can be the percent-
age of marginal banks and fragile banks, while fragile banks is put double weights compared to
marginal banks.
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Table 22: Stock market reaction: GIIPS exposure
Variable AR(1d) AR(3d) AR(5d)
(1) (2) (3)
Post*GIIPS -1.206∗∗∗ -2.645∗∗∗ -1.351
(-4.07) (-4.05) (-1.45)
Post 0.297∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗ -0.682∗∗
(3.46) (2.38) (-2.16)
GIIPS 0.380 0.478 0.477
(1.32) (0.58) (0.40)
Constant -0.039 0.226 0.427
(-0.38) (0.78) (1.04)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2023 1974 1937
R2 .02442846 .06554179 .08554726
The dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of bank i at day t; the column(1) is the
daily AR; the column(2) is the 3 days cumulative AR; the column(3) is the 5 days cumulative
AR; GIIPS is the percentage of Greek sovereign bonds over total sovereign bonds of bank i.
Table 23: Stock market reaction: Greek sovereign bond exposure
Variable AR(1d) AR(3d) AR(5d)
(1) (2) (3)
Post*Greece -1.881∗∗∗ -3.431∗∗∗ -1.385
(-3.49) (-3.68) (-1.07)
Post 0.024 -0.085 -1.021∗∗∗
(0.31) (-0.46) (-3.89)
Greece 0.464 0.622 -0.832
(0.89) (0.37) (-0.41)
Constant 0.070∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗
(1.94) (3.82) (5.27)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
Observation 2023 1974 1937
R2 .02180617 .05919952 .08426775
The dependent variable is the abnormal stock return of bank i at day t; the column(1) is the
daily AR; the column(2) is the 3 days cumulative AR; the column(3) is the 5 days cumulative
AR; GIIPS is the percentage of GIIPS sovereign bonds over total sovereign bond of bank i.
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Table 24: Robustness test: Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
TSi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
TSi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
TSi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
ATi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
ATi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
ATi,t
Post×Safe -6.051* -5.238 -4.304** -0.412 -0.441 -0.575**
(3.411) (3.343) (1.828) (0.274) (0.278) (0.232)
Post×Fragile -7.259* -8.586** -5.430** -0.428 -0.381 -0.624***
(3.793) (3.796) (2.126) (0.321) (0.326) (0.224)
Post 1.919 0.378 1.172 0.132 0.188 0.0596
(3.284) (3.322) (2.685) (0.248) (0.254) (0.306)
Level2 29.23*** 29.18*** 29.16*** 3.186*** 3.188*** 3.191***
(7.264) (7.277) (7.316) (0.963) (0.963) (0.966)
Level3 19.41*** 19.49*** 19.72*** 1.822*** 1.819*** 1.828***
(6.391) (6.376) (6.417) (0.629) (0.631) (0.635)
Level4 15.02* 15.01* 15.14* 2.533** 2.533** 2.543**
(8.160) (8.183) (8.186) (1.100) (1.099) (1.099)
Level5 24.86** 24.90** 25.00** 2.403** 2.402** 2.402**
(9.880) (9.873) (9.884) (1.058) (1.060) (1.063)
Safe×Level2 -20.20** -20.16** -20.15** -2.358** -2.359** -2.364**
(8.233) (8.249) (8.289) (1.078) (1.079) (1.082)
Safe×Level3 -6.885 -6.961 -7.122 -0.888 -0.885 -0.897
(7.278) (7.260) (7.298) (0.742) (0.744) (0.747)
Safe×Level4 -2.997 -3.000 -3.144 -1.518 -1.518 -1.528
(8.835) (8.859) (8.864) (1.155) (1.155) (1.155)
Safe×Level5 -10.61 -10.64 -10.74 -1.378 -1.376 -1.376
(10.33) (10.32) (10.34) (1.107) (1.109) (1.113)
Fragile×Level2 -39.63*** -39.57*** -39.41*** -4.276*** -4.278*** -4.285***
(10.73) (10.75) (10.81) (1.489) (1.490) (1.494)
Fragile×Level3 -22.37*** -22.42*** -22.72*** -1.833** -1.831** -1.837**
(8.273) (8.255) (8.293) (0.776) (0.777) (0.776)
Fragile ×Level4 -15.96* -15.95* -16.08* -2.317* -2.317* -2.327*
(9.313) (9.332) (9.343) (1.227) (1.227) (1.228)
Fragile ×Level5 -32.88*** -32.93*** -33.11*** -3.048*** -3.046*** -3.060***
(10.77) (10.76) (10.80) (1.112) (1.114) (1.119)
lsize 4.473 4.277 0.00532 0.865** 0.872** 0.544
(4.437) (4.346) (4.760) (0.369) (0.370) (0.458)
GIIPS×Post 3.401 -0.122
(2.222) (0.194)
Constant -63.81 -61.39 -9.033 -11.36** -11.45** -7.463
(53.72) (52.53) (57.62) (4.500) (4.503) (5.581)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CountryFE×Post No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662 1,662
R-squared 0.173 0.174 0.179 0.158 0.158 0.159
S1,i,t−S0,i,t is the different amount of sovereign between those of higher yields and those of lower yields at one credit rating
of bank i at time t. In column (1)-(3) and (4)-(6), the difference of sovereigns is scaled down by the total sovereign amount
of bank i and total asset of bank i respectively. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA,
AA, A, BBB, B, C. GIIPS is equal to 1 if bank i locates in one of the following countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain. Post is the dummy variable of the 2011 test. Clustered standard errors are in the parenthesis.
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Table 25: Robustness test: Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
TSi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
TSi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
TSi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
ATi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
ATi,t
S1,i,t−S0,i,t
ATi,t
Post×Safe -4.783* -5.240* -5.707* -1.862*** -1.912*** -1.781*
(2.795) (2.713) (3.391) (0.691) (0.663) (0.930)
Post×Fragile -10.97*** -10.49*** -12.33*** -1.939** -1.887** -2.165**
(3.228) (3.398) (4.157) (0.729) (0.767) (1.003)
Post 6.366** 7.003** 9.083*** 1.574** 1.643** 2.387**
(2.620) (2.677) (3.379) (0.663) (0.661) (0.928)
Level2 10.89 10.90 10.89 1.520* 1.521* 1.520*
(7.147) (7.150) (7.193) (0.883) (0.883) (0.887)
Level3 13.22* 13.20* 13.20* 2.191* 2.189* 2.164*
(7.324) (7.337) (7.341) (1.151) (1.152) (1.142)
Level4 39.24*** 39.27*** 39.24*** 6.878*** 6.881*** 6.900***
(4.652) (4.650) (4.693) (1.157) (1.155) (1.161)
Level5 17.36** 17.36** 17.38** 2.037** 2.037** 2.050**
(8.214) (8.210) (8.317) (0.801) (0.801) (0.816)
Safe×Level2 -4.905 -4.896 -4.639 0.0288 0.0297 0.0558
(8.218) (8.226) (8.269) (1.216) (1.217) (1.225)
Safe×Level2 -2.691 -2.670 -2.610 -0.447 -0.445 -0.413
(8.382) (8.394) (8.398) (1.383) (1.384) (1.380)
Safe×Level3 -33.73*** -33.75*** -33.54*** -5.771*** -5.774*** -5.772***
(6.129) (6.139) (6.176) (1.366) (1.364) (1.372)
Safe×Level4 -7.524 -7.521 -7.397 -0.463 -0.463 -0.470
(8.989) (8.986) (9.087) (0.987) (0.987) (1.001)
Safe×Level5 -7.524 -7.521 -7.397 -0.463 -0.463 -0.470
(8.989) (8.986) (9.087) (0.987) (0.987) (1.001)
Fragile×Level2 -9.729 -9.732 -9.726 -1.352 -1.352 -1.352
(7.331) (7.334) (7.379) (0.898) (0.898) (0.902)
Fragile×Level3 -20.78** -20.76** -20.97** -3.043** -3.042** -3.043**
(9.586) (9.597) (9.648) (1.369) (1.370) (1.366)
Fragile×Level4 -51.16*** -51.19*** -51.23*** -9.033*** -9.036*** -9.061***
(14.78) (14.78) (14.91) (2.577) (2.577) (2.595)
Fragile×Level5 -26.94** -26.94** -26.93** -2.946*** -2.946*** -2.953***
(10.20) (10.20) (10.31) (0.921) (0.920) (0.936)
lsize 0.0952 0.128 0.512 6.712*** 6.716*** 6.881***
(0.488) (0.512) (0.325) (0.575) (0.579) (0.407)
GIIPS×Post -1.115 -0.121
(1.499) (0.355)
Constant -9.341 -9.734 -14.51*** -82.80*** -82.84*** -84.86***
(5.882) (6.111) (4.138) (7.291) (7.336) (5.266)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CountryFE×Post No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
R-squared 0.179 0.179 0.184 0.203 0.203 0.207
S1,i,t−S0,i,t is the different amount of sovereign between those of higher yields and those of lower yields at one credit rating
of bank i at time t. In column (1)-(3) and (4)-(6), the difference of sovereigns is scaled down by the total sovereign amount
of bank i and total asset of bank i respectively. Level i, where i=1,2,3,4,5,6, indicates the credit ratings of sovereigns: AAA,
AA, A, BBB, B, C. GIIPS is equal to 1 if bank i locates in one of the following countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain. Post is the dummy variable of the 2014 test. Clustered standard errors are in the parenthesis.
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Table 26: European banks Regulatory Arbitrage in 2011 test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Post×RA×Safe -0.514∗ -0.193 -0.215 -0.223 -0.219
(-1.89) (-0.92) (-1.34) (-1.38) (-1.36)
Post×RA×Fragile -0.542∗∗ -0.514∗∗ -0.281∗ -0.289∗ -0.287∗
(-2.57) (-2.19) (-1.69) (-1.73) (-1.72)
Safe×RA 0.196 -0.122 0.051 0.056 0.053
(0.90) (-0.57) (0.33) (0.36) (0.34)
Fragile×RA 0.049 0.024 0.092 0.093 0.092
(0.43) (0.10) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55)
Post×RA 0.828∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.098 0.297
(3.78) (3.05) (4.49) (0.71) (1.58)
Post×Safe 0.161 -0.018 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007
(1.34) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.08)
Post×Fragile 0.174 0.197∗ 0.092 0.097 0.096
(1.33) (1.82) (1.03) (1.07) (1.07)
RA -0.619∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.192
(-3.91) (-2.06) (-4.24) (-0.12) (-1.15)
Post -0.640∗∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ 0.101 -.0126
(-4.56) (-5.68) (-7.12) (0.96) ( -0.12 )
lsize -0.039 -0.080 -0.121 -0.114 -0.116
(-1.04) (-0.75) (-1.09) (-1.03) (-1.04)
Local c*Post -0.631 -0.886 -0.764
(-0.50) (-0.71) (-0.68)
local c 6.127∗∗∗ 6.291∗∗∗ 6.168∗∗∗
(4.69) (4.87) (5.27)
Constant 1.275∗∗ 1.747 2.094 1.330 1.457
(2.45) (1.35) (1.55) (0.98) (1.08)
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE×Post No No No No Yes
Observation 8049 8049 8049 8049 8049
R2 .011 .040 .251 .490 .491
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by total assets
during 2010 and 2012; Post=1 if after the 2011 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the
sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within one risk-weighting category. The
benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s capital ratio
is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own
country’s sovereign bond. T-values are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 27: European banks Regulatory Arbitrage in 2014 test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Post*RA*Safe -0.717∗∗ -0.542∗∗ -0.393∗ -0.396∗ -0.398∗
(-2.61) (-2.08) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-1.77)
Post*RA*Fragile -0.756∗∗ -0.602∗∗ -0.423∗ -0.425∗ -0.428∗
(-2.57) (-2.21) (-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.90)
Safe*RA -0.528∗ -0.703∗∗ -0.457∗∗ -0.461∗∗ -0.460∗∗
(-1.97) (-2.32) (-2.44) (-2.45) (-2.44)
Fragile*RA -0.634∗∗ -0.788∗∗ -0.436∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.441∗∗
(-2.35) (-2.47) (-2.35) (-2.36) (-2.35)
Post*RA 0.723∗∗ 0.571∗∗ 0.398∗ 0.398∗ 0.317
(2.67) (2.20) (1.81) (1.80) (1.47)
Post*Safe 0.174∗∗∗ 0.093 0.051 0.052 0.053
(2.89) (1.16) (0.79) (0.80) (0.81)
Post*Fragile 0.261∗∗∗ 0.175∗ 0.123 0.124 0.125
(3.04) (1.87) (1.59) (1.60) (1.60)
RA 0.502∗ 0.654∗∗ 0.355∗ 0.315 0.353
(1.89) (2.21) (1.96) (1.56) (1.67)
Post2014 -0.167∗∗∗ -0.108 -0.065 -0.064 .0480091
(-3.04) (-1.37) (-0.98) (-0.96) ( 0.75 )
lsize -0.004 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(-0.38) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.26)
Local c*Post 0.467 0.460 0.417
(0.91) (0.93) (0.87)
local c 7.013∗∗∗ 6.905∗∗∗ 6.917∗∗∗
(8.97) (9.43) (9.35)
Constant 0.299∗∗ 0.410 0.276 0.210 0.198
(2.42) (0.69) (0.46) (0.35) (0.33)
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post No No No No Yes
Observation 7732 7732 7732 7732 7732
R2 .010 .018 .557 .586 .587
The dependent variable
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
is the sovereign j held by bank i scaled down by total assets
during 2013 and 2015; Post=1 if after the 2014 stress test,otherwise Post=0. RA=1, if the
sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within one risk-weighting category. The
benchmark is marginal bank whose capital ratio is between 5 %-6%. Fragile bank’s capital ratio
is lower than 5 %. Safe banks’ capital ratio is higher than 6%. Local c=1 if bank i holds its own
country’s sovereign bond.T-values are in parentheses. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and p<0.1)
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Table 28: Robustness test: restricted sample to low △ on CET 1 ratio
Safe Marginal All All
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
ATi,t
Post×RA 0.426*** 0.872**
(0.0502) (0.319)
Post -0.438*** -0.540*** -0.423*** 0.268
(0.0684) (0.0519) (0.0621) (0.174)
RA -0.527*** -0.871** -0.528*** 0.0532
(0.0617) (0.316) (0.0634) (0.0762)
Post×RA×Marginal 0.409* 0.412*
(0.228) (0.229)
Post×Group -0.146 -0.148
(0.122) (0.122)
RA×Marginal -0.322 -0.324
(0.222) (0.222)
Post×RA 0.432***
(0.0507)
Local c 6.321*** 9.407** 7.133*** 7.222***
(1.727) (3.350) (1.445) (1.349)
Local c×Post2010 -1.262 -2.301 -2.071 -2.255*
(1.675) (3.466) (1.420) (1.317)
lsize -0.0894 -0.471 0.0483 0.0488
(0.108) (0.297) (0.182) (0.183)
Constant 1.721 6.068 0.0106 -0.790
(1.341) (3.470) (2.242) (2.228)
Bank FE YES YES YES YES
sovereign FE*Post YES YES NO YES
Observations 7,113 1,010 7,601 7,601
R-squared 0.246 0.446 0.245 0.478
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
; Column (1) presents the regression on safe banks; Column
(2) presents the regression on marginal banks; Column(3) and (4) present the regression of these
two groups; RA=1 if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within the
same category; Marginal banks’ core capital ratio is between 5 %-6%; local c=1 if bank i holds
its own country’s sovereign bond;
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Table 29: Robustness test: Two tests together
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
PostTest1*RA*Safe -0.345∗ -0.108 -0.039 -0.292∗ -0.282∗
(-1.67) (-0.60) (-0.26) (-1.82) (-1.77)
PostTest1*RA*Fraigle -0.350∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.098 -0.352∗∗ -0.342∗∗
(-1.85) (-2.13) (-0.63) (-2.24) (-2.19)
PostTest2*RA*Safe -1.518∗∗∗ -1.106∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗ -0.984∗∗ -0.984∗∗
(-3.41) (-2.68) (-2.56) (-2.64) (-2.63)
PostTest2*RA*Fragile -1.479∗∗∗ -1.397∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗
(-3.24) (-3.21) (-2.71) (-2.80) (-2.79)
PostTest1*Safe -0.042 -0.166∗ -0.234∗∗ 0.059 0.047
(-0.58) (-1.79) (-2.53) (0.61) (0.49)
PostTest1*Fragile -0.060 0.062 -0.123 0.170∗ 0.159
(-0.44) (0.59) (-1.29) (1.77) (1.66)
PostTest2*Safe 0.309∗∗ 0.115 0.087 0.084 0.085
(2.12) (0.69) (0.55) (0.65) (0.65)
PostTest2*Fragile 0.325 0.347∗ 0.229 0.227 0.230
(1.60) (1.94) (1.37) (1.63) (1.63)
Safe*RA 0.143 -0.190 -0.042 0.088 0.084
(0.60) (-0.84) (-0.25) (0.55) (0.53)
Fragile*RA -0.042 -0.044 -0.002 0.126 0.121
(-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.01) (0.76) (0.73)
PostTest1*RA 0.632∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.179 0.207
(4.22) (3.12) (3.60) (1.54) (1.48)
PostTest2*RA 1.896∗∗∗ 1.619∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗ 0.924∗∗
(4.47) (3.97) (3.88) (2.44) (2.54)
Local c*PostTest1 -0.118 0.099 0.149
(-0.09) (0.08) (0.13)
RA -0.540∗∗ -0.343 -0.511∗∗∗ -0.086 -0.121
(-2.65) (-1.61) (-3.36) (-0.57) (-0.69)
PostTest -0.405∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ 0.008 0.000
(-4.41) (-4.10) (-3.84) (0.11) (.)
lsize -0.033 -0.099 -0.148∗∗ -0.135∗ -0.128∗
(-1.15) (-1.51) (-2.04) (-1.96) (-1.86)
local c 6.250∗∗∗ 6.155∗∗∗ 6.145∗∗∗
(9.21) (9.56) (9.62)
Constant 1.084∗∗ 1.970∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗ 1.608∗ 1.545∗
(2.36) (2.46) (2.71) (1.91) (1.86)
Bank FE No Yes No Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post No No No No Yes
Observation 11620 11620 11620 11620 11620
R2 .01137219 .03551944 .30945425 .50423379 .50494939
Marginal banks are benchmark. The dependent variable is
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
; RA=1 if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is
higher than the median within the same credit rating; Marginal=1 if banks’ core capital ratio is between 5 %-6%; Fragile=1
if bank’s core capital ratio is lower than 5 %; local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s sovereign bond;
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Table 30: Robustness test: Two tests together
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
PostTest1*RA*Safe -2.988∗∗ -2.393∗ -0.665 -1.770∗∗∗ -1.791∗∗∗
(-2.11) (-1.80) (-1.12) (-2.99) (-3.05)
PostTest1*RA*Fraigle -5.486∗∗∗ -5.506∗∗∗ -1.624∗∗ -2.752∗∗∗ -2.771∗∗∗
(-4.36) (-3.90) (-2.56) (-4.35) (-4.38)
PostTest2*RA*Safe -5.215∗∗∗ -4.441∗∗∗ -1.955∗∗∗ -2.146∗∗∗ -2.154∗∗∗
(-4.26) (-4.14) (-3.15) (-3.46) (-3.47)
PostTest2*RA*Fragile -6.365∗∗∗ -6.197∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗ -2.290∗∗∗ -2.296∗∗∗
(-4.39) (-4.40) (-2.84) (-3.13) (-3.13)
PostTest1*Safe 1.369∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗ -0.282 0.989∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗
(3.63) (3.67) (-1.22) (5.50) (5.58)
PostTest1*Fragile 2.018∗∗∗ 2.180∗∗∗ 0.006 1.286∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗
(5.04) (5.48) (0.02) (5.79) (5.71)
PostTest2*Safe 1.730∗∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗ 0.573∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.12) (1.82) (2.84) (2.83)
PostTest2*Fragile 1.923∗∗∗ 1.873∗∗∗ 0.578 0.576∗∗ 0.577∗∗
(3.98) (3.46) (1.58) (2.15) (2.15)
Safe*RA -0.937 -1.620 -1.130∗∗ -0.576 -0.563
(-1.13) (-1.56) (-2.56) (-1.34) (-1.32)
Fragile*RA -0.639 -0.715 -0.732 -0.180 -0.170
(-0.51) (-0.60) (-1.46) (-0.37) (-0.35)
PostTest1*RA 4.152∗∗∗ 3.786∗∗∗ 2.390∗∗∗ 0.932∗ -0.073
(3.44) (3.03) (4.83) (1.88) (-0.11)
PostTest2*RA 7.518∗∗∗ 6.993∗∗∗ 3.965∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ -0.454
(6.88) (6.94) (7.04) (2.74) (-0.48)
Local c*PostTest1 -32.039∗∗∗ -30.987∗∗∗ -30.794∗∗∗
(-10.93) (-10.99) (-10.90)
RA -1.607∗ -1.174 -1.759∗∗∗ -0.030 1.353∗
(-1.79) (-1.20) (-4.41) (-0.03) (1.80)
PostTest -1.565∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -1.329∗∗∗ -0.008 0.000
(-8.21) (-7.81) (-8.73) (-0.07) (.)
lsize 0.053∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗ 0.219 0.249 0.247
(2.74) (2.58) (1.23) (1.30) (1.30)
local c 61.256∗∗∗ 60.294∗∗∗ 60.266∗∗∗
(14.39) (14.20) (14.18)
Constant 2.900∗∗∗ -4.093 0.474 -3.215 -4.098∗
(3.70) (-1.33) (0.22) (-1.41) (-1.77)
Bank FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post No No No No Yes
Observation 11620 11620 11620 11620 11620
R2 .00780041 .00891315 .65267617 .76725228 .76791725
Marginal banks are benchmark. The dependent variable is
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
; RA=1 if the sovereign
bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within the same category; Marginal=1 if banks’
core capital ratio is between 5 %-6%; Fragile=1 if bank’s core capital ratio is lower than 5 %;
local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s sovereign bond.
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Table 31: Time dependent RA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalAsseti,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
PostTest1*RA*Safe -0.391∗ -0.125 -0.084 -0.313∗ -0.282∗
(-1.88) (-0.70) (-0.53) (-1.91) (-1.68)
PostTest1*RA*Fraigle -0.075 -0.153 -0.115 -0.341∗∗ -0.308∗
(-0.36) (-0.69) (-0.73) (-2.15) (-1.87)
PostTest2*RA*Safe -1.370∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -0.844∗∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗ -0.874∗∗∗
(-3.53) (-2.70) (-2.89) (-2.99) (-2.99)
PostTest2*RA*Fragile -1.130∗∗∗ -1.014∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗ -0.736∗∗ -0.735∗∗
(-2.95) (-2.89) (-2.38) (-2.49) (-2.48)
PostTest1*Safe 0.039 -0.144 -0.224∗∗ 0.034 -0.003
(0.40) (-1.50) (-2.23) (0.31) (-0.03)
PostTest1*Fragile -0.151 -0.121 -0.193 0.063 0.026
(-1.00) (-0.81) (-1.48) (0.45) (0.17)
PostTest2*Safe 0.517∗∗ 0.198 0.171 0.175 0.177
(2.07) (1.06) (0.96) (1.07) (1.08)
PostTest2*Fragile 0.369∗ 0.106 -0.026 -0.023 -0.020
(1.69) (0.47) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.09)
Safe*RA 0.222 -0.154 -0.013 0.097 0.084
(0.92) (-0.67) (-0.08) (0.60) (0.52)
Fragile*RA 0.041 0.015 0.025 0.133 0.117
(0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.80) (0.70)
PostTest1*RA 0.612∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.188 0.196
(4.02) (2.95) (3.47) (1.53) (1.42)
PostTest2*RA 1.575∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗ 0.562∗∗
(4.72) (4.06) (4.25) (2.10) (2.22)
Local c*PostTest1 -0.499 -0.266 -0.144
(-0.41) (-0.22) (-0.13)
RA -0.600∗∗∗ -0.368∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.044
(-2.83) (-1.69) (-3.39) (-0.29) (-0.29)
PostTest -0.415∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ 0.026 0.000
(-4.21) (-3.99) (-3.61) (0.33) (.)
lsize -0.080 -1.115∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗ -1.128∗∗∗ -1.124∗∗∗
(-1.51) (-4.40) (-4.57) (-4.55) (-4.52)
local c 6.482∗∗∗ 6.349∗∗∗ 6.330∗∗∗
(9.60) (9.90) (9.95)
Constant 1.657∗∗ 14.340∗∗∗ 14.311∗∗∗ 13.742∗∗∗ 13.682∗∗∗
(2.37) (4.65) (4.78) (4.59) (4.42)
Bank FE No Yes No Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post No No No No Yes
Observation 12725 12725 12725 12725 12725
R2 .01005513 .04638922 .27972295 .42767863 .42944719
Marginal banks are benchmark. The dependent variable is
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalAsseti,t
; Post=1 if after the 2011
stress test; RA=1 if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within the same
category; Marginal=1 if banks’ core capital ratio is between 5 %-6%; Fragile=1 if bank’s core
capital ratio is lower than 5 %; local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s sovereign bond;
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Table 32: Time dependent RA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
PostTest1*RA*Safe -2.327∗ -1.723 -0.362 -1.544∗∗∗ -1.731∗∗∗
(-1.90) (-1.53) (-0.69) (-3.14) (-3.49)
PostTest1*RA*Fraigle -0.721 -0.702 0.024 -1.129 -1.307∗
(-0.42) (-0.39) (0.04) (-1.64) (-1.89)
PostTest2*RA*Safe -3.625∗∗∗ -2.832∗∗∗ -1.433∗∗ -1.583∗∗ -1.610∗∗
(-3.58) (-3.06) (-2.13) (-2.46) (-2.49)
PostTest2*RA*Fragile -4.601∗∗∗ -4.394∗∗∗ -1.253∗ -1.420∗∗ -1.442∗∗
(-3.69) (-3.61) (-1.75) (-2.06) (-2.09)
PostTest1*Safe 1.404∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ -0.303 1.041∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗
(3.50) (3.54) (-1.21) (5.58) (5.46)
PostTest1*Fragile 0.247 0.355 -0.630∗∗ 0.704∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.49) (-2.03) (2.47) (2.89)
PostTest2*Safe 1.768∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗ 0.659∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(3.31) (3.22) (1.78) (2.78) (2.76)
PostTest2*Fragile 1.989∗∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗ 0.480 0.513∗ 0.519∗
(3.67) (3.46) (1.20) (1.80) (1.81)
Safe*RA -0.840 -1.539 -1.089∗∗ -0.527 -0.433
(-1.02) (-1.45) (-2.44) (-1.23) (-1.03)
Fragile*RA -0.379 -0.491 -0.677 -0.118 -0.030
(-0.31) (-0.41) (-1.35) (-0.24) (-0.06)
PostTest1*RA 3.493∗∗∗ 3.116∗∗∗ 2.111∗∗∗ 0.657 0.688
(3.44) (3.05) (5.03) (1.52) (1.40)
PostTest2*RA 5.594∗∗∗ 5.042∗∗∗ 3.112∗∗∗ 0.860 1.267∗
(6.25) (6.05) (5.42) (1.45) (1.77)
Local c*PostTest1 -32.568∗∗∗ -31.454∗∗∗ -31.124∗∗∗
(-12.65) (-12.65) (-12.45)
RA -1.688∗ -1.230 -1.752∗∗∗ 0.865∗ 1.092∗∗
(-1.88) (-1.22) (-4.30) (1.92) (2.12)
PostTest -1.504∗∗∗ -1.407∗∗∗ -1.255∗∗∗ -0.009 0.000
(-6.93) (-7.85) (-7.34) (-0.07) (.)
lsize 0.050∗∗∗ 0.133 0.039 0.047 0.052
(2.71) (1.28) (0.94) (1.00) (1.04)
local c 61.648∗∗∗ 60.632∗∗∗ 60.580∗∗∗
(16.14) (15.80) (15.76)
Constant 3.089∗∗∗ 2.319∗ 2.654∗∗∗ -0.833 -1.469∗
(3.96) (1.84) (5.30) (-0.92) (-1.74)
Bank FE No Yes No Yes Yes
sovereign FE No No No Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post No No No No Yes
Observation 12725 12725 12725 12725 12725
R2 .00522086 .0062086 .66203939 .77382936 .77468029
Marginal banks are benchmark. The dependent variable is
Sovereigni,j,t
TSi,t
; Post=1 if after the 2011
stress test; RA=1 if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within the same
category. local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s sovereign bond.
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Table 33: Robustness test: Time Trend
(1) (2)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
TimeTrend*RA 0.019 -0.087
(0.53) (-0.29)
TimeTrend*Safe -0.015 -0.021
(-1.05) (-1.64)
TimeTrend*Fragile -0.004 0.011
(-0.23) (0.24)
Safe*RA -0.109 -1.684∗∗∗
(-1.07) (-2.68)
Fragile*RA -0.099 -1.868∗∗∗
(-0.88) (-3.33)
RA -0.030 0.679
(-0.24) (0.93)
time trend 0.012 -0.070
(0.46) (-0.97)
lsize -0.120 0.394
(-1.09) (0.72)
Constant 1.516 -3.968
(1.12) (-0.60)
Bank FE Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post Yes Yes
Observation 8049 8049
R2 .48981736 .76687121
Marginal banks are benchmark. The dependent variable of (1) is
Sovereigni,j,t
TAi,t
; the one of (2) is
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
; RA=1 if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within the
same category; Marginal=1 if banks’ core capital ratio is between 5 %-6%; Fragile=1 if bank’s
core capital ratio is lower than 5 %; local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s sovereign bond;
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Table 34: Robustness test: Time Trend
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
Post*RA*Safe -3.380∗∗∗ -1.035∗ -1.035∗
(-3.20) (-2.00) (-2.00)
Post*RA*Fragile -3.912∗∗∗ -1.280∗∗ -1.280∗∗
(-3.36) (-2.10) (-2.10)
Safe*RA -2.668∗ -2.003∗∗ -2.003∗∗
(-1.84) (-2.57) (-2.57)
Fragile*RA -2.988∗ -1.564∗ -1.564∗
(-1.87) (-1.92) (-1.92)
Post*RA 3.458∗∗∗ 0.732 0.732
(3.36) (1.26) (1.26)
Post*Safe 1.739∗∗∗ 0.300∗ 0.303∗
(4.26) (1.90) (1.91)
Post*Fragile 2.051∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗ 0.381∗∗
(3.85) (2.02) (2.03)
RA 2.348 0.637 0.637
(1.64) (0.49) (0.49)
lsize 0.055∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003
(1.93) (3.21) (1.13)
Local c*Post -1.844 -1.844
(-0.98) (-0.98)
local c 58.939∗∗∗ 58.939∗∗∗
(12.36) (12.36)
time trend -0.008∗∗
(-2.51)
Constant 1.584∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.379∗∗
(3.77) (2.16) (2.33)
Bank FE No Yes Yes
sovereign FE Yes Yes Yes
sovereign FE*Post No Yes Yes
Observation 7689 7689 7689
R2 .00420989 .7111051 .71110523
Marginal banks are benchmark. The dependent variable is
Sovereigni,j,t
TotalSovereigni,t
; Post=1 if after the
2011 stress test; RA=1 if the sovereign bonds’ spread yield is higher than the median within the
same category; Marginal=1 if banks’ core capital ratio is between 5 %-6%; Fragile=1 if bank’s
core capital ratio is lower than 5 %; local c=1 if bank i holds its own country’s sovereign bond.
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B Appendix 2
Test result before and after recapitalization in 2014
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Figure 6: The evolution net income over total assets
Table 35: Summary of credit ratings before or after the tests
Ratings Before 2011 test After 2011 test
AAA AT, DE, DK, FI, FR AT, DE, DK, FI, FR
LI, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK LI, LU, NL, NO, SE, UK
AA BE, ES, SI BE, ES, SI, IT
A CY, CZ, EE, IT, MT, PL, SK, PT CY, CZ, EE, MT, PL, SK
BBB BG, HU, GR, IE, IS, LT BG, HU, LV, RO, LT
B GR, RO IE, IS, PT
C GR
Before 2014 test After 2014 test
AAA DE, DK, FI, LI, LU, NO, NL, SE AT, DE, DK, FI, LI, LU, NO,NL, SE
AA AT, BE, EE, FR, UK BE, EE, FR, UK,
A CZ, MT, PL, SK CZ, MT, PL, SK, IE, LV,
BBB BG, ES, IS, IT, LT, LV, SI BG, ES, IS, IT, LT, RO
B CY, HU, IE, PT, RO CY, HU IE, PT
C GR GR
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Figure 7: The evolution of different credit risk exposures
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Figure 8: Total sovereign over total assets
Note:Sovereign debt amount is scaled down by total asset. In the graph, shows the value-
weighted average across banks. Short includes the sovereign debt with a maturity less
than 3 years; medium is the sovereign debt lasting less than 10 years; long represent all
the sovereign amount with a maturity larger than 10 years.
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Figure 9: Different maturity of sovereign in groups
Note: Short term: maturity≤ 1 Year; Medium term: maturity<10 Year; Long term:
maturity ≥ 10 year.
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GIIPS sovereign in groups
Figure 10: GIIPS sovereign in groups
Note: The left graph shows the amount of GIIPS sovereign; the right graph includes the
percentage of GIIPS over total asset.
Figure 11: Summary of GIIPS sovereigns across groups
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C Appendix3
C.1 Sovereign risk treated in the 2011 stress test
On the Methodological Note - Additional guidance of 2011 stress test (Page 5-6); EBA
define a consistent approach to deal with the sovereign risk. Since simplicity is a desired
element of any approach, a common PD and LGD should be identified as a starting point.
They use the public credit ratings of sovereign bonds offered by Credit Agencies. Notch
downgrades can then be applied in the stress taking into account the situation as of 1
June 2011. The following notch downgrades, which depend on the starting rating levels,
are to be applied to the exposures vis--vis sovereign and institution exposures: (1) AAA
/ Aaa no downgrading; (2) AA / Aa2 to A- / A3: two notch downgrades; and
(3) BBB+ / Baa1 or below: four notch downgrades with a floor at CCC. For simplicity
this approach could focus purely on determining appropriate provisions (EL) for both IRB
and TSA banks. No changes would be made to RWA from the existing submission.
C.2 Different types of risk trested in the 2014 stress test
(A) Credit risk
Scope: All assets in the banking book which are exposed to credit risk excluding
counterparty credit risk, on and off-balance sheet positions, IRB and STA portfolios.
Methodology also applied to IRC.
Methodology: Stressed point-in-time PD and point-in-time LGD for provisioning.
Potential rating migration and stressed IRB regulatory parameters for RWA.
RWA impact: Stressed RWA in IRB and STA, including RWA for defaulted assets and
IRB excess or shortfall. RWA floored at 2013 levels.
(B) Market risk
Scope: All financial assets and liabilities assessed at fair value (positions in HfT, AfS
and designated at fair value through profit and loss portfolios), including counterparty
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credit risk. Hedge accounting portfolios. Securitizations held at fair value.
Methodology: Simplified approach: bankspecific reduction in NTI based on historical
variation. Comprehensive approach: revaluation of positions based on market risk
parameters. CVA haircuts for OTC derivatives. Default of largest counterparty (excl.
CCP, market infrastructure, sovereign).
RWA impact: RWA increase for VaR, SVaR and CRM capital charges due to predefined
assumptions (constant RWA for banks using simplified approach; VaR replaced by SVaR
for banks using comprehensive approach, fixed scaling for CRM). IRC and CVA increase
due to worsened risk parameters.
(C) Sovereign risk
Scope: (direct debt exposures as well as indirect exposures to central and local
governments). Assessed at fair value (HFT, AFS, fair value through profit and loss) and
amortized cost positions.
Methodology: All fair value positions: application of market risk methodology for
impact of changes in market prices. Regulatory banking book positions: application of
credit risk methodology for impairment estimates based on rating migration defined by
ESRB/ECB.
RWA impact: RWA increase due to worsened risk parameters in IRB and STA.
(D)Securitization risk
Scope: Securitization and securitization positions assessed at fair value (HfT, AfS,
designated at fair value through profit and loss) and amortized cost positions. ABCP
(incl. ABCP liquidity lines) excluded but subject to either the regular RWA treatment
or market risk methodology. Methodology: Increase of RWA depending on risk profile of
the positions (three risk buckets). Impairment estimates for positions not held for
trading. Application of market risk methodology for fair value positions. RWA impact:
RWA increase for all securitization positions based on predefined risk buckets.
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C.3 Economic Hypothesis
C.3.1 Model of Glasserman and Kang (2014)
Regulators’ objective is to stabilize the market by minimizing the risk in the bank’s
portfolio y while allowing the bank an adequate rate of return at time t=1:
min
y
yTΣy
s.t. µTy ≥ l
for some l > 0. It’s equivalent38 to solve the following maximization under regulation
constraints at t=1:
max
y
µTy
s.t.
√
yTΣy ≤ η
Solving the objective function under regulation constraints, from the regulators’ point
of view the optimal banks’ portfolio should be:
⇒ y∗1 = η√
µTΣ−1µ
Σ−1µ
The optimal portfolios under regulations can be implemented by imposing a required
capital ratio on banks. Banks’ assets are assigned to different risk-weights w according
to different categories of the asset39. At t=1 their objective function under regulation
constraints becomes:
(BC)max
x
µTx− γ
2
xTΣx
s.t. xTw ≤ K
⇒ x∗1 = 1γΣ−1µ− (w
TΣ−1µ−γK)+
wTΣ−1w
1
γ
Σ−1w
38Under the assumption that the return of x is normally distributed. Regulators’ minimization of banks
probability of default can be transformed into the minimization problem of risk level.
39More details can be found in the Basel III
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C.3.2 My extension of the model
The objective function for all types of banks at t=1 becomes:
max
x
π(µTx− γ
2
xTΣx) + (1− π)P

π = 1 if xTw ≤ K
π ∈ [0, 1) if xTw > K
If x1 =
K
w
on the binding constraint, I have V1 = µ
Tx1− 1γxTΣx = µT (Kw )− 1γ (Kw )TΣ(Kw );
If x1 = x
∗
0, the expected value becomes V2 = π(µ
Tx∗0 − 1γx∗T0 Σx∗0) + (1− π)P .
At the optimal, there are two possible cases: Case (1) V1 > V2 and Case (2)V1 > V2
C.3.3 Regulatory Arbitrage
Suppose that the risk weight w is linear to the risk of the asset σ: w = cσ, where
σ = (diag(Σ))
1
2
40 and c is a constant. From the previous optimal solution, we have:
x∗1 =
1
γ
Σ−1µ− (wTΣ−1µ−γK)+
wTΣ−1w
1
γ
Σ−1w
Replace w = cσ, then we have:
x∗1 =
1
γ
Σ−1µ− (wTΣ−1µ−γK)+
wTΣ−1w
1
γ
Σ−1w
x∗1 =
1
γ
Σ−1µ− (cσTΣ−1µ−γK)+
cσTΣ−1cσ
1
γ
Σ−1cσ
x∗1 =
1
γ
Σ−1(µ− (cσTΣ−1µ−γK)+
cσTΣ−1cσ
σ)
x∗1 =
1
γ
Σ−1(µ− (cσTΣ−1µ−γK)+
cM−1
σ)
⇒ x∗1 = 1γΣ−1(µ− ρσ)
Where (cσTΣ−1µ − γK)+ is a scalar function of K and denote ρ as the function of
K and c. If the constraints are binding, x∗1 is not linear to x
∗
0 =
1
γ
Σ−1µ any more, i.e.,
the regulations imposed on banks change the optimal investment scheme of constrained
banks. In the real economy, the risk weight w = cσ¯ is linear to the standard deviations
of the asset categories σ¯, that is to say, it is not a continuous variable. Banks can always
chose x
′
1( 6= x∗1) to take more risk.
40Σ = σMσT , M is the correlation matrix of assets
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